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Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A
Response to Market Manipulation
Jon D. Hanson* & Douglas A. Kysar**
INTRODUCTION
[Liaws and institutions must go hand in hand with the pro-
gress of the human mind.
-Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) 1
In two articles published last year, we hypothesized that, be-
cause consumers are subject to predictable cognitive processes that
depart from rational utility maximization, manufacturers have the
opportunity and incentive to manipulate consumer perceptions of
product risks.2 This problem of market manipulation, we argued,
follows from basic economic logic-by lowering consumers' risk esti-
* Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.A., 1986, Rice University. J.D.,
1990, Yale University.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University. BA., 1995, Indiana Uni-
versity. J.D., 1998, Harvard University.
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the participants of this symposium for very helpful comments, and Carol Igoe for
superb secretarial assistance. This Article also benefited from long-term collabora-
tion with Steve Croley and Kyle Logue, to whom we remain indebted. We grate-
fully acknowledge the Harvard Law School Summer Research Program for funding
portions of our research. Finally we especially want to thank Kathleen, Emily,
Erin, and Ian Hanson and Vicki Kysar, who helped in countless ways, including
ensuring that we not take behavioralism too seriously.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10
Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 37, 42-43 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899).
2. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630 (1999) [hereinafter
Hanson & Kysar I]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420 (1999)
[hereinafter Hanson & Kysar II]. We have also discussed these issues specifically
in the context of tobacco regulation. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, The
Failure of Economic Theory and Legal Regulation, in Smoking: Risk, Perception,
and Policy (Paul Slovic ed., 2000) (in press) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar III].
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mates, manufacturers concomitantly raise consumers' willingness
to pay for their products. We found empirical evidence for our
market manipulation hypothesis in a variety of places, including
the consumer marketing literature, the consumer psychology liter-
ature and actual market behavior. As we emphasized, some of
that review was intended primarily to give readers a flavor "of how
manufacturers manipulate general consumer perceptions."3 Al-
though that particular evidence may not have provided direct proof
of risk-related manipulation, it did support such an inference.4
For a variety of reasons, we looked especially closely at the
tobacco industry and the market for cigarettes. As we concluded,
"our history of tobacco marketing and our review of the smoker
risk perception literature are especially significant, as they provide
the strongest evidence that manufacturer manipulation not only
occurs, but also succeeds."5 Finally, we revisited the oft-discussed
concept of enterprise liability, a products liability regime in which
manufacturers are absolutely liable for the costs of all harms that
their products cause. 6 We argued that several features of enter-
prise liability could help alleviate the problem of market
manipulation. 7
Our previous article offered only a "sketch" of the policy pre-
scription we had intended to "flesh out" in this Article.8 Accord-
ingly, in describing the possible benefits of an enterprise liability
system, we emphasized the tentative nature of our prescription
and acknowledged that our somewhat cursory treatment may have
suffered from the same fault that we found in other scholars' work,
namely a failure to take behavioralism 9 seriously. Again, this Ar-
3. Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1429.
4. See id. at 1428-67.
5. Id. at 1469-70.
6. Manufacturers, in other words, would pay not just for accidents that they
could have prevented, but also for accidents that consumers might have prevented
at least cost and accidents that were not cost-justifiably preventable by either the
manufacturer or the consumer. In addition, under enterprise liability, absolute
liability would be mandatory in the sense that manufacturers would be unable to
escape it through warnings or warranty disclaimers. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D.
Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91
Mich. L. Rev. 683, 693-94 (1993) [hereinafter Croley & Hanson I].
7. See Hanson & Kysar H, supra note 2, at 1553-71.
8. See id. at 1554.
9. "Behavioralism" and "behavioral law and economics" are the terms that
legal scholars use to describe a mounting effort to incorporate the findings of cogni-
tive psychology into orthodox law and economics. Although we noted our own dis-
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ticle was to provide a more "exhaustive" analysis of the policy im-
plications of market manipulation.10 When this Article was still
just an outline, however, we were confronted with a provocative
critique of our earlier articles, particularly our tentative defense of
enterprise liability. In an apparent preemptive strike, Professors
James Henderson and Jeffrey Rachlinski set out to demonstrate
that such a "radical"" proposal as enterprise liability is indefen-
sible. Moreover, the authors strongly suggest in their conclusion
that our attempts to "take behavioralism seriously" are not, them-
selves, worthy of being taken seriously. 12
Despite the stated goal of their article, however, there appears
to be a wide margin of overlap between our respective views. At
various points in their critique, for example, Henderson and Rach-
linski note that "consumers cannot make choices that result in an-
ything like optimal levels of product-related safety;"' 3 that
manufacturer means of selling products "surely include exploita-
tion of consumers' cognitive limitations and affective vulnerabili-
ties;"' 4 that "it is almost certainly true that some manufacturers
try to manipulate consumers' assessments of risk some of the time
.... Market forces ensure that if manufacturers can sell more of a
product by manipulating consumer preferences, they will do so;" 15
and that "economic forces induce manufacturers to undertake mar-
keting campaigns that have adverse social consequences that es-
cape remedy under the existing legal regime." 16 In other words,
comfort with those terms in our previous articles, see Hanson & Kysar I, supra
note 2, at 633 n.2, and although the use of"behavioralism" is arguably inappropri-
ate in light of the fact that it is cognitive, not behaviorist, psychology that is being
integrated into the legal economic methodology, see James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcom-
ings of Enterprise Liability, 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 213, 218 n.22 (2000), we
take some comfort in the fact that a distinction is sometimes made between "beha-
viorism" (without the "al"), which is the school of psychology that excludes cogni-
tions from its analysis, and "behavioral science," which is not necessarily so
constrained. In any event, the terminology at this point appears to be firmly en-
trenched in the legal literature. See, e.g., Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000).
10. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1572.
11. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 233.
12. See id. at 255-58.
13. Id. at 213-14.
14. Id. at 223.
15. Id. at 224.
16. Id. at 243.
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Henderson and Rachlinski appear to agree with the central theo-
retical point of our articles. 17 Moreover, they seem to accept one of
the major policy implications of our analysis-specifically, that the
case for holding cigarette manufacturers absolutely liable for to-
bacco-caused harms is quite strong.' 8
Their primary disagreement rests with our argument that en-
terprise liability might provide an effective response to market ma-
nipulation in the vast majority of other product contexts. First,
Henderson and Rachlinski argue that we overstate the extent of
market manipulation and underestimate the ability of existing
laws to identify and redress manipulative conduct. In their view, a
clearer case must be made that market manipulation is a problem
worth solving and that existing laws do not adequately address it
before adopting a proposal such as enterprise liability. In addition,
they argue that, even if enterprise liability does offer the best theo-
retical response to market manipulation, it offers little hope of
practical results due to certain insurmountable difficulties in im-
plementation. Finally, they contend that enterprise liability might
actually backfire if adopted, ultimately exacerbating the problem
of market manipulation by enabling product manufacturers who
oversell safety through fear-based marketing appeals.
In this Article, we will attempt to climb out of the hole in
which Henderson and Rachlinski have placed us. Although we had
anticipated writing a shorter article with a slightly different
thrust, we very much appreciate the opportunity to address the is-
sues raised by Henderson and Rachlinski, some of which others
have also raised, and to clear up aspects of our previous work that
may have been confusing or incomplete. Thus, we will respond to
Henderson and Rachlinski's specific challenges and describe more
particularly the role of enterprise liability as a mediating structure
between manipulable consumers and exploitative manufacturers.
In doing so, we will generally assume, as Henderson and Rachlin-
ski do, 19 that the goal of the products liability system is efficiency,
by which we mean the reduction of accident costs through adjust-
17. Admittedly, however, they do not appear overly impressed with the signif-
icance of that point: "Flar from being a 'provocative' thesis, it seems almost obvi-
ous that manufacturers stand ready, willing and able to exploit human frailty to
make a buck." Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 224 (footnote omitted).
18. See id. at 257. In the interest of full disclosure, we note that one of us has
served as a consumer-information expert for plaintiffs on several tobacco cases.
19. See infra note 38.
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ments in the frequency of product usage, the making of all cost-
justified investments in care, and the allocation of remaining acci-
dent costs to those parties best situated to bear them. That notion
of efficiency has long been the central normative measuring stick
in the products liability debate. As will be seen, however, the no-
tion is beginning to appear somewhat wooden in the context of
more sophisticated understandings of human cognition, risk
awareness, preference formation, and decisionmaking. Indeed, the
next great challenge for products liability scholars may be to artic-
ulate a coherent alternative goal for products liability law, given
that the efficiency goal and the rational actor model, as conven-
tionally understood, often require analysts to ignore (or treat as
exogenous) many considerations that cognitive theorists have
demonstrated are pivotal to people's perceptions of products, per-
ceptions of risks, preferences, and reactions to adverse outcomes. 20
I. THREE LEVELS OF DEBATE ABOUT ENTERPRISE LLABiLiTY
Before responding to Henderson and Rachlinski's specific criti-
ques, it will be useful for us first to clarify a number of general
points of confusion in their argument. In these introductory re-
marks, we will take a step back from our most recent discussion
regarding the behavioral approach to products liability. Instead,
we will give an overview of the modern intellectual debate about
enterprise liability, pointing out as we go how Henderson and
Rachlinski attempt, in our view unsuccessfully, to characterize
that debate to their advantage.
A. The Basic Level
In setting up their critique, Henderson and Rachlinski under-
state the case for enterprise liability. They do recognize some of
the benefits of enterprise liability and some of the problems that
enterprise liability might address. For example, they write: "[En-
terprise liabilityl's new proponents argue that [enterprise liability]
would force manufacturers to set prices that reflect the true risk
products pose and refrain from manipulative advertising about
risk, as there would be no profit in it;"21 and "The new proponents
20. For one attempt to meet that challenge, see Jon D. Hanson & Ana C.
Reyes, Law and Attribution: Toward a New Positive Theory of Tort Law (Nov. 10,
2000) (manuscript on file with authors).
21. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 219.
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of [enterprise liability] argue that .... [mianufacturers might use
marketing strategies that lead consumers to underestimate or ig-
nore the dangers a product poses, thereby inducing consumers to
purchase products that they might otherwise avoid, or to use prod-
ucts more dangerously than reason dictates."22 With respect to the
particular harms that enterprise liability might prevent, they
write: "Distracting consumers from the real risks products pose
could have two types of unwanted social consequences: it might un-
dermine consumers' efforts to take precautions against harm and
it might attract 'high-risk' consumers to products that they should
avoid."23 Our dissatisfaction with that description is that, as we
highlight below, it understates the types of manipulation that can
take place and the full range of beneficial effects that enterprise
liability might have.
1. The Basic Case For Enterprise Liability24
To put enterprise liability in context, it is necessary to distin-
guish among three types of regulation: command-and-control
rules; performance-based standards; and incentive-based systems.
Roughly, command-and-control rules impose specific requirements
on regulated firms. For instance, a polluter might be required to
adopt a particular type of technology designed to limit the quantity
of pollution. Performance-based standards tell firms what they
must accomplish but leave them to decide how best to do so. Such
22. Id. at 226-27.
23. Id. at 227-28.
24. Although this is a topic that we have written about quite extensively
elsewhere, it is necessary to summarize some of the main arguments here.
Readers interested in a more thorough treatment should consult those earlier
works. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2; Hanson & Kysar III, supra note 2;
Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129 (1990)
[hereinafter Hanson & Logue I]; see also Jon D. Hanson et al., Smokers'
Compensation: Toward a Blueprint for Federal Regulation of Cigarette
Manufacturers, 22 S. Ill. U. L.J. 519 (1998); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson,
The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law,
108 Harv. L. Rev. 1787 (1996) [hereinafter Croley & Hanson III; Croley & Hanson
I, supra note 6; Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An
Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 1
(1991) [hereinafter Croley & Hanson III].
The summary appearing in this section, Section I.A.1, first appeared, in
slightly different form, in Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes:
The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 Yale L.J. 1163,
1173-78 (1998) [hereinafter, Hanson & Logue II].
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a standard, for example, might specify the maximum quantity of
pollution that a firm may produce without specifying the means by
which the firm is required to comply. Finally, incentive-based sys-
tems force firms to internalize the total costs of their activities,
leaving firms to decide what, if anything, to do about those costs.
Beginning toward the end of the twentieth century and contin-
uing through today, the clear trend in regulation has been away
from command-and-control rules and toward incentive-based (or,
as they are sometimes referred to, market-based) systems. That
trend is consistent with, and largely the result of, an emerging
scholarly consensus that incentive-based regulatory systems are
often the superior approach because they harness the power of the
market to generate efficient outcomes and do not rely on regulators
to attempt to identify and mandate those outcomes. As Susan
Rose-Ackerman explains, an incentive-based system attempts to
internalize all appropriate costs and then permits the decentral-
ized, independent choices of individuals and businesses to shape
policy outcomes.25 If the institution responsible for administering
the incentive-based system can determine the marginal cost asso-
ciated with the underlying product (admittedly, often a big "if),
then it can charge a fee equal to that marginal cost and let the
manufacturers respond. That approach arguably avoids the costly
and imperfect process of creating fully specified command-and-con-
trol rules or performance-based standards, and it ensures that the
party with the best information-the manufacturer-is left with
an incentive to self-regulate. Put differently, command-and-con-
trol and performance-based regulations seek to prohibit or discour-
age certain market outcomes, while incentive-based regulations
seek to eliminate the underlying market failures that give rise to
undesirable outcomes.
Enterprise liability is one possible ex post incentive-based re-
gime. In other work, 26 we have argued that enterprise liability is,
on efficiency grounds, probably the most desirable products liabil-
ity regime. That form of regulation may be particularly appropri-
ate when a product's characteristics make consumers
undeterrable-that is, when tort law can do very little to give con-
sumers more incentives than they already have to take efficient
25. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look
at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 Duke L.J. 1206, 1215 (1994).
26. See supra note 24.
TAKING BEHAVIORALISM SERIOUSLY
precautions.27 In this Article, we focus on two general sources of
consumer undeterrability. First, consumers may be undeterrable
if they are optimistic with respect to-that is, if they systemati-
cally underestimate-the risks posed by products. Second, consum-
ers may be undeterrable if they are able to externalize product
risks to third parties. The latter source of consumer undeter-
rability may be of less significance than the former, given certain
psychological tendencies that mitigate against its existence, a pos-
sibility we discuss at greater length below.28
Insofar as consumers are undeterrable, tort law should place
product-accident costs on manufacturers. Because tort law cannot,
by hypothesis, influence consumer decisionmaking, consumers will
take too few precautions, will fail to demand efficiently safe prod-
ucts from manufacturers, and will consume too many inefficiently
unsafe products.2 9 Shifting all of the costs to manufacturers, how-
ever, would force them to internalize the relevant costs; they, in
turn, would pass those costs along to consumers. At least in the-
ory, that system would lead to optimal manufacturer care levels
and optimal activity levels.
To see why that is the case, consider a stylized example of an
individual consumer faced with the choice of buying and consum-
ing a package of widgets. If the consumer decides to purchase the
widgets, she faces the following costs: $2.00, equaling the nominal
price or the purchase price of the widgets (reflecting their produc-
tion and marketing costs30 ), plus another $2.00, equaling the pre-
sent value of the future injury-related costs to herself and to others
associated with consuming the widgets. Ideally, the consumer
27. For a more complete discussion of the concept of"undeterrability," see Jon
D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, Toward Placing Products Liability in Context: The
Effect of Non-Tort Systems of Deterrence and Other Sources of Undeterrability 21-
42 (Oct. 1996) (manuscript on file with authors). Although the term "undeter-
rable" was not then used, the idea behind it was first discussed in Hanson & Logue
I, supra note 24, at 159-68, in which one of us (with Kyle Logue) described how the
first-party insurance externality produces nonoptimal care levels and activity
levels in consumer product markets.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 55-56.
29. By "efficiently safe products," we mean products for which manufacturers
have made all cost-justified investments in safety. "Inefficiently unsafe products"
are those for which not all such investments have been made. The products that
Henderson and Rachlinski emphasize, for which the manufacturer provides more
than the optimal investment in safety, we will describe later as "inefficiently safe."
30. We are assuming for purposes of this example that the market for widgets
is competitive and that manufacturers enjoy only normal profits.
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would purchase widgets if and only if she valued a package at
$4.00 or higher. Assume, however, that she does not internalize
the health-related costs of the widgets-that is, the additional
$2.00 of costs has no effect on her decision to purchase widgets. In
that case, even if she valued the widgets at only $3.00, she would
purchase the widgets. Further suppose that the widget manufac-
turer ("Acme Widgets") could completely eliminate the $2.00 per
package risk by investing an additional $1.50 per package in safety
measures. In that case, the efficient outcome would be for Acme to
make the investment, thereby eliminating the risk associated with
its product.31 Assuming consumer undeterrability and the absence
of manufacturer liability, however, the manufacturer would not in-
vest the $1.50 in risk reduction because doing so would cause the
manufacturer to lose customers. Consumers would not perceive
the $2.00 reduction in risks associated with the additional cost and
would instead purchase cheaper and less safe brands of Widgets.
Those results would present at least two deterrence-related
problems. First, consumers would purchase too many packages of
widgets; in other words, activity levels would be too high. Second,
manufacturers would invest too little in accident prevention; that
is, manufacturer care levels would be too low. 32 The economic case
for enterprise liability and other forms of ex post incentive-based
regulation, therefore, centers on their ability to force manufactur-
ers, and in turn consumers, to internalize the total costs of wid-
gets. As a consequence, both activity levels and manufacturer care
levels would be pushed in the efficient direction. Because the nom-
inal price would equal the total real price, consumers would
purchase the efficient quantity of widgets.33 There would, in short,
be no welfare loss associated with the disparity between consum-
ers' valuation of widgets and the total social cost of widgets in the
market.
31. To put that conclusion in terms of Learned Hand's famous formula, see
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), because the
burden of preventing the accident ($1.50) is less than the expected accident cost
($2.00), which amounts to the probability times the magnitude of the loss, effi-
ciency requires that the accident be prevented.
32. A third problem is that consumers would lack incentives to take efficient
levels of care in using products. However, as we review below, there may be little
that tort law can or need do about consumer care levels.
33. The consumer, who valued the next package at only $3.00, would not buy
because the price would be $3.50.
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Manufacturers benefit when the costs caused by their prod-
ucts are externalized by consumers. The basic case for enterprise
liability is that it internalizes those costs, leading the manufac-
turer to minimize them under the pressures of the market. In that
manner, the efficiency advantages that flow from enterprise liabil-
ity go far beyond the narrow class of potential benefits that Hen-
derson and Rachlinski identify.34
2. The Basic Case Against Enterprise Liability
In response, tort scholars sometimes argue, as Henderson and
Rachlinski do, that a regime that requires manufacturers to warn
consumers of a product's risks and that otherwise holds manufac-
turers liable for failing to make all efficient investments in safety
(that is, a fault-based system in which fault is measured in accor-
dance with economic principles), would lead consumers and manu-
facturers to behave as if all costs were internalized. Roughly,
warnings would inform consumers of product risks and could, by
themselves, conceivably ensure that all costs are internalized in
the sense that consumers accurately perceive such risks and de-
mand appropriate levels of product safety from manufacturers.
Holding manufacturers liable for fault in the design or manufac-
ture of their product would serve as a safety net, ensuring that
manufacturers produce efficiently safe products even if consumers
remain inadequately informed after warnings.
That line of argument, though, does not refute the key point in
favor of enterprise liability, which is that it is an incentive-based,
market-oriented form of regulation. Enterprise liability imposes
costs on the manufacturer as the party best able to determine
which designs and warnings would lower the total costs, including
accident costs, of its product. Both the warning requirement and a
fault-based liability standard rely instead on command-and-con-
trol-style regulation. Courts and juries, who typically have neither
the ability nor the incentive to make such judgments accurately,
must determine how best to inform consumers or to design, pack-
age and promote a product. In contrast, enterprise liability har-
nesses the power of the market to help ensure that products are
efficiently designed, consumers are adequately informed, and ac-
tivity levels are maintained at or near the optimal level. Any re-
34. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
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gime less strict than enterprise liability requires a jury to try to
outwit and outmaneuver the market.3 5
So, again, the case for enterprise liability seems logically com-
pelling. To Henderson and Rachlinski, and most other tort schol-
ars who have written on the topic, however, there is still good
reason to prefer a fault-based regime. The common law has long
understood something that we, the proponents of enterprise liabil-
ity, have allegedly ignored. A fault-based liability system is in
place because the common law is concerned with the economic in-
centives of consumers as well as of manufacturers. As Henderson
and Rachlinski describe, 36 consumers can influence the rate and
severity of product accidents in a variety of ways. Given that influ-
ence, a fault-based liability system is necessary because
"[clonsumers would have no incentive to undertake their own pre-
cautions if manufacturers were forced to bear all of the cost of the
harm that products cause."37 According to Henderson and
Rachlinski:
The traditional fault-based system of products liability law
represents a careful balancing of responsibility between con-
sumers and manufacturers. It holds manufacturers responsi-
ble for those things that they can best control-incorporating
cost-effective safety precautions and providing warnings-and
holds consumers liable for the rest. Courts have designed
this allocation of liability to ensure that consumers and man-
ufacturers are partners in reaching socially optimal levels of
care.
3 s
35. As noted below at text accompanying notes 157-68, however, even enter-
prise liability requires some degree of guesswork on the part ofjudges and juries in
the context of certain causal judgments.
36. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 225-26.
37. Id. at 226.
38. Id. From that selection, it is clear that Henderson and Rachlinski perceive
the common law to be dedicated primarily to serving the goal of efficiency (al-
though they do at one point indicate that the common law is likewise consistent
with basic notions of morality). See also id. at 216 ("[Plolicy concerns have discour-
aged widespread adoption of the [enterprise liability] system because it under-
mines consumer incentives to avoid accidents." (footnote omitted)); id. at 224-25
("Fault-based liability imposes liability on the parties-most often manufacturers
or consumers-who can most effectively avoid accidents."); id. at 228 ("As stated
above, the traditional arguments hold that consumers must bear the risk of harm
caused by safely designed products so that consumers will undertake precautions
and will avoid products if they are high-risk consumers.").
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In Henderson and Rachlinski's view, therefore, fault is "the
central feature of products-liability law,"39 an organic truth
evolved over centuries of careful analysis by common law judges.
Consequently, our new rhetoric is an attempt "to up-end the tradi-
tional arguments that support the role of fault in products cases."40
B. The Intermediate Level
Despite Henderson and Rachlinski's suggestion that the cur-
rent, fault-based allocation of responsibility between consumers
and manufacturers is tradition-tested, settled, and foundational to
tort law, the history of products liability reveals otherwise. To be-
gin with, the allocation of responsibility in products liability law
has been anything but stable over the last century. In fact, for at
least several decades, a dramatic trend toward enterprise liability
was evident in American jurisprudence-a trend that Henderson
(with long-time coauthor Professor Aaron Twerski) has recognized
unequivocally:
From the turn of the last century, significant expansions of
products liability law have included eliminating the privity
requirement in negligence actions, replacing negligence and
implied warranty with strict liability in tort, and applying
products liability not only to production defects but also to
defective product designs and product marketing. Eliminat-
ing the requirement that plaintiffs prove product defective-
ness as a prerequisite to recovery would seem to be the next
logical step on this path.41
In other words, if there is a tradition over the last century, it is one
of consistent expansion, not equilibrium. Therefore, we believe
that explanations other than deference to long-standing, common-
law traditions more accurately explain why we are not currently
living in a regime of enterprise liability. We provide a brief sum-
mary of those explanations here.4 2
As we have just indicated, the conventional wisdom among le-
gal scholars is that throughout most of the twentieth century, and
39. Id. at 253.
40. Id. at 228.
41. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing The American Prod-
ucts Liability Frontier: The Rejection Of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1263, 1266-67 (1991) (citations omitted).
42. A fler version of this story is provided in Croley & Hanson I, supra note
6, at 695-767.
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particularly in the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, products liability
law was in the midst of what was probably the most significant
revolution in the common law's history. 43 Specifically, courts were
in a process of expanding and perhaps even abandoning the tradi-
tional fault-based rules that Henderson and Rachlinski believe are
so critical to the common law's efficiency. Although few scholars
maintain that the law made it that far, fewer still dispute the
trend.
Similarly, there appears to be wide consensus regarding the
premises underlying that trend-a trend that led to Sec. 402(A) of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, among other developments.
Those premises, which were assumed by the "first generation" of
economics-oriented products liability scholars, included the follow-
ing: (1) manufacturers exercise unfair market power over consum-
ers; (2) it is cheaper for manufacturers than it is for consumers to
insure against product-caused accidents; (3) consumers tend to ex-
ercise little control over whether they are injured by products they
consume and, in any event, have strong incentives independent of
the tort regime to take efficient care when they can; and (4) con-
sumers are optimistic with respect to the underlying risks of prod-
ucts largely because manufacturers manipulate their perceptions
through advertising and the like. Given those premises, the case
for enterprise liability was nearly inescapable. Moreover, given
the fact that those premises did, for a short while, dominate the
arguments of legal scholars and, to a lesser extent, influential
courts, the law expanded toward enterprise liability.
1. The Intermediate Case Against Enterprise Liability
That expansion continued until the early- to mid-1980s, when
the brakes were applied and the common law trend was eventually
thrown into reverse. The event that precipitated widespread
counter-revolutionary court decisions has become popularly known
43. See, e.g., Joseph A. Page, Book Review, 78 Geo. L.J. 649, 652-53 (1990):
Although the stirrings of the old tort reform can be traced through judicial
decisions during the first half of this century, the pace did not quicken
until the 1950s and 1960s. With an extraordinary outburst of energy, the
courts recognized their new duties, abolished immunities, and adopted ex-
pansive rules for measuring damages. Perhaps the most dramatic devel-
opment was the judicial adoption of a rule of strict liability for harm
caused by defective, unreasonably dangerous products.
Id. (citations omitted).
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as the "liability insurance crisis." Roughly speaking, liability in-
surance rates increased dramatically, insurers refused to offer cov-
erage against certain risks, and manufacturers withdrew some
products from the market altogether. Virtually all tort scholars of
the day attributed those symptoms to tort law's expansion toward
enterprise liability-which explains why the terms "liability insur-
ance crisis" and "tort crisis" subtly became synonymous in both le-
gal academic and popular discourse. Those same tort scholars
argued that the crisis stood as proof that the tort system had ex-
panded too far toward enterprise liability and that there must
have been something wrong with the premises underlying the com-
mon law trend.
In dozens of law review articles published in the mid-1980s,
the "second generation" of law and economics scholars set out to
identify which of those premises were flawed. And they discovered
that, upon close scrutiny, all of them were. Some legal economists
argued, for example, that there was no compelling evidence that
consumers are optimistic and no theoretical reason to believe that
they would be. The idea that manufacturers might manipulate
consumers through some bells and whistles in a television ad was
considered as silly as it was insulting to the consumer, who, in the
work of the most prominent products liability scholars, began to
look and act increasingly like the rational actor of their economic
models. Others argued that manufacturers did not appear to use
market power to exploit consumers and that, even if they did, there
is no theoretical reason to believe that they would use that power
to make inefficiently safe products. Instead, they would make opti-
mal products and simply exercise their market power by charging
a higher price.
The second generation of efficiency-oriented scholars also ex-
plained that the tort system is a terribly wasteful form of insur-
ance. They argued that, particularly in light of the number of
consumers who already have some form of private or public first-
party insurance against product-caused accident risks, it was
highly inefficient to force manufacturers to provide unwanted in-
surance for which consumers would nonetheless have to pay an im-
mense tort tax. Finally, products liability scholars pointed to
anecdotes-some real and some later revealed as mythical-that al-
legedly confirmed their concern that consumers under this virtual
tort lottery were actually taking more risks than they otherwise
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would, in the apparent hope that a spilled cup of coffee might gen-
erate a few million dollars.
The underlying message of all of those arguments was that the
tort crisis was the price this country had to pay for accepting the
powerful but flawed rhetoric of the early proponents of enterprise
liability. Many of those scholars hit the lecture circuit and began
to share different versions of that same basic message with legisla-
tures and other public-policy oriented groups. Not surprisingly,
their story met with a receptive and well-financed audience of bus-
iness and insurance interests who had strong financial reasons to
join the call for a retreat from enterprise liability and who sprang
into action, lobbying Congress and state legislatures. As a conse-
quence, tort law was "reformed" and reverted to the regime that
Henderson and Rachlinski are defending.44
In their important article, Henderson and Twerski disputed
the view that political and economic interests slowed the expan-
sion toward enterprise liability.45 Instead, they argued, the
counter-revolution was driven by the fact that "a system of liability
without defect is beyond the capacity of the courts to implement."4
They pointed to a number of practical difficulties that they viewed
as insurmountable by courts attempting to apply enterprise liabil-
ity, difficulties that have been partially addressed in several arti-
44. See id. at 654-55:
Despite their apparent similarities, there is an important difference be-
tween the old and the new tort reform. The former derived inspiration
and major impetus from the ideas of scholars and had its primary influ-
ence on the courts. The latter is fueled by the economic self-interest of
those who perceive themselves as adversely affected by the tort system.
In essence, the new tort reform is a political attack on tort law in the
legislative arena.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Carl Deal & JoAnne Doroshow, The CALA Files:
The Secret Campaign by Big Tobacco and Other Major Industries to Take Away
Your Rights 37-43 (2000) (describing the coordinated campaign by the industry
coalition to support tort reform through the creation of advocacy groups that ap-
pear to be citizen-based); Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at
the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1995) ("In 1986, hundreds of
the nation's largest manufacturers and insurance companies banded together to
lobby state governments to enact tort reform' legislation, and two years later they
formed a separate entity to lobby at the federal level."(citations omitted)); Andrew
F. Popper, A One-Term Tort Reform Tale: Victimizing the Vulnerable, 35 Harv. J.
on Legis. 123, 125-28 (1998) (describing various interest groups aligned in favor of
legislative changes to tort law).
45. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 41, at 1266-67.
46. Id. at 1267.
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cles 47 and that will be further addressed in this Article. 48 It will
not ruin the surprise to state at this point that we believe the diffi-
culties are quite surmountable and, concomitantly, that interest
group action, at times legitimated by legal scholarship, represents
the dominant force behind the legislative and judicial abandon-
ment of the trend toward enterprise liability.
2. The Intermediate Case For Enterprise Liability
Our depiction of common law trends conveys different
messages from those conveyed by Henderson and Rachlinski's ac-
count. First, it reveals that there is nothing sacrosanct or even
stable about the common law in this area. To be sure, there are
some features of products-liability law that have not changed sig-
nificantly over the past century, but many of its features have been
whip-sawed by changing historical trends. Moreover, the very ar-
eas that we are debating are the ones that have experienced the
most dramatic changes. Second, our depiction reveals that the as-
sumptions that Henderson and Rachlinski seem to treat as given,
natural, and immutable-for example, that the fault-based system
represents the correct "balancing of responsibility between con-
sumers and manufacturers"49 in efficiency terms-are actually just
conclusions from an argument that is still underway. When they
state that the common law has not adopted enterprise liability "be-
cause it undermines consumer incentives to avoid accidents,"50
they are simply asserting their conclusion.
Relatedly, when Henderson and Rachlinski indicate that we
are offering "new rhetoric," they are at least partially mistaken.
Putting to one side their repeated reduction of our arguments to
"rhetoric," we dispute their claim that the arguments are all that
new. As we explained in our previous article, the first generation
of products liability scholars focused quite explicitly on the prob-
lem of manipulation in calling for expanded liability. Significantly,
scholars since then have offered little by way of counterargument
to those points-in part, we have argued, because the economic
models that they employ have no place for such endogenous influ-
ences on risk perceptions. It is more accurate, we think, to under-
47. See infra text accompanying notes 150-54.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 155-69.
49. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 226.
50. Id. at 216.
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stand our earlier work as an effort to revive forgotten
arguments-aided by the cognitive behavioralist insights that are
posing a challenge to orthodox law and economics in many set-
tings. Put differently, we might fairly be described as offering a
traditional argument in favor of traditional trends in products-lia-
bility law.
We have another complaint about the Henderson and Rachlin-
ski nomenclature. They frequently refer to us as the "new propo-
nents" for enterprise liability. They are correct, of course, to
distinguish us from the first generation of efficiency-minded schol-
ars and jurists who favored enterprise liability-and who, by impli-
cation, offered the "old rhetoric." The problem is really that, except
for one or two exceptions, they seem to think that all of the rele-
vant arguments in favor enterprise liability are contained in the
articles published last year. A closer look at the other articles that
they do at one point cite51 would have revealed that our line of
argument is not that new. Indeed, this debate has been taking
place for nearly a decade in its current incarnation and, in signifi-
cant respects, is really a continuation of work that has been going
on in legal scholarship for much longer. Their oversight may have
been a distinction without a difference were it not for the fact that
many of Henderson and Rachlinski's criticisms either mis-
characterize or ignore previous work.5 2
Without attempting to replicate any of the detail that we have
provided in that previous work, we will briefly summarize some of
the key elements of the argument in favor of enterprise liability.
Recall that the basic case for enterprise liability follows from its
incentive-based regulatory effects. That immense advantage
should, in our view, place the burden of proof on those who would
rely instead on a command-and-control alternative. Recall also
that the principal arguments against enterprise liability are that
consumers should pay for the accidents that they can prevent, lest
they have no incentive to take care; and that manufacturers should
pay for accidents other than the ones that they can cost-justifiably
prevent, lest they be forced to provide costly and inefficient acci-
dent insurance. Other than those somewhat overlapping conten-
51. See id. at 217 n.19.
52. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 150-52.
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tions regarding consumer care and insurance,53 the second
generation simply rejected the arguments of the first generation by
asserting that there was no significant consumer information prob-
lem and no reason to worry about manufacturer exploitation of
consumers. It is just a slight exaggeration, therefore, to say that
the only argument clearly against enterprise liability is that, as
Henderson and Rachlinski put it, "[clonsumers would have no in-
centive to undertake their own precautions if manufacturers were
forced to bear all of the cost of the harm that products cause."54
Although the consumer-incentives argument is no minor
point, the case for enterprise liability was, in our view, pretty well
made even before our last two articles considered the implications
of behavioralism for products liability: as the first generation of
enterprise liability advocates argued, consumers have strong rea-
sons to take care regardless of whether they are compensated
through tort law for personal injuries. Anecdotes to the contrary
about coffee-spilling fortune seekers struck us as unpersua-
sive-perhaps in large part because there has been no sudden and
substantial rash of McDonald's customers spilling 140-degree cof-
fee on their laps and enduring the resultant third-degree burns
and skin grafts in order to try their luck with a jury. More gener-
ally, the second generation offered no persuasive empirical evi-
dence and relied solely on abstract economic models to support
their supposition that a significant number of consumers would be-
have in a way that seemed so clearly to contradict what we think
we know about people.
The belief that consumers have significant incentives to take
care independent of the promise of tort compensation is shared
even by critics of enterprise liability-indeed, perhaps even by our
present critics. Although Henderson and Rachlinski argue that a
fault-based system is necessary to ensure that consumers have
some incentive to take care, they nonetheless contradict them-
selves elsewhere by suggesting that consumers have such incen-
tives irrespective of tort-provided compensation:
53. There exists a fair amount of double counting in those two arguments in-
asmuch as the major complaint about tort-provided insurance is that it removes
the incentives of consumers to take care-that is, it encourages moral hazard and
adverse selection in insurance pools.
54. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 226.
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No [enterprise liability] system can fully compensate consum-
ers for all of the harm that products cause. Full compensa-
tion would require that the system grapple with non-market
assets such as life and limb. No tort remedy really fully com-
pensates a parent for the loss of child or a maimed accident
victim for the loss of a limb. Neither would it be possible for a
tort system to offer an adequate sum for damages so as to
make someone truly indifferent between the size of the dam-
ages and the injury. Psychological research suggests that the
amount that people would be willing to accept to endure ex-
treme injuries ex-ante is much greater than the amount that
people would be willing to pay to restore themselves to full
health ex-post. Because the legal system always operates ex-
post, it will chronically under-compensate victims relative to
the ex-ante value people place on life and limb.5 5
We suspect that the contradiction in Henderson and Rachlin-
ski's views may stem from the fact that their argument about the
need to provide consumer incentives emerges out of an abstract ec-
onomic model, whereas their argument immediately above de-
pends on actual evidence and their own intuitions. In any event,
we share their intuitions and, and as we have argued elsewhere,
there is strong evidence that those intuitions are sound.56
Henderson and Rachlinski might respond that there could still
be a substantial problem of moral hazard for those product-caused
injuries that do not cause major personal injuries or pain and suf-
fering. That may well be, but as one of us, with Kyle Logue, has
argued at length,5 7 little can be done about the problem that con-
sumers might take less care with respect to pecuniary losses be-
cause of the promise of compensation. As critics of enterprise
liability have emphasized, the majority of consumers are covered
through some form of public or private first-party insurance for
some or all of the costs associated with product-caused accidents.
Because first-party insurance is largely unable to control for moral
hazard and adverse selection in the risk pools relevant to products
55. Id. at 250 (footnote omitted).
56. See Croley & Hanson 111, supra note 24, at 34-37; Croley & Hanson II,
supra note 24, at 1902-2006; Croley & Hanson I, supra note 6, at 790-92; Hanson
et al., note 24, at 559-60; see also Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,
75 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 242, 285 (1996).
57. See generally Hanson & Logue I, supra note 24 (identifying the first-party
insurance externality and arguing that it prevents optimal consumer behavior ir-
respective of tort-provided incentives).
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liability, consumers are already externalizing those costs onto
their fellow first-party insureds, in what amounts to a tragedy of
the commons. Removing tort compensation from those insureds,
therefore, would not suddenly force them to internalize the costs of
their carelessness.
That first-party insurance externality reduces any concern that
the legal system should have in striving to place proper incentives
on consumers. Insofar as they are insured and truly behave ac-
cording to the simplistic model underlying the moral hazard the-
ory, consumers are unlikely to take care even if they are well
informed of the risks. As Henderson and Rachlinski indicate, it
makes little sense to place liability on consumers if they are not
informed or if they are otherwise not "inclined and able to act effec-
tively on [their] information."58
Finally, what about the alleged adverse insurance effects of
the expansion toward enterprise liability? In a pair of articles,59
one of us, with Steve Croley, has argued not only that the expan-
sion did not generate adverse insurance effects, as critics of enter-
prise liability claim, but also that the so-called "liability crisis" was
not evidence of a tort system in need of reform. Instead, it repre-
sented precisely the hoped for manifestation of beneficial deter-
rence effects associated with the trend toward enterprise liability.
After all, the fact that some product prices increased, that some
liability insurance rates increased, and that some products were
removed from the marketplace is exactly what the first generation
of enterprise liability advocates predicted would happen.
In short, even disregarding our two behavioralist articles that
attract Henderson and Rachlinski's criticism, we believe that a
strong economic case for enterprise liability already exists. The
fact that the law has been retreating from its earlier advances only
suggests to us the power of flawed economic models, particularly
when combined with influential political and economic interests.
It does not, we contend, represent evidence that a fault-based lia-
bility system is somehow natural or inevitable.
58. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 225.
59. See Croley & Hanson II, supra note 24, passim; Croley & Hanson III,
supra note 24, at 1914-17.
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C. The Advanced Level
Despite those forceful arguments, still open in the products li-
ability debate were the questions of how well informed consumers
really are and whether manufacturers might somehow find a way
to exploit consumers through market manipulation. Initially,
scholars sought to answer those questions through a straightfor-
ward economic account of consumer information. Debates focused
on the costs to the consumer of obtaining information about prod-
uct risks. In a fairly exhaustive treatment, one of us, with Steve
Croley, concluded that the relative infrequency of product acci-
dents would often lead to situations in which it would be quite ra-
tional for consumers to remain underinformed of product risks. 60
At the same time, however, some products liability scholars began
to view consumer risk awareness through the lens of cognitive psy-
chology, determining that consumer perceptions might be influ-
enced by cognitive factors irrespective of economic costs and
benefits. Those scholars generally attempted to predict how one or
more cognitive factors would bias consumer risk perceptions in a
particular direction.
When we began delving into the cognitive psychology litera-
ture we were struck by two things. First, it was plain to us from
the experimental evidence that people are incredibly sensitive to
subtle variations in the way options are framed-sensitive in the
sense of being easily, but unwittingly, manipulated.61 Second, we
noticed that scholars who were also relying on the literature in
their products liability arguments were missing or ignoring (or at
least failing fully to appreciate) that point.62 Once we thought
about the profitability of risk-perception manipulation, our hy-
pothesis was in place-a hypothesis that, by coincidence, recalled a
primary argument of the first generation in favor of enterprise
liability.63
Bracketing for now doubts concerning the persuasiveness of
our empirical evidence, we felt, and still do, that if market manipu-
lation of the sort that we predicted was at all common, then the
already strong case for enterprise liability would be even stronger.
Indeed, the problem of manipulation greatly heightens the need for
60. See Croley & Hanson I, supra note 6, at 770-79.
61. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 2, at 643-87, 724-43.
62. See id. at 693-721.
63. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1567-71.
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an incentive-based products liability regime such as enterprise lia-
bility. That heightening is true not just because market manipula-
tion provides additional reason to believe that consumers will tend
to underestimate product risks, but also because it enhances man-
ufacturers' ability to evade command-and-control alternatives to
enterprise liability.64
1. The Extent and Efficacy of Market Manipulation
To have some sense of that need for market corrective action,
it is necessary to have an understanding of the extent of market
manipulation-a topic that we covered in significant detail in our
previous article. We were thus disappointed to read Henderson
and Rachlinski's suggestion that instead of "serious quantitative
assessment" we relied on "clever rhetorical moves."6 5 Although
they admit that satisfying a burden of proof with respect to con-
sumer risk perceptions would "surely [be] a messy and difficult em-
pirical chore," they claim that it is "an essential prelude to
abandoning the central feature of products-liability law."66
We do not accept Henderson and Rachlinski's unprincipled as-
signment of the burden of proof. Indeed, for reasons suggested
above, we think a good case exists for placing the burden on them
as opponents of enterprise liability. Not surprisingly, we think
that they would have an extremely difficult time developing the
requisite empirical foundations for their defense of the status quo,
if the burden of proof were so shifted. In any event, the empirical
case we make that market manipulation is ubiquitous and the the-
oretical argument we make that enterprise liability is the best so-
lution to market manipulation, in our view, are strong enough to
64. As we describe infra text accompanying notes 368-71, other reasons to
support enterprise liability include the fact that it eliminates undesirable incen-
tives to avoid safety innovations that exist under a negligence regime.
65. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 253-55 ("Their argument fails to
provide a serious quantitative assessment of the extent of market manipulation.");
see also id. at 218 ("provides no quantitative assessment of the extent of the prob-
lem it purports to identify"); id. at 219 ("failure to demonstrate the extent of the
social problem that the manipulation of consumers allegedly creates"); id. at 230
("[Enterprise liability's] new proponents do not clearly identify the extent of the
problem that manufacturers' attempts to manipulate consumers allegedly cre-
ate."); id. at 253-54 ("Clever rhetorical moves notwithstanding, the debate between
those who believe consumers overreact to risk and those who believe consumers
under-react to risk cannot be avoided.").
66. Id. at 253.
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unseat the position that the current legal regime is adequately re-
sponsive to such manipulation or that the demonstrably unrealis-
tic models used to justify that regime can, by themselves, yield
acceptable answers to important policy questions.
Before summarizing our evidence, we will address some of the
more general claims that Henderson and Rachlinski make to sug-
gest that we are operating on shaky empirical foundations. They
indicate, for example, that absent empirical evidence to the
contrary:
[tihere are several good reasons to suppose that manipulating
consumer risk perceptions is extremely difficult, despite the
influence cognitive biases have on these estimates. First,
many cognitive processes operate against consumption-the
status quo generally runs against purchasing a new product.
Second, manufacturers must also compete against manufac-
turers of other products for consumers' limited budgets. Fi-
nally, for manufacturers to manipulate consumers
successfully, they must command consumers' attention; ad-
vertising may be ubiquitous, but it is also easily ignored by
media-savvy consumers who have learned how to disregard
advertising.6 7
Those comments indicate that Henderson and Rachlinski mis-
understand our point. We do not claim that manufacturers can get
consumers to buy just any products. There are, for example, many
expensive advertising campaigns and ballyhooed products that flop
each year. And even very successful products are not desirable to
all consumers.
Our point is simply that manufacturers will improve their
chances of success significantly if they can, by accident or with in-
tent, happen upon a device that lowers consumers' risk estimates
or otherwise favorably manipulates consumer perceptions. That
the market is extremely competitive ensures that manufacturers
will tend to find such techniques-just as it ensures that manufac-
turers will produce effective mousetraps. Such incremental devel-
opment, whether of mousetraps or manipulation, can occur even
without a conscious effort on the part of manufacturers. The fact
that they are trying to manipulate and the fact that such efforts,
though costly, are ubiquitous, provide strong evidence that manip-
ulation works, despite Henderson and Rachlinksi's claim to the
67. Id. at 230.
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contrary. The same competitive process that Henderson and Rach-
linski identify as mitigating of manipulation may actually ensure
that manufacturers do not throw their money away, even if many
of their attempts at manipulation may fail and even if many con-
sumers may disregard (or think they disregard 6s) advertise-
ments.69
Henderson and Rachlinski also complain that our examples
"actually suggest only that manufacturers attempt to manipulate
consumers; they reveal little or no evidence of the success of these
efforts."70 One response to that argument is that it overlooks a
crucial component to our story. As we detail below, 71 a large por-
tion of our work was devoted to studying available social science
evidence of consumers' perceptions of the risk of smoking. That
evidence reveals that tobacco industry efforts to manipulate risk
estimates have been quite successful. Another response to Hen-
derson and Rachlinski's argument is that we have merely used
market evidence in the same manner that economists typically do
and, indeed, in the manner that Henderson and Rachlinski them-
selves do. We have identified a host of advertising, promotional,
litigious, lobbying and other activities that are, at least arguably,
designed to shape perceptions of product risks. Our argument has
been that the very persistence of such efforts supports the infer-
ence that they succeed; otherwise, manufacturers engaging in such
68. Cf Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People 22-23 (2000)
(noting that priming, the processes or experiences that can bring a particular con-
cept to mind, can operate "even when the priming is unconscious," and that "lilt is
possible to flash words on a screen so fast that people will not realize that they
have seen any word at all, and yet their judgments will be affected by their expo-
sure to these words").
69. Henderson and Rachlinski also oversimplify the role of the status quo bias
in consumer behavior. For almost all non-durable consumer products, the relevant
status quo is one of repeat purchasing rather than abstinence. Even with respect
to durable products, the status quo may not necessarily run against consumption.
Consumers rapidly grow accustomed to a given level of consumption and, consis-
tent with the status quo bias, react to deviations from that level with more sensi-
tivity than a standard utility function would predict. See Robert F. Frank, Luxury
Fever 64-74 (1999); Juliet B. Schor, The Overspent American 3-21 (1998). To the
extent that consumers tend to maintain their accustomed level of consumption,
therefore, the status quo bias would favor rather than discourage product
purchases.
70. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 230.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 77-178.
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costly but unsuccessful efforts would be driven from the
marketplace.
Henderson and Rachlinski's primary complaint, though, is
with the extent of the evidence that we do offer. In their view, we
"provide only anecdotal examples to illustrate the existence of
manufacturer manipulation of consumers." 72 Given that market
manipulation is, by its very nature, not generally perceived or un-
derstood as manipulative (otherwise, it would not be nearly so ef-
fective), it is easy to point to a few of the advertisements that we
highlighted in our article and claim that they do not, by them-
selves, constitute enough evidence to warrant our concerns. Easy,
but in our view, inaccurate. The problem with Henderson and
Rachlinski's conclusion is that it is based on misunderstandings of
the evidence that they did review and on the fact that they simply
ignored what we described as our most important evidence.
As we did in part, Henderson and Rachlinski describe our evi-
dence as "anecdotal." That characterization, however, may simply
be the consequence of their focusing on only the anecdotes. 73
72. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 230.
73. Henderson and Rachlinski combed our articles and "identiflied] thirty-
eight specific examples of advertisements," id. at 231, which they categorized into
examples that support our thesis (seven), examples that involve merely "generic
efforts to sell more product unrelated to risk" (seventeen), and examples that in-
volve "outright deceptive advertising that have nothing to do with psychology"
(fourteen). Id. at 231-32 n.80. As noted in the text, this laundry list overlooks vast
swaths of our articles containing pertinent evidence of market manipulation, most
notably our entire treatment of the subject of tobacco products, which Henderson
and Rachlinski admit "largely support[s] [our] thesis," id. at 233, n.80, but which
they ignore for the bulk of their critique.
Even within their selective list, Henderson and Rachlinski unfairly discount
the relevance of many of our examples. For instance, they wave away seventeen
specific examples because the examples involve attempts to manipulate product
attributes other than specific risk attributes. Yet they make no attempt to respond
to our introduction of that evidence, which argued that "[tihe evidence of manipu-
lation of general product perceptions supports an inference of risk perception ma-
nipulation by manufacturers as well: if manufacturers manipulate perceptions of
non-risk-related products attributes, they likely do the same for risk attributes."
Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1429. That type of reasoning should not be
foreign to Henderson and Rachlinski; after all, they cite Professor George Priest's
famous article on consumer product warranties, which introduced the very form of
argument to the products liability debate. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra
note 9, at 214, n.4 (citing George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product War-
ranty, 90 Yale L.J. 1297 (1981)).
They discount fourteen more examples because, in Henderson and Rachlin-
ski's view, they constitute "outright deceptive advertising that have nothing to do
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with psychology." Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 232 n.80. The authors
are correct that most-though not all-of those examples rely on a form of manipula-
tion more blunt than the subtle exploitations of cognitive biases on which we have
focused most of our attention. Namely, they involve bald lies made in the market-
place by product manufacturers. We would dispute, however, that lies "have noth-
ing to do with psychology." The successful accomplishment of "outright deceptive
advertising" surely involves efforts by manufacturers to shape and influence the
perceptions and judgments of consumers, and psychology surely has something to
say about those efforts. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cogni-
tion 480-82, 495-98 (1991) (reviewing literature on attitude formation and change,
particularly with respect to how people evaluate the credibility and attractiveness
of sources of information). More importantly, the perpetration of fraudulent be-
havior suggests that manufacturers have the motive and will to engage in conduct
that is illegal and potentially harmful to customer good will, so long as that con-
duct might result in lowered consumer perceptions of product risks or elevated
perceptions of product benefits. Given that evidence, we find it highly plausible
that manufacturers would also be willing to engage in conduct that is below the
radar of both regulators and consumers. Finally, quite apart from the question of
how one characterizes this brand of manufacturer manipulation, it is still a form of
market manipulation and, for all of the reasons that we have described, would
often be best combated by enterprise liability.
Henderson and Rachlinski then engage in more specific attempts to discount
certain of our examples. For instance, they reject our description of the tactics
used by pharmaceutical companies to encourage physicians to prescribe their
drugs, calling such efforts "outright bribery." See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra
note 9, at 232 n.80. Like the instances of "outright deceptive advertising" defended
in the previous paragraph, however, we fail to see why "outright bribery" is not
indicative of a troubled consumer product marketplace. Again, enterprise liability
offers potentially ameliorative effects, whether one brands manufacturer conduct
as bribery or manipulation. Henderson and Rachlinski also dismiss our examples
involving gun advertisements, claiming that "the NRA is not a manufacturer and
does not sell guns." Id. Even apart from the fact that several of the cited gun
advertisements come from gun manufacturers such as Smith & Wesson, not the
National Rifle Association, we are not as sure as Henderson and Rachlinski that
the NRA does not have an interest in promoting the sale of guns or, indeed, that
the line between the NRA and gun manufacturers is so clearly drawn. See Brent
W. Landau, Recent Legislation, State Bans on City Gun Lawsuits, 37 Harv. J. on
Legis. 623, 636 n.112 (2000). More importantly, such advertisements, whether the
product of manufacturers or not, help to fuel a sort of handgun "arms race" in
which manufacturers create guns that are progressively more deadly and more
concealable. See, e.g., Tom Diaz, Making a Killing: The Business of Guns in
America (1999). Finally, the authors discount our examples involving elasticity
and efforts to appear cooperative because they were "not tied to a specific advertis-
ing strategy that [Henderson and Rachlinski] could recognize." Henderson &
Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 232 n.80. They may not have been able to recognize
the advertising strategies to which those examples related because the examples
featured in our account of tobacco industry manipulation which, as noted above,
Henderson and Rachlinski disregarded. In addition, it is not difficult to think of
campaigns in which all sorts of companies-from chemical manufacturers to fast
food chains-seek to portray themselves as trustworthy, concerned, and public spir-
ited. See also infra text accompanying notes 269-73 (describing similar efforts by
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There is a different way of reading our earlier work. In our first
automobile manufacturers). Indeed, quite apart from reading our section on to-
bacco-industry conduct, one can scarcely watch television without encountering
one or another piece of the current multi-million dollar public relations campaign
of Philip Morris intended to convince the public that it is a responsible, caring,
philanthropic corporate citizen.
In short, we believe that even the narrow aspects of our case on which Hender-
son and Rachlinski do focus are given short shrift in their analysis. Perhaps no
example demonstrates that shorting better than the use of marketing and promo-
tional efforts by manufacturers to convince women in developing countries to
purchase infant formula. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1464-65. In
dismissing those efforts, Henderson and Rachlinski state: "[W]e do not count this
as distracting from product risk as the product risk was that of misuse-heavy dilu-
tion of the product." Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 232 n.80. To that
characterization we have two responses. First, overdilution, which was just one of
several factors that resulted in injury and death among Third World infants raised
on formula, may have been a "misuse," but it was a completely foreseeable one for
which the manufacturers could be held responsible even under existing products
liability law. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2 cmt. p (1998);
Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L. Rev. 1193 n.378 (1994) ("During the past quarter century, many courts
have expanded the scope of consumer protection to include foreseeable uses includ-
ing foreseeable misuses."). Second, and more fundamentally, the infant formula
example reveals precisely why enterprise liability is needed to enlist manufacturer
aid in regulating consumer behavior. Without enterprise liability, infant formula
manufacturers engaged in marketing campaigns that were recognized by groups
such as the World Health Organization as deceptive and unfair. See Hanson &
Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1465. The first calls for regulation came from the United
Nations Protein Advisory Group as early as 1974, yet seven deadly years passed
before it even proposed a restrictive advertising code. See Caryn L. Finkle, Com-
ment, Nestle, Infant Formula, and Excuses: The Regulation of Commercial Adver-
tising in Developed Nations, 14 Nw. J. Intl L. & Bus. 602, 604 (1994). Even today,
results of those international regulatory efforts remain quite mixed. See id. En-
terprise liability, on the other hand, would provide incentives for manufacturers to
accommodate rather than exploit the special circumstances of their customers. It
would harness the sophisticated understanding of psychological nuances that
manufacturers demonstrate in their marketing practices-infant formula makers
preyed on the desire of Third World women to appear "modern" or "Western"
through the use of salespersons dressed as medical professionals and such slogans
as "Give your baby the benefit of modern research"-to help sharpen consumer
awareness of product risks and behaviors that can alleviate those risks.
Our argument is that manufacturers, operating under the incentives of the
market, are the best educators of consumers. Properly aligned, market incentives
could result in the construction of not only safer manufacturer designs for prod-
ucts, but also of more effective product warnings for consumers. Henderson and
Rachlinski overlook those possibilities because they view the harm suffered by de-
veloping world infants as solely a result of product misuse by the infants' mothers.
Like the many other examples pigeonholed by Henderson and Rachlinski's analy-
sis, we view the situation as involving far more complex interactions between man-
ufacturers and consumers than they apparently do.
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article we devoted approximately fifty pages to reviewing the cog-
nitive psychology literature-a literature that reveals an immense
variety of ways in which we humans are manipulable and whose
authors often recognize the clear application of their work for sell-
ers and marketers.74 Even absent more direct evidence, the evi-
dence of cognitive psychologists and decision theorists would be
adequate to show that market manipulation is a natural and logi-
cal consequence of cognitive biases and manufacturer profit mo-
tives. Coupled with the more direct evidence that we did offer,
these dozens of behavioralist studies ripen into a sophisticated ac-
count of why and how manipulation occurs-an account based on
decades of empirical research not properly described as anecdotal.
In our second article, we devoted more than one hundred law
review pages to providing evidence of market manipulation.
Among other sorts of evidence, we described a major research liter-
ature and an industry devoted to consumer behavior analysis, both
of which seemed informed significantly by psychological theory and
evidence. Although that literature has been described as "quasi-
empirical,"75 its practitioners both within and without academic
settings generate research stipends several orders of magnitude
greater than those from many other academic disciplines. 76 Again,
that market evidence does not seem fairly described as anecdotal.
After that literature review, we looked carefully at several con-
sumption venues. A fulsome description of the manipulative as-
pects of the modem American shopping mall could fill a book; but
we focused on a couple of the even more common competitive shop-
ping venues, at which many readers would likely believe that ma-
nipulation is rare to non-existent: gas stations and supermarkets.
Although our analysis certainly could have gone into more de-
tail, we do not believe that even the sort of evidence we presented
can be fairly dismissed as anecdotal. That evidence reveals that
the intent and the effect of well designed shopping forums is to
74. See Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making 27-29,
47 (1993); see also Roger Lowenstein, Outsider Who Challenged Dismal Science,
Wall St. J., June 6, 1996, at C1 (quoting cognitive psychologist Amos Tversky, who
stated that his findings would have been familiar to "advertisers and used-car
salesmen," though not to orthodox economists).
75. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 253.
76. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1429 (noting that
"[mianufacturers spend $8 billion per year studying consumer behavior and
psychology").
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influence the purchasing decisions of consumers and that such ma-
nipulation is a motive behind many of the design features that
most of us know about and never question. We did not argue that
sellers should be liable for such manipulation, but we did point out
that the evidence of manipulation of non-risk related perceptions
supports a strong inference of manipulation risk-related percep-
tions. Then, to provide more direct evidence of manipulation of
risk-related features, we examined several product types for which
such behavior appeared common-for example, food products, phar-
maceutical drug products, environmentally marketed products,
products marketed to thrillseekers, and products utilizing appeals
to fear. In every context that we examined, we found sellers who
were devoting significant resources in an effort to manipulate con-
sumers' risk perceptions.
2. The Lessons of Tobacco Industry Manipulation
In addition to reducing all of that evidence to one heroic foot-
note,77 Henderson and Rachlinski reach their critical conclusion
having inexplicably disregarded our most relevant and extensive
evidence-our analysis of the market for cigarettes. As we empha-
sized, "our history of tobacco marketing and our review of the
smoker risk perception literature are especially significant, as they
provide the strongest evidence that manufacturer manipulation
not only occurs, but also succeeds." 78 The best explanation that we
can muster for Henderson and Rachlinski's omission is that by ac-
cepting our argument that cigarette manufacturers should be ab-
solutely liable,79 they felt justified in ignoring that evidence. But
granting our policy conclusion with respect to cigarettes hardly
justifies disregarding the arguments and evidence behind that con-
clusion, particularly in light of our claims that the tobacco industry
evidence was our most important evidence and that it had implica-
tions well beyond the market for cigarettes.80
77. See supra note 73.
78. Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1469.
79. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 257.
80. Perhaps Henderson and Rachlinski believe that the tobacco industry is
exceptional. After all, we ourselves were careful to describe several reasons why
we believed that manipulation was especially likely to occur in the market for ciga-
rettes. We noted that the industry's budget for marketing, promotion, and other
related activities, and hence its capacity to experiment with manipulative prac-
tices, was especially generous among product manufacturers; that consumers long
TAKING BEHAVIORALISM SERIOUSLY
Our review of the tobacco market suggests just how powerful,
omnipresent, and unobservable manipulation can be. Several
prominent legal scholars had examined the market for tobacco
products and concluded that it was without significant market fail-
ures-that, for instance, consumers were well informed of tobacco
product risks-and that, therefore, enhanced liability or regulation
in such a market would offer no efficiency gains.81 That same mar-
ket now happens to be the one for which we have the most availa-
ble evidence of both industry conduct and consumer information.
Our ability to observe industry practices in this context is therefore
nearly unique, as is our ability to measure their effects. As we
have argued, the evidence suggests that consumers are not ade-
quately able to appreciate tobacco product risks or to confront the
tobacco purchasing decision with anything like the optimal level of
care and cognition.
It may be that the strength of our case is what makes Hender-
son and Rachlinski feel they can justifiably ignore it. At one point,
they hint at that possibility by stating that "[ciigarettes represent
the most obvious example of... circumstances [in which enterprise
liability may be appropriate]. The dangers that they pose trigger
both cognitive dissonance and over-optimism more so than the cog-
nitive biases that result in overreaction to risk."82 By granting our
argument and accepting our evidence, they simultaneously seem to
disarm it. The problem is that there was nothing "obvious" about
the evidence we provided or the conclusions that we drew from it.
Perhaps in hindsight Henderson and Rachlinski find the problem-
have been somewhat aware that tobacco products raise health and safety concerns,
thereby enhancing the need on the part of manufacturers to manage consumer
perceptions; that the concentrated nature of the industry might have a catalytic
effect on the perpetration of manipulative practices. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra
note 2, at 1467-68. Those considerations, however, only suggest that manipulation
in the cigarette context will be different in degree, not in kind, from the manipula-
tion that takes place in other markets. See id. at 1551-53 (explaining why greater
market competition would not drive out all manipulative practices in the tobacco
market).
81. See, e.g., Robert D. Tollison & Richard E. Wagner, The Economics of
Smoking (1992); W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking: Making the Risky Decision (1992); Gary
T. Schwartz, Tobacco Liability in the Courts, in Smoking Policy: Law, Politics, and
Culture 131 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993); Gregory P.
Taxin, Tobacco Industry Liability for Cigarette-Related Injuries: 'Smokers, Give It
Up!", 16 J. Prod. & Toxics Liab. 221 (1994); see also infra text accompanying note
142 (discussing Henderson and Twerski's earlier views on tobacco products).
82. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 257.
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atic nature of tobacco markets to be obvious, but at one point in the
not too distant past, many scholars,8 3 Henderson included,84 held
a vastly different viewpoint.
Henderson and Rachlinski's discounting of the tobacco evi-
dence has important consequences. We examine a single industry
closely and demonstrate how it has been preoccupied with manipu-
lation for at least fifty years. That evidence is particularly re-
vealing because it is in depth and because we have access to many
of the internal documents that are simply not available to us with
other industries-documents that reveal not just the strategies
used by manufacturers but the intent behind them. Moreover, we
review a great deal of non-anecdotal evidence regarding the effects
of those manipulative efforts. A major section of our article enti-
tled "The Actual Success of Market Manipulation," 5 examines
widespread market evidence and a host of empirical studies of con-
sumer risk perceptions with respect to tobacco products. Together
that evidence permits us to conclude with reasonable confidence
that the incredible efforts and expenditures made by the industry
have paid off in terms of influencing consumer perceptions. For
those reasons, we argued that our "case study in tobacco industry
manipulation provides a degree of proof about consumer product
markets greater than anything previously available in the aca-
demic literature."8 6
The fact that so many scholars and commentators have
trouble believing that consumers could underestimate (or behave
as if they underestimate) the risks of one of the most talked-about
hazards of the century only demonstrates how difficult it is to rec-
ognize the existence and impact of market manipulation. Signifi-
cantly, enterprise liability reduces the need either to identify
market manipulation or to quantify its effects. In the process, it
enhances the degree of faith that one may place in the efficiency of
market outcomes. At one point in their argument, Henderson and
Rachlinski seem to suggest that the mere fact that consumption of
certain products, including cigarettes, is widespread indicates that
83. See supra note 81.
84. See infra text accompanying note 142.
85. Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1505-51.
86. Id. at 1470.
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those products are, for some consumers, welfare-enhancing.8 7
Under the current regime, we do not believe that such an inference
is defensible. However, by internalizing the health costs of those
products and by reducing or eliminating the incentive on the part
of manufacturers to manipulate consumer understanding of those
costs, the institution of enterprise liability would greatly increase
the faith that one could place in such an assertion.
By disregarding our cigarette evidence, Henderson and Rach-
linski miss another key insight: manipulation involves a great deal
more than merely advertising.88 In fact, as our examples imply,
market manipulation extends far beyond the simple attempt to
manipulate the cognitive processes of individual consumers di-
rectly. It also involves attempts to influence the wide variety of
institutions that also exert an influence on consumer views or that
might otherwise intervene in the tobacco market because of the
risks posed by its products. Henderson and Rachlinski recognize
that institutions and mechanisms other than advertising can influ-
ence consumer perceptions:
[Elven apart from manufacturers, our society includes impor-
tant entities that benefit from increasing consumer fear of
products. These include public-interest consumer advocates,
plaintiffs attorneys, hospitals, insurance companies, politi-
cians who adopt consumer rights as one of their issues, con-
87. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 230. Henderson and Rach-
linski state:
[Enterprise liability]'s new advocates could argue that the widespread
consumption of dangerous products such as cigarettes, alcohol, firearms
and motor vehicles provides ample evidence of the success of these mar-
keting campaigns. Such an argument, however, would be misplaced.
These products all confer some benefits upon the users. Even without ma-
nipulative advertising, many consumers would surely purchase them.
Id. (citations omitted). If consumers would purchase the products without manip-
ulative advertising, then it must be the case that the benefits Henderson and
Rachlinski speak of outweigh the costs that consumers would perceive even in the
absence of manipulation. That assumption seems to be based simply on the fact
that consumption of those products is widespread.
88. As we concluded, the tobacco industry engaged in a "multidimentional ap-
proach" employing "diverse manipulative strategies." Hanson & Kysar II, supra
note 2, at 1502. Compare, e.g., Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 217
("These scholars argue that manufacturers employ advertising techniques in ways
that completely undermine the justifications for retaining a fault-based liability
system.").
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sumer-information media outlets (such as Consumer Reports)
and the media in general. s9
They do not recognize, however, the manner in which manufactur-
ers can influence those same institutions and mechanisms. It is
not simply that "the budgets and influence of consumer advocates
and consumer information outlets are dwarfed by the power of
manufacturer marketing,"90 but also that manufacturers can com-
pete for influence in those same non-advertising venues. Cam-
paign contributions to politicians, sponsorship of non-
governmental institutions, the heavy influence of advertising dol-
lars on media content, and the establishment of faux citizen groups
to intervene in public debate are just a few of the most obvious
examples of such manufacturer influence.
As noted above, our argument in favor of enterprise liability
begins with the widely accepted premise that incentive-based regu-
lations provide the most effective means of accomplishing legal
goals. In light of the accomplishments tobacco manufacturers have
made in the absence of enterprise liability, we believe that the case
for its adoption is even stronger than previously understood. That
is, market manipulation suggests that incentive-based regulatory
approaches are even more desirable than conventional wisdom
would have it. 9 1 Because it operates at the most basic level of
manufacturer motivation-the profit motive-enterprise liability is
able to influence manufacturer behavior in a full range of contexts,
not just in the areas of product design and warning construction.
Advertising, promotion and even the more subtle attempts to affect
consumer perceptions described above come under the influence of
the legal regime with the adoption of enterprise liability. More im-
portantly, the same forces that manufacturers currently utilize to
undermine consumer appreciation of product hazards can be redi-
rected in favor of strengthening such appreciation.
II. Is EXISTING PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAw SENSITIVE TO THE
MANIPULATION OF CONSUMERS?
The previous Section outlined our reasons for supporting a
products liability system of enterprise liability. In response, Hen-
89. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 248.
90. Id.
91. See supra note 25.
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derson and Rachlinski argue that our analysis fails to credit ex-
isting systems of regulation for their sensitivity to the problem of
market manipulation.92 Specifically, they claim that: (a) govern-
mental agencies following a command-and-control approach al-
ready regulate deceptive advertising; (b) the recently promulgated
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability contains provi-
sions that link manufacturer fault to consumer expectations in a
manner that accounts for market manipulation; and (c) novel liti-
gation techniques have developed in response to the problem of cig-
arette industry conduct. Each of those aspects of current law,
according to Henderson and Rachlinski, contributes to the conclu-
sion that "[elxisting tort remedies are more sensitive to manufac-
turers' attempts to manipulate consumers than the new
proponents of [enterprise liability] suggest."93
We wish to emphasize at the outset that we enthusiastically
endorse the recent trends toward greater legal recognition of ma-
nipulative conduct that Henderson and Rachlinski identify. Too
often, the products liability debate deals in archetypes, as if legal
regimes occupied only fixed and distinct spheres of possibility. The
more accurate conception is of a products liability continuum,
ranging from no liability for manufacturers to enterprise liability
and featuring various familiar landmarks such as negligence and
strict liability along the way. Even those seemingly clear
landmarks are resistant to precise definition, as the long-standing
struggle to define "defect" has shown. 94 Thus, to some extent, our
frequent calls for an enterprise liability standard can be inter-
preted as a more general call to move along the products liability
continuum further toward enterprise liability than under the cur-
rent regime. Understood in that light, the trends identified by
Henderson and Rachlinski, such as novel tobacco litigation and the
new sensitivity to advertising in the Third Restatement, actually
represent the very type of legal developments that we endorse.
92. They contend that our case for enterprise liability "fails to take account of
the existing legal mechanisms available to address the manipulation of consum-
ers." Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 218.
93. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 234.
94. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on
Defective Product Design, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 867, 868-72 (1998) (describing the
difficulty among commentators of settling upon an agreed understanding of prod-
uct defect).
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Moreover, while we did surmise that enterprise liability offers
the best prospect of combating the problem of market manipula-
tion, we did not reach that position without deliberation. A careful
reading of our work reveals that we have considered and discussed
many of the same sorts of alternative mechanisms for addressing
the problem of market manipulation that Henderson and Rachlin-
ski emphasize. 95 We did not argue that other forms of regulation
cannot help to address that problem. Indeed, we believe that some
other forms of regulation can be useful and, in any event, are some-
times the only available option to redress problematic situations.96
Nevertheless, we remain skeptical of arguments intended to reas-
sure policymakers and the public that the problem of market ma-
nipulation is well in hand, simply because one or more existing
regulatory schemes may address it. Our argument has been and
continues to be that market manipulation is a major problem
under existing legal arrangements. As we have also tried to make
clear, there is strong reason to believe that market manipulation,
in its countless, malleable varieties, will not be significantly re-
duced by the many sorts of regulations that have already been at-
tempted and that do not rely on transforming the underlying
incentives of manufacturers and sellers of consumer products. 97
95. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1555-58; Hanson & Logue II,
supra note 24, at 1263-73, 1322-49; Hanson et al., supra note 24, at 524-52.
96. See, e.g., Hanson et al., supra note 24, at 527-28.
97. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1483 (describing how social
science studies have demonstrated that product warnings can have a forbidden
fruit appeal to children and quoting a tobacco industry document that recognized
that "the warning label on the package may be a plus"); Hanson & Logue II, supra
note 24, at 1168 n.9 (describing how 'le]ach of the two most significant prior efforts
to regulate cigarette manufacturers-through warning requirements and advertis-
ing bans - turned out to favor the cigarette industry"); Hanson & Kysar, supra note
2 (describing ways in which industry public service campaigns, ostensibly designed
to help curb underage smoking can have counterproductive results and recounting
a variety of ways in which tobacco manufacturers circumvent or, indeed, openly
ridicule product warning requirements). Even now, when social concerns appear
to be the greatest threat to the tobacco industry, when advertising is supposedly
prohibited on television, and when still other types of advertising are prohibited by
the global settlements (e.g., outdoor advertisements or advertisements using car-
toon characters), cigarette companies are finding ways to advertise. The series of
corporate responsibility advertisements recently run by Phillip Morris on televi-
sion is a perfect example. By projecting an image of charitable largesse and gen-
eral good will, the tobacco maker is able to confound consumer attitudes about
cigarettes: contrary to the predictions of the rational actor model, people's beliefs
about the source of a risk greatly affect their view of the magnitude of that risk.
The voice mail messages used by Brown and Williamson earlier this year on its
TAKING BEHAVIORALISM SERIOUSLY
As may now be obvious, one's position on the question of how
well the existing law addresses the problem of manipulation de-
pends upon how significant one perceives the underlying problem
to be. Henderson and Rachlinski may believe that existing legal
arrangements adequately, or nearly adequately, address the prob-
lem because they also believe that there is no empirically signifi-
cant problem to solve. Consistent with that belief, there are
several telling features of the examples that Henderson and Rach-
linski provide. First, none of their highlighted legal solutions even
purport to address the many means of manipulation separate from
advertising that we have described. Even if regulators could end,
or substantially curtail, harmful manipulation through advertis-
ing, the removal of that single weapon from what is an arsenal of
available weapons for manufacturers would have only limited
benefits.
Second, even with respect to just advertising, we see little rea-
son to feel reassured by the current state of regulation. Despite
Henderson and Rachlinski's suggestion that existing legal regula-
tions successfully combat the problem of market manipulation,
their examples are of regulations that currently represent, at best,
unfulfilled promise-market manipulation is, today, still ubiqui-
tous, and the regulations are too new or too rarely used to have
had any significant effect. We will address those criticisms more
particularly in this Section by examining each of the alternative
legal mechanisms that, according to Henderson and Rachlinski, al-
ready provide an adequate response to the problem of market
manipulation.
A. Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices Regulation
Henderson and Rachlinski first argue that we overlooked the
role of federal and state agencies that regulate unfair and decep-
customer service number provide another example. See Hanson & Kysar, supra
note 2. The content of the messages is almost surreal in its flagrant mockery of
concerns about underage smoking. More surprising, however, is the way in which
the 1-800 number used to reach those messages circulated among consumers, ulti-
mately resulting in a highly successful, virtually free, and apparently legal adver-
tising campaign for Brown and Williamson.
We do not argue that all of those types of circumventions of legal controls
would disappear under enterprise liability. Rather, we argue simply that we have
not done the best we can to address an underlying problem merely by adopting a
particular regulation directed at one or more symptoms of the problem.
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tive trade practices. Contrary to that assertion, in our earlier arti-
cles we did acknowledge the fact that the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), state Attorneys General, and other govern-
ment actors review advertisements for unfair or deceptive prac-
tices.98 However, we argued that such command-and-control
regulation could never stay apace with the market's ability to pro-
duce massive amounts of ever-evolving exploitative conduct. More
precisely, we contended that agencies such as the FTC99 suffer
from a number of institutional limitations that prevent them from
fully combating the problem of market manipulation. 100
Henderson and Rachlinski initially appear to accept our posi-
tion by noting that "manufacturers and retailers will almost cer-
tainly outpace regulatory efforts to develop, ex ante, an effective
set of command-and-control restrictions on advertising."101 To
suggest why we have understated the influence of current laws,
however, they then highlight the FTC's potential for after-the-fact
corrective action: "[Tihe breadth of the statutory authority held by
the [FTC] allows it to conduct ex post assessments of marketing
practices that deceive and harm consumers." 10 2 Granted, but that
does not alter our point. Henderson and Rachlinski do not claim,
nor could they, that the authority to act has translated into suffi-
cient action. As we have previously written, the practices chal-
lenged by the FTC are likely to "represent only those that have
been around long enough or are egregious enough to become trans-
parent."10 3 The FTC, and many agencies like it, have very limited
resources with which to take advantage of their authority, and it is
not at all clear that the penalties they exact pose much of a threat
to the thousands of sellers they regulate. Moreover, our argument
is that consumer product markets will evolve to contain manipula-
tive practices, even if the perpetrators are unaware of their of-
fense. If manufacturers themselves are not cognizant of their
98. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1555-58.
99. We use the FTC as our prime example because its regulatory activity is
generally regarded as the most comprehensive and successful of governmental ac-
tors in the area of deceptive trade practices. See Paul H. Rubin, Information Regu-
lation (Incl. Regulation of Advertising), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 5110
(1997).
100. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1555-58; see also Hanson & Logue
II, supra note 24, at 1173-78, 1263-81.
101. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 237.
102. Id.
103. Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1556.
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manipulative behavior, how can regulators be aware? Put differ-
ently, ex post regulation is not equivalent to ex post incentive-
based regulation. For those reasons, we do not believe that the
FTC's command-and-control approach could ever equal the resolve
of financially motivated market actors.
B. Existing Tort Law and the Third Restatement
Henderson and Rachlinski make the strongest case that we
have undersold the effectiveness of existing products liability law
in their discussion of certain doctrines reflected in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability. They note that, under the
Third Restatement, a manufacturer's primary duty is to adopt rea-
sonable product designs rather than simply warn against product
risks. 10 4 According to this policy, even if a manufacturer under-
mines the force of a product warning through manipulative adver-
tising, the manufacturer can still theoretically be held liable if the
product design is defective. They also note that an important fac-
tor in determining the reasonableness of a product design is "the
nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding the prod-
uct, including expectations arising from product portrayal and
marketing." °10  Indeed, according to Henderson and Rachlinski,
"the new Restatement speaks directly to the potential of advertis-
ing to manipulate consumer perceptions and behavior and admon-
ishes courts to be alert to these possibilities in assessing the
adequacy of product designs and warnings."10 6
Our earlier articles did not address these aspects of the Third
Restatement and, in that respect, we were guilty of underesti-
mating the sensitivity of existing products liability law to manipu-
lative manufacturer conduct, at least inasmuch as the
Restatement both reflects and influences the common law. Guided
by consumer expectation principles such as those highlighted by
104. This policy is reflected in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2
cmt. 1 (1997). See also Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328
(Tex. 1998) (affirming a jury award for injuries caused by an improperly mounted
tire, despite clear warning, because safer design was available); Rogers v. Inger-
soll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (refusing to shield a manufacturer
from liability for a non-functioning reverse alarm on a milling machine, despite the
existence of a warning to check the reverse alarm before operating machine).
105. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 235 (quoting Restatement
(Third) of Torts, § 2 cmt. f (1998)).
106. Id.
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Henderson and Rachlinski, courts can attempt to make judgments
about the nature and degree of manipulation involved in a manu-
facturer's conduct. For instance, as the authors point out, the Ohio
Supreme Court has upheld a plaintiffs judgment based on the de-
fective design of an all-terrain vehicle in part because the vehicle
was marketed in a manner likely to encourage unreasonably dan-
gerous conduct by drivers.10 7
We welcome such recognition of the impact of manufacturer
marketing and related conduct. As we have argued elsewhere, 08
our general recommendation with respect to market manipulation
is that policymakers of all stripes-judges, legislators, regulators,
legal scholars, economists, public health advocates, and
others-give serious thought to the possibility that market manipu-
lation actually is as pervasive and problematic as we have de-
scribed. The all-terrain vehicle opinion described by Henderson
and Rachlinski represents precisely that type of open and deliber-
ate inspection of market conduct. In a more recent example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has created an exception to the tradi-
tional learned intermediary tort doctrine in recognition of the fact
that pharmaceutical drug manufacturers are marketing directly to
consumers with increasingly aggressive techniques that raise
doubts about the physician's ability to fulfill the learned intermedi-
ary role. 10 9
Whether the Third Restatement will help lead courts further
in this direction remains to be seen. We are certainly cheered that
Henderson and Rachlinski believe that tort law will, in part be-
cause of the latest Restatement, take seriously the possibility that
"product-related risks should not be undermined by advertise-
ments." 10 Nevertheless, we fear that the type of sensitivity that
Henderson and Rachlinski perceive in the Third Restatement will
prove too weak a medicine to significantly challenge the disease of
107. See id. at 235-36 (citing Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d
568 (Ohio 1981)).
108. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 2.
109. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999); see also Honora-
ble v. Easy Life Real Estate System, 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(accepting, for purposes of stating a Fair Housing Act claim, the argument that
"market outcomes frequently will be heavily influenced, if not determined, by the
ability of one actor to control the format of information, the presentation of choices,
and, in general, the setting within which market transactions occur, allowing some
to exploit those tendencies for gain" (internal quotations omitted)).
110. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 234.
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market manipulation. Contrasted with the Ohio all-terrain vehicle
opinion are cases such as Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Mc-
Guire,' in which a group of alcoholics brought suits against man-
ufacturers of alcoholic beverages, alleging that they had failed to
warn and instruct plaintiffs of the danger of developing alcoholism
from prolonged and excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages.
More specifically, plaintiffs argued that defendant "Seagram was
advertising and promoting [alcoholic] products to increase con-
sumption, to maintain regular customers, to attract new markets
and to suppress vital information," 112 and that "[tihese pictorials
and writings created the false illusion and false belief that drink-
ing was safe."113
The Supreme Court of Texas greeted these claims with a per-
functory application of the "common knowledge" doctrine, in which
a defendant manufacturer is not liable for harms which are "gener-
ally known and recognized."" 4 Despite its otherwise routine ap-
plication of the defense, the Court noted significant discomfort
with the tension it perceived between what is supposedly "common
knowledge" and what is prominently displayed in television ads,
billboards, and other public venues:
Obviously, there is a certain irony in the "common knowl-
edge" defense. Because the pervasive danger of alcoholism
from prolonged and excessive consumption of alcoholic bever-
ages is so well known, Seagram has no duty to warn or in-
struct. However, while Seagram argues that the danger of
alcoholism is a matter of common knowledge such that it had
no duty to warn or instruct, it continues to spend billions of
dollars advertising the consumption of alcoholic beverages as
a particularly positive activity ....
There is . . . substantial evidence that alcohol commer-
cials do encourage alcohol use. By presenting drinkers in
carefree social and sexual situations, alcohol commercials
connote the harmlessness and acceptability of alcoholic bev-
erages and suggest that alcohol consumption is a particularly
111. 814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991). Henderson and Twerski helped write an ami-
cus brief supporting the result that the Texas Supreme Court adopted in this ap-
peal. See Henderson and Twerski, supra note 41, at 1323 n.241.
112. Seagram, 814 S.W.2d at 386.
113. Id. at 387.
114. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. j (1965). The doctrine also ap-
pears in the Third Restatement. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2
cmt. j (1998).
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positive activity. This visual barrage of attractive and seduc-
tive messages infiltrates the audience's consciousness and
creates an unconscious presumption in favor of drinking. 115
Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court in Maguire v. Pabst Brew-
ing Co., 116 rejected the claim of a plaintiff who was injured when
struck by a drunken driver.117 Plaintiff argued, among other
things, that the "untrammeled marketing practices" of a beer man-
ufacturer constituted "an invitation to excess, through exaltation
of hedonistic tendencies over good judgment."118 Despite noting
that "there is a ring of truth to plaintiffs' characterization of [the
manufacturer's] advertising practices"' 9-which included $25 mil-
lion per year in expenditures and use of the slogan, "Let's Have
Another"-the Court concluded that the plaintiff could not prevail
on any of the six theories of liability that he advanced. 120
An important difference between these cases, in which plain-
tiffs' claims of undue manufacturer influence failed, and the Ohio
all-terrain vehicle case or the New Jersey learned intermediary
case, in which such claims succeeded, is that the plaintiffs were
unable to link the manufacturer conduct to some existing product
defect. In other words, the successful plaintiffs used manufacturer
manipulation to supplement evidence of an alternative design or to
blunt the force of an otherwise available defense such as assump-
tion of risk or product misuse; the unsuccessful plaintiffs were
forced to rely upon evidence of manipulation as their primary vehi-
cle for liability. As Henderson (with Twerski) has noted, courts are
extremely reluctant to "hold distributors of nondefective products
liable for having promoted their product too aggressively."' 12 As
the authors report:
[allthough a few decisions over the years have explicitly re-
lied on theories of overpromotion to justify liability in the ab-
sence of traditionally defined defect, and although several
opinions in more recent alcohol and cigarette litigation have
referred disapprovingly to the methods by which distributors
115. Seagram, 814 S.W.2d at 388 n.5 (quoting Note, 58 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1107
(1985)).
116. 387 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1986).
117. See id. at 569.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 572.
121. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 41, at 1328.
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have promoted their harmful products, American courts gen-
erally have not recognized product overpromotion as an indi-
rect means of imposing product-category liability 122
The Third Restatement reinforces the courts' reluctance by
permitting the judicial assessment of manufacturer marketing ef-
forts to occur solely within the context of determining design defec-
tiveness. The inquiry focuses on whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous in light of consumer expectations, not on
whether consumer awareness of product risks has been manipu-
lated or is otherwise inaccurate. No liability attaches to manipula-
tion alone. That approach necessarily limits the scope of conduct
that is subject to legal inspection, even apart from the fact that it
only permits inspection of manipulation in the form of product ad-
vertising. Ultimately, the approach gives rise to the tension that
some courts feel in summarily dismissing novel claims despite
their "ring of truth" and despite the "irony" of liquor manufactur-
ers, claiming as "common knowledge" a truth that they spend bil-
lions of dollars contradicting.
Of course, we recognize that these cases would face significant
problems under any liability regime-problems regarding general
and specific causation and the measure of damages, among others.
But, putting those difficulties aside, our point is that courts are not
adequately sensitive to the problem of manipulation even in ex-
treme cases in which the efforts to manipulate are apparent and
disconcerting to judges and juries. The cases also confirm our sus-
picion that, in many of the instances in which manufacturer ma-
nipulation is thickest and most identifiable, judges and juries seem
likely to conclude that consumers nevertheless know and under-
stand the underlying risk. That is true because manufacturer in-
centives to manipulate consumer risk perceptions are strongest in
precisely those cases in which consumers have some predicate
awareness of the risk.123 Consequently, just as scholars and com-
122. Id. (citations omitted). This year, those same authors report in their prod-
ucts liability casebook that this type of "negligent marketing" theory is being
tested by some crime victims against manufacturers of handguns. See James A.
Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, Products Liability: Problems and Process 471
(4th ed. 2000). They conclude the discussion, however, by pointing out that "no
court ha[s] yet to fashion such a broad 'negligence marketing' theory" and that "[i]t
remains to be seen whether the appellate courts will approve such a novel theory
of liability." Id.
123. Cf infra text accompanying notes 219-26.
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mentators struggle to understand how consumers could possibly
underestimate the risks of smoking amidst massive public health
campaigns, courts and juries will be disinclined to believe that ma-
nipulation could be powerful enough to undermine consumer at-
tention to risks that are thought to be a matter of "common
knowlege."
One deficiency of the existing products liability system, there-
fore, seems to be that even in those cases in which judges and ju-
ries identify manipulative conduct, they are unduly reluctant to
act against it. Indeed, given that current law responds only to
fairly egregious manipulation-and then only when consumers can-
not be said to have been aware of the risk-it is no surprise that
Henderson and Rachlinski can offer so few examples of cases in
which concern for market manipulation influenced the judicial out-
come. A second, and probably more important, deficiency stems
from the fact that manipulation in the vast majority of remaining
product markets is far less transparent and, therefore, far less
likely to undergo any judicial inspection in products liability cases.
That deficiency exists not only because much manipulation is sub-
tle and can occur in forms other than just basic advertising, but
also because an extremely common form of risk perception manip-
ulation in consumer product markets is silence. That is, when con-
sumers are not cognizant of a product's risk, the manufacturer's
best strategy is generally to leave well enough alone, helping to
ensure that consumers remain unduly optimistic with respect to
the risk. 124 Therefore, even if courts did routinely conduct inspec-
tions of product advertisements in search of manipulative conduct,
they would not even attempt to discern the influence of what is
perhaps the most prevalent form of manufacturer manipulation.
Enterprise liability, on the other hand, offers the theoretical
promise of forcing product risk information out in the open, both
through its impact on the price mechanism and through its en-
hanced incentive for manufacturers to monitor and manage the
rate and severity of accidents involving their products. A product
risk that goes undiscovered by consumers and for which manufac-
turers are not liable under a fault-based regime may well turn out
under enterprise liability to be one that manufacturers identify
and prevent or, alternatively, disclose and explain to consumers,
124. See infra text accompanying notes 178, 219-26.
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all in an effort to lower liability costs. Enterprise liability aims to
avoid reliance upon the limited capabilities of judges and juries to
hypothesize alternative designs and discern the impact of market-
ing. The Seagram and Pabst courts may have rejected liability
against alcohol makers simply because the litigants failed to con-
jure the reasonable alternative design that existing law generally
requires of them.125 To the extent that enterprise liability forces
manufacturers to internalize the costs of product-caused harms, it
would help to inspire the production of such alternative designs,
along with alternative distribution schemes, product warnings,
consumer awareness campaigns, and other as-yet unimagined in-
novations, all by enlisting the power of the ultimate laboratory-the
market.
Henderson and Rachlinski have already "concede[d] that eco-
nomic forces induce manufacturers to undertake marketing cam-
paigns that have adverse social consequences that escape remedy
under the existing legal regime."126 In other words, they have con-
ceded that consumers are manipulable and that manufacturers ex-
ert an influence on both consumer perception and behavior Given
that concession, enterprise liability, with its ability to self-disci-
pline manufacturer behavior and enlist manufacturers' marketing
prowess in aid of regulating consumer product use, follows as the
logical products liability regime. The challenge for those inter-
ested in limiting manufacturer exploitation of consumer cognitive
biases is to devise a system of regulation that equals the manipula-
tive market in resourcefulness and tireless zeal to influence con-
sumer behavior. As noted in our earlier articles, 127 we believe that
the only institution capable of doing so is the market itself. The
occasional success of a fault-based liability regime at recognizing
manipulative conduct does not alter that belief. It only makes us
wonder what conduct is left unrecognized.
C. Tobacco Litigation
Henderson and Rachlinski offer one more piece of evidence to
show that courts are adjusting tort doctrines to respond to the
125. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 2(b) (1998).
126. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 243.
127. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1555-58; Hanson et al.,
supra note 24, 597-99.
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problem of market manipulation. Specifically, with respect to ciga-
rette-related injuries, they explain that
the bases of manufacturers' liability have been extended far
beyond failure-to-warn. (Indeed, traditional state law fail-
ure-to-warn claims are now largely preempted by federal reg-
ulations.) A panoply of other theories based on the marketing
of cigarettes is available to products liability plaintiffs, some
of which clearly reflect growing judicial concern with manu-
facturers' manipulation of consumers' cognitive biases. 128
We would interpret their evidence a little differently. We find
the history and current state of tobacco litigation and regulation
anything but reassuring, for reasons that we have laid out in detail
elsewhere. Again, we will not rehearse those arguments here, but
a few comments seem in order, particularly in light of Henderson
and Rachlinski's claim that we have somehow failed to consider
the ways in which the law has already responded to our concerns.
Henderson and Rachlinski seem to be claiming that the judi-
cial system's desire to take manipulation into account is mani-
fested in plaintiffs' use, for many years, of a large number of
theories well beyond the limited focus of "failure-to-warn." Their
claim, however, confuses cause and effect. The fact that so many
legal theories have been attempted is a consequence of the fact
that what had been the best option, failure-to-warn, has long been
virtually unavailable to plaintiffs. Because of that unavailability,
plaintiffs have been forced to experiment with a range of less ap-
pealing theories. Many theories have been tried, but the win-loss
record over the last fifty years, and even over the last several
years, does not reveal a judiciary that is particularly sensitive to
the problem of manipulation.129
128. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 234 (footnotes omitted).
129. See Hanson & Logue II, supra note 24, at 1169-72; see also Carl T. Bogus,
Gun Litigation and Societal Values, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1353, 1365 (2000) ("Since the
1950s more than a thousand lawsuits had been filed against cigarette companies
by and on behalf of injured smokers. With the exception of one case relating not to
tobacco but to asbestos contained in Kent cigarette's 'Micronite' filter, the cigarette
companies had won them all." (citations omitted)). That trend was finally broken
by the unprecedented actions brought by state Attorneys General on behalf of their
state's Medicaid programs-actions, significantly, that avoided the problem of
plaintiff conduct. In addition, a handful of individual tobacco plaintiffs were able
to achieve success, at least at the trial court level. See id. at 1366. Nevertheless,
despite those recent developments, the historical win-loss record for the tobacco
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Moreover, probably the biggest obstacle to plaintiff recovery
has been some form of the primary argument on which Henderson
and Rachlinski rely to reject enterprise liability as a viable policy
option: that consumers are adequately informed and need to take
responsibility for their consumption choices. Plaintiffs have tried
to convince juries and courts that they were manipulated, but their
attempts have been unsuccessful. Even when juries were doctri-
nally barred from considering the assumption of risk defense, they
were unable to stop their perceptions of smoker awareness of
health hazards from influencing their judgments.13 0 Market ma-
nipulation takes place in ways that jury members do not recognize.
Juries are disinclined to believe that plaintiffs could fall prey to
manipulative conduct or, indeed, that such conduct even occurs. If
anything, therefore, the history of cigarette litigation demon-
strates the ease with which those responsible for regulating the
market can be manipulated into believing that consumers are not
manipulated. Indeed, the fact that the failure-to-warn option was
unavailable and that "mandatory" warnings have been unsuccess-
ful is attributable largely to the industry's successful efforts to cre-
ate just those results.131
Even the headline-grabbing punitive damages verdict levied
earlier this year132 can hardly be considered a result of conven-
tional products liability law. It took a remarkable confluence of
events-some of which were largely independent of the tort sys-
tem-to unearth the evidence upon which that verdict was based.
Indeed, without the actions of a few key whistleblowers, a uniquely
motivated Surgeon General, a brave and determined FDA Com-
missioner, and the Congressional subpoena power, the tobacco in-
industry remains at a stunningly high percentage of victories, even among contem-
porary lawsuits.
130. Bogus, supra note 129, at 1362-66 (reviewing the case of Wilks v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 680 So.2d 839 (Miss. 1996)).
131. See Hanson & Logue II, supra note 24, at 1322-24; Hanson & Kysar I,
supra note 2, at 717-21; Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1509-10. A similar
story can be told with respect to other efforts by regulatory agencies to control
tobacco manufacturer conduct. Henderson and Rachlinski claim that "the law
seems ahead of the cognitive psychological research on this point, having restricted
advertising for cigarettes decades ago." Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at
257. As described earlier, however, tobacco manufacturers have found a multitude
of ways in which to circumvent regulatory restrictions and, indeed, to turn those
restrictions around to their advantage. See supra note 97.
132. See Gordon Fairclough, Tobacco Companies Rail Against Verdict, Plan to
Appeal $144.87 Billion Award, Wall St. J., July 17, 2000, at A3.
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dustry's string of courtroom victories may well have continued
unabated to this day. Put differently, the existing products liabil-
ity system wrestled with tobacco products for decades and pro-
duced a remarkably uniform set of results. With new evidence, the
system is beginning to produce some different outcomes, at least in
a handful of notable cases. The availability of that new evidence
(and the correlative sensitivity to cognitive manipulation found in
more recent litigation) is not necessarily a victory of the existing
paradigm. Instead, it reflects the brave effort of a few individuals
who had little to do with the tort system (except to the extent that
they were often themselves sued by tobacco companies). Moreover,
even if one were to credit such tobacco litigation as a triumph of
the existing products liability system, the system remains a highly
imperfect way to confront manipulative conduct on the part of to-
bacco manufacturers. Far too much conduct escaped legal control
for far too long before the judicial system even began to recognize
the nature of the tobacco problem.
Finally, Henderson and Rachlinski note that "[tihe recent
global settlements of actions by state Attorneys General contain
explicit commitments on the part of cigarette manufacturers to
curtail efforts to manipulate consumers via advertising, especially
efforts to entice young persons to begin smoking."133 We recognize
and endorse those efforts by state Attorneys General to confront
market manipulation on the part of tobacco manufacturers directly
and creatively. Nevertheless, as one of us has argued elsewhere at
length (with Kyle Logue),' 3 4 the global settlements have been ill-
conceived from their inception, primarily because they fail to capi-
talize on the market-based advantages of a regulatory scheme such
as enterprise liability. Advertising restrictions have proven far too
blunt an instrument to control tobacco industry conduct. At best,
such restrictions manage to block tobacco manufacturers from en-
gaging in one type of manipulation; at worst, they create new op-
portunities for manufacturers to exploit consumer's cognitive
failings.' 3 5 Perhaps the ultimate demonstration of such regulatory
133. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 234.
134. See Hanson & Logue II, supra note 24, at 1316-49.
135. See supra note 97. In addition, consider the recent "natural" marketing
campaigns adopted by R.J. Reynolds for its Salem Menthol cigarettes and Brown &
Williamson for its Kool Natural cigarettes. Both campaigns arrived on the heels of
increased public scrutiny of the chemical additives in traditionally manufactured
cigarettes and efforts by some states and Congress to require full disclosure of
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failure is evidence that even the industry's (now required) cam-
paigns to discourage children from smoking can have the opposite
effect, a fact of which the industry seems well aware. 136 Our in-
ability to capture precisely the empirical effect of such regulations
and industry countermoves only strengthens the need for enter-
prise liability. Properly disciplined, the market process will un-
ravel such difficult empirical questions for us. Again, the problem
with command-and-control approaches, even as embodied in the
sweeping and dramatic settlements by state Attorneys General, is
that they do not eliminate the underlying incentive to manipulate.
They are merely fingers in the cracks of a bursting dam, unable to
succeed because they are unable to stem the destructive pressure
at its source.
Henderson and Rachlinski might respond here by reminding
us that they now concede that cigarette manufacturers should be
subject to an enterprise liability rule.137 Therefore, we should not
use the cigarette market as an example of a context in which their
arguments against enterprise liability do not apply. We would
have two responses to such a contention. First, if Henderson and
Rachlinski truly endorse enterprise liability in this context, then
they cannot credibly point to current levels of liability for cigarette
manufacturers as evidence that the judicial system is sufficiently
sensitive to the problem of market manipulation. Every year in
this country, cigarettes cause approximately 400,000 deaths. 138
The liability incurred by tobacco manufacturers represents only a
those additives. The ad campaigns feature forest green design schemes,
Edenesque images of waterfalls and lush foliage, and repeated use of the words
"nature" and "natural." A single-page print ad for Kool Natural Lights, for in-
stance, repeats the word "natural" a remarkable thirteen times. The companies
skirt deceptive advertising liability by linking "natural" with the cigarettes' mint
leaf-supplied menthol flavor. The overall effect of the campaigns, however, is far
more subtle. As behavioral researchers have noted, people respond more favorably
to risks that they view as emanating from natural, as opposed to man-made,
sources. In other words, a risk may be underestimated simply because it is attrib-
uted to nature. R.J. Reynolds unabashedly exploits that cognitive bias in the tag-
line to its Salem ads: "Menthol from nature. Created by plants, not people." Never
mind that cigarettes typically contain hundreds of additives, most of which are
created by people, not plants. See Hanson & Logne II, supra note 24, at 1348
n.769.
136. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1479-83.
137. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 257.
138. See Hanson & Logue II, supra note 24, at 1167.
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tiny fraction of that harm. 139 Assuming that causation can be
firmly established in only one half of those cases and using a range
of values in well-known tobacco cases for purely compensatory
damages-from the first jury verdict against the industry (later to
be reversed) in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. of $400,000140 to
the more recent award in the Engle class action of roughly
$4,000,000 for each of the three sample plaintiffs141-total industry
liability for compensatory damages alone should be between $80
billion and $800 billion per year. If one accepts that enterprise lia-
bility may be appropriate in this context, then clearly tort law has
a long way to go in its treatment of tobacco plaintiffs before it can
be cited as evidence of the law's sensitivity to market
manipulation.
Second, Henderson and Rachlinski's acceptance of the idea of
holding cigarette manufactures absolutely liable for cigarette-
caused injuries is, at least for Henderson, somewhat of a dramatic
conversion. Writing again with Twerski, Henderson once ex-
pressed an unambiguous opinion of what the law should be and
would be at this point in our history with respect to cigarette
litigation:
We have little doubt that the attempts by some courts to use
risk- utility analysis to impose liability on entire product cat-
egories in the absence of feasible alternative designs are
doomed to failure. Thus, the movement to declare such prod-
ucts as cigarettes... categorically defective will be over and
done with well before the end of the century .... Similarly,
the attempt to push failure-to-warn doctrine to extremes in
order to impose liability in . . . cigarette . . . litigation is
doomed to failure ..... [Such] cases share a common denomi-
nator. They involve high-profile products with strong con-
sumer demand whose dangers are well-known.
One further observation. Asbestos litigation has been a
bitter pill for the American judicial system to swallow....
Courts will think long and hard before they once again allow
such a litigation disaster through the cracks. Asbestos was
139. See supra note 129 (describing the industry's historical success at avoiding
adverse judgments).
140. 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd in part and afrd in part, 893 F.2d
541 (3d Cir. 1990), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
141. See Richard Daynard, The Engle Verdicts and Tobacco Litigation, 321
Brit. Med. J. 312 (2000).
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factually unique. The dangers were hidden and the defend-
ants arguably malevolent. If such a set of facts should return
to haunt us in the future, courts will have to cope. But they
will not change the law in ways that generate such over-
whelming spectacles on a routine basis. Thus to expect that
courts will open their doors to litigating the fate of politically
unpopular products such as cigarettes... providing causes of
action to hundreds of thousands of alleged victims, is fantasy.
One way or another, these category-liability cases will be
brought to heel. 142
Ten years ago, Henderson unmistakably and confidently held
the views that smokers are well informed and that manufacturer
liability would therefore be inappropriate. Striking, too, is his cer-
tainty that, even if some case were to emerge in which plaintiffs
were ill-informed and defendants were malevolent, judges would
not open the courthouse doors. In light of those strongly held
views, we credit Henderson for recognizing that market manipula-
tion has played a role in adversely skewing smokers' risk percep-
tions and for urging courts to welcome tobacco plaintiffs. However,
with respect to the judicial reaction, the record is mixed and, in a
literal sense, the jury is out: it is far too premature to wave recent
tobacco verdicts as a banner of the existing liability system's sensi-
tivity to manipulation.
Moreover, we believe that Henderson's change of view on to-
bacco litigation supports a strong presumption in favor of adopting
enterprise liability even in non-tobacco contexts. Henderson and
Twerski's view in 1991 regarding consumer risk perceptions was
both understandable and extremely widely held, especially among
economically-oriented products liability commentators. That Hen-
derson and Rachlinski now see it as wrong, presumably because of
the rare opportunity to look at detailed evidence indicating as
much, is telling. How many other product markets would turn out
to contain "hidden dangers" or even "malevolent defendants" under
such scrutiny? The confidence that most of us place in our opinion
about how well informed consumers are about product risks is as
unwarranted as it is widespread. Our confidence in our ability to
recognize when and how market manipulation might operate with
142. James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of
American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1332, 1336-37 (1991) (foot-
notes omitted).
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respect to any product-as any products liability regime less com-
plete than enterprise liability requires-seems no more justified.
Enterprise liability, in contrast, does not so significantly depend on
our demonstrably limited abilities to make such discernments. As
such, we believe that it is preferable to any alternative that re-
quires drawing fine lines on limited evidence, using limited facul-
ties, with, at least so far, limited results.
D. Summary
We have described a variety of reasons why existing systems
of consumer product regulation do not sufficiently redress wide-
spread manipulation of consumer product risk and benefit percep-
tions. Henderson and Rachlinski, in their final analysis, do not
appear to dispute that fact, "conced[ingl that economic forces in-
duce manufacturers to undertake marketing campaigns that have
adverse social consequences that escape remedy under the existing
legal regime."143 Whether because of underenforcement of legal
rules by agencies, widespread failure to bring claims by potential
plaintiffs,'" inability on the part of agencies, courts and juries to
appreciate and act against manipulation, failure of any of the cur-
rent regulatory alternatives to address the many forms of market
manipulation other than advertising, manipulation of juries by liti-
gants and their attorneys in a manner similar to market manipula-
tion, or the fact that no current law responds to manufacturer
manipulation of consumer preferences, 145 manufacturer conduct
has not been controlled in the manner or to the extent predicted by
a standard legal economic model of this problem.
For those reasons, we believe that existing law should yield to
a more dramatic policy solution-a solution such as enterprise lia-
bility. While Henderson and Rachlinski argue with some force
that "the existing liability system does a much better job.., than
[enterprise liability] proponents give it credit for,"146 even those
authors admit that no incarnation of the existing system has
proven as adept at combating manipulation as is necessary. In
143. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 243.
144. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litig-
ious Society, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 4 (1983).
145. This possibility is discussed infra text accompanying notes 191, 379-91.
146. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 243,
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such a case, we believe that enterprise liability is justified simply
because it is the most potent products liability regime that the law
can offer, though we recognize that even enterprise liability will
prove inadequate in some respects. 147 That is, in addition to the
many other arguments that we and others have made in favor of
enterprise liability, one can now add the argument that enterprise
liability represents the best hope the law has at constraining the
incredibly slippery and subtle phenomenon of market
manipulation.
No one can know precisely what the world would look like had
enterprise liability long been the law of the land. But we cannot
help but imagine that many of those 400,000 people per year who
now die from smoking-related diseases would strongly prefer such
a world, as would many of the other consumers who have been in-
jured or killed by other products after first being manipulated by
their manufacturers. We do not agree that the current legal re-
gime is anywhere close to being adequately sensitive to the prob-
lem of market manipulation. Nor will it be, we fear, until the trend
toward enterprise liability is revived. Consumers should not have
to wait for legal scholars and lawmakers to perceive manipulation
that is intended by its practitioners both to be unobservable and to
alter and obscure what little vision we do have.
III. Is ENTERPRISE LIABILITY UNWORKABLE?
Still, Henderson and Rachlinski contend that, "whatever at-
tractiveness [enterprise liability) may have as a purely theoretical
construct, the absolute manufacturers' liability that it calls for
could never be made to function as a practical matter."148 Accord-
ing to Henderson and Rachlinski, the twin insurance evils of moral
hazard and adverse selection would combine to prevent enterprise
liability from achieving its much-lauded potential to reduce acci-
dent costs. Moreover, even apart from those allegedly fundamen-
tal flaws of enterprise liability as an "insurance scheme,"
149
Henderson and Rachlinski argue that proponents of enterprise lia-
bility have never proposed an operable concept of causation to ac-
company the no-fault liability standard. Upon close inspection,
147. See infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
148. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 244.
149. Id. at 238.
20001 313
314 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:259
Henderson and Rachlinski contend, any causation analysis that
might be offered would either be utterly unworkable or patently
untrue to the theoretical foundations of enterprise liability.
A. Insurance-Based Arguments
According to Henderson and Rachlinski, we do "not even at-
tempt to address the practical problems presented by a strict liabil-
ity system for products." 5 ° More specifically, they claim that our
analysis of enterprise liability "ignores basic mechanics of any in-
surance scheme"151 that would render it unworkable. Henderson
and Rachlinski's characterization is mistaken. One of us has co-
authored five articles entirely or substantially devoted to consider-
ing insurance effects and other alleged practical problems of enter-
prise liability. 152 Above, we briefly reviewed a few of the responses
contained in those articles. 153 Henderson and Rachlinski them-
selves identify one of the most important responses: the fact that
consumers have strong incentives to take care regardless of the
promise of potential tort awards.' 54 But they fail to consider how
that fact significantly dampens their fears of insurance market un-
raveling. More generally, Henderson and Rachlinski do not even
attempt to address our rebuttals of their insurance-based argu-
ments, rebuttals that have been part of the written record for some
time now.
150. Id. at 218.
151. Id. at 238.
152. See, e.g., Hanson & Logue I, supra note 24; Croley & Hanson III, supra
note 24; Croley & Hanson II, supra note 24; Hanson & Logue II, supra note 24; and
Hanson et al., supra note 24.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
154. The authors write: "No tort remedy really fully compensates a parent for
the loss of child or a maimed accident victim for the loss of a limb. Neither would it
be possible for a tort system to offer an adequate sum for damages so as to make
someone truly indifferent between the size of the damages and the injury." Hen-
derson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 250. In other words, because physical losses
of life and limb are imperfectly commensurable with monetary tort awards, the
moral hazard problem is at least partially mitigated in the context of a products
liability system. Henderson and Rachlinski's description of that incommensurabil-
ity exists within the same paper that asserts: "Consumers would have no incentive
to undertake their own precautions if manufacturers were forced to bear all of the
cost of the harm that products cause." Id. at 226. No incentive, one must assume,
except the fact that "it seems unlikely that a consumer, worried about protecting
life and limb, would be willing to ignore safety concerns because the legal system
promises some inadequate financial compensation if injury should occur." Id. at
250.
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Additionally, the lesson that emerges from our work on
behavioralism is this: never underestimate the power of consumer
product manufacturers to influence the behavior of consumers.
Henderson and Rachlinski complain that "[riequiring manufactur-
ers to serve as absolute insurers would impose liability on manu-
facturers for harm that could better be prevented by
consumers," 15 5 apparently believing that manufacturer liability
and consumer prevention are mutually exclusive. We see no rea-
son to assume, however, that the institution of enterprise liability
would cause manufacturers to suddenly abandon their ability to
influence consumer perceptions and preferences-an ability that
Henderson and Rachlinski repeatedly acknowledge. 156 Instead,
we believe that manufacturers would continue to utilize their arse-
nal of weapons to shape consumer views of product risks and ap-
propriate product usages. Under enterprise liability, however, this
arsenal would be deployed in service of a more socially beneficial
cause. Indeed, we believe that the evidence reviewed in our earlier
articles suggests that manufacturers would be quite successful in
this task. At the absolute least, they would be as adept as first-
party insurers.
Because their arguments begin with an inaccurate conception
of enterprise liability as solely a third-party insurance scheme,
Henderson and Rachlinski severely underestimate the potential
for enterprise liability to mitigate the problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection while inspiring more efficient risk-avoidance
behavior on the part of both manufacturers and consumers. By
viewing enterprise liability in this way, Henderson and Rachlinski
neglect the active role that manufacturers play in affecting the in-
cidence and severity of product risks, both through their control of
the design and manufacture of products and their construction of
consumer perceptions and preferences. Similarly, Henderson and
Rachlinski fail to perceive the many ways in which manufacturers
can replicate and, indeed, surpass the efforts of first-party insurers
to segment risk pools and otherwise maintain the integrity of their
insurance systems. Their most serious errors, however, are to
make those assumptions without acknowledging, let alone ad-
dressing, the arguments that undermine them and that have re-
155. Id. at 214.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
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mained unanswered for several years now and then to characterize
us as somehow failing to confront the debate.
B. The Difficulty of Defining Causation
Unlike their insurance-based arguments, one critique of enter-
prise liability that Henderson and Rachlinski have offered has long
gone unanswered. Reviving the powerful critique of enterprise lia-
bility made first by Henderson and Twerski, 157 our present critics
argue that enterprise liability would "flounder hopelessly" 158 in its
attempt to grapple with problems of causation. Without some in-
herent limiting concept like risk-utility or design defect to narrow
the range of causes of harm, the authors believe that the causation
analysis under enterprise liability would set no limit on the num-
ber of potentially liable parties. Yet, if a notion like risk-utility or
design defect is employed to limit the scope of the causation analy-
sis, then the resulting liability system differs from the current sys-
tem in doctrinal terminology only. A chief argument in favor of
enterprise liability is that it requires internalization of all product-
caused accident costs, without applying imprecise concepts such as
fault. That argument, however, loses much of its force if such con-
cepts are incorporated into the analysis through the back door of
causation.
The causation critique of enterprise liability is especially pow-
erful because it addresses the topic in a voice somewhat foreign to
standard legal economic analysis of products liability. Economi-
cally oriented scholars typically begin their analyses with a bare
minimum requirement of "but-for" causation and then, often im-
plicitly and unselfconsciously, look to policy to see if the circum-
stances are such that it makes sense to say that an individual
"caused" the accident. Generally, those policy concerns imply that
the responsible individual is a person who, in some circumstances,
might be able to lower the costs of accidents by adjusting their be-
havior. That is, there are some potential benefits to be reaped
from having that party internalize costs.1 59 The legal system has
157. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 41, at 1279-83.
158. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 241.
159. Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner captured that rela-
tionship between efficiency and causation as follows: "If the basic purpose of tort
law is to promote economic efficiency, a defendant's conduct will be deemed the
cause of an injury when making him liable for the consequences of the injury
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long adopted a very similar approach-asking first if the defendant
is a cause in fact (i.e., "but-for" causation) and next whether,
among the many potential causes in fact, the defendant can justly
be called the "proximate cause." The latter determination is widely
acknowledged by courts and commentators to be driven by policy
considerations. Thus, as positivist legal economists have empha-
sized, the processes for determining causation used by economists
and courts are similar.160
Significantly, with rare exceptions (Henderson and Twerski's
work being chief among them), scholars who have addressed the
topic of products liability have assumed that causation can be
shown. That is, participants in the debate have typically assumed
that, ignoring the conduct of the plaintiff, there are potential deter-
rence benefits to be gained from holding the defendant liable. The
questions being asked by legal economists have instead been of the
following sort: Should manufacturers be liable even when the con-
sumer appears to have known the risk? Even when the consumer
could have done something to prevent the accident? Even when
the accident was not cost-justifiably preventable by the manufac-
turer? Scholars who oppose enterprise liability have answered
"no" to all of these questions. The implicit (and sometimes explicit)
assumption, however, has been that, if those questions were an-
swered otherwise, holding defendants liable would make economic
sense. Absent considerations of plaintiff knowledge and care, in-
ternalizing costs to the defendant is assumed to have beneficial de-
terrence effects in the products liability contexts under discussion.
Most of the major criticisms of enterprise liability, therefore, have
sought to show that the answer to one or more of the three ques-
tions presented above is "no," assuming that causation is
established.
Henderson and Twerski's (and now Henderson and Rachlin-
ski's) contribution to the debate is to draw attention to the ambigu-
ity in the word "causation." They observe that under enterprise
would promote an efficient allocation of resources to safety and care .... " William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach,
12 J. Legal Stud. 109, 110 (1983).
160. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure
of Tort Law 246-47 (1987); Landes & Posner, supra note 159. For more general
efficiency-oriented analyses of causation in tort law, see Guido Calabresi, Concern-
ing Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev.
69, 106-07 (1975).
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liability, manufacturers would supposedly be liable for any acci-
dents that their products "cause." Because "cause" is not defined
explicitly, and because the debate has proceeded largely on the as-
sumption that causation is established, Henderson and Rachlinski
can plausibly claim that defenders of enterprise liability are advo-
cating manufacturer liability for any accident in which "but-for"
causation can be established. At that point it is easy to conjure up
examples of situations in which there are several such "but-for"
causes. For example, Henderson and Rachlinski write:
Assume the following sequence of events: A victim-to-be is
driving an automobile while intoxicated, swerves to avoid a
skate-boarder interfering with traffic, loses control of the au-
tomobile, breaks through a traffic barrier and collides vio-
lently with a tractor-trailer parked by the roadside. Against
which [enterprise liability] insurance pool would a claim for
the victim's injuries appropriately be brought? The automo-
bile's [enterprise liability] insurance pool? The alcoholic bev-
erage's? The skate board's? The traffic barrier's? The
tractor trailer's? Some of the above? All of the above? If sev-
eral, or all, of the relevant insurance pools were implicated,
on what conceptual basis would responsibility be
apportioned? 1' 1
The most important point to note about that hypothetical is
just how far it strays from the prototypical products liability case
of a single consumer product inflicting harm on its user. We
strongly suspect that the majority of consumer product accident
cases do not involve such complex and multifarious causal factors
as Henderson and Rachlinski introduce in their scenario. Thus,
the cases would not require the type of extended proximate causa-
tion analysis that we are about to describe.
Nevertheless, we will take the bait and respond to the ques-
tions raised by Henderson and Rachlinski's scenario. In our view,
those questions are troublesome because the scenario is full of
products that appear to be the "but-for" cause of the injury, but
that, absent more information, do not appear to be tied to the acci-
dent in a way that clearly suggests internalizing costs would be
beneficial. Indeed, by calling the plaintiff a "victim," and by indi-
cating that the plaintiff had considerable control over the accident
(for instance, by not becoming intoxicated in the first place), the
161. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 241.
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example confuses our categories even further. Of all the factors
involved, one might think that it is the plaintiff who "caused" the
injury and that none of the products had any "causal" connection.
Considerations of that sort, however, involve more than the
simple "but-for" type of causation analysis. Instead, they involve
the types of policy judgments that are made in the determination
of "proximate" cause, raising the question of whether and how a
system of enterprise liability would utilize proximate causation
principles to narrow the scope of potentially responsible parties.
Henderson and Rachlinski apparently believe that enterprise lia-
bility would require dismissing the traditional legal concept of
proximate causation altogether, and that is why they argue that
the above hypothetical would cripple a court applying enterprise
liability.'6 2 As Professor Mark Geistfeld has explained, 163 how-
ever, there is no good reason to adopt that view. At the very least,
the current method of determining proximate cause could continue
unabated under enterprise liability. That is a simple, but often
overlooked, point. Identifying a manufacturer to pay for an acci-
dent is not the goal of enterprise liability. In other words, there is
no requirement under enterprise liability that, for every accident
in which "but-for" causation can be shown, a corresponding manu-
facturer must be made to pay compensation. Rather, enterprise
liability would continue to employ concepts of proximate causation
to make the causation analysis tractable.
The question then becomes, of course, what exactly should
those guiding concepts be? Assuming that efficiency is the goal of
the tort system, the answer is simply to hold those parties liable
for whom liability makes the most economic sense. Elsewhere, one
of us (with Melissa Hart) 64 has proposed a series of questions re-
garding any accident context that can be helpful in determining
whether or not the imposition of liability would have beneficial effi-
ciency effects. Pertinent considerations include: whether a partic-
ular party appears to have the ability to undertake cost-justifiable
investments in care that would prevent or lessen the harm;
162. See id.
163. See Mark Geistfeld, Implementing Enterprise Liability: A Comment on
Henderson and Twerski, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1157, 1162-66 (1992).
164. See Jon D. Hanson & Melissa R. Hart, Law and Economics, in A Compan-
ion to Philosophy of the Law and Legal Theory 311-31 (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1994).
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whether imposing costs would help regulate activity levels;
whether a particular party's responsiveness to legal incentives is
blunted by forces like judgment-proofness, insurance, social norms,
or, as discussed earlier, an overriding aversion to personal injury
due to the inadequate nature of financial compensation; and
whether a particular party is in a good position to spread the costs
of those accidents that cannot be prevented. To that list, we would
add the question of whether a particular party's market position
affords them the ability and incentive to manipulate risk percep-
tions. One can see that considerations of that sort go much further
than the analysis of defect that Henderson and Rachlinski offer as
the "'conceptual linchpin' that holds products liability law to-
gether."165 Activity levels, to give just one example, are crucial de-
terminants of the efficiency of product markets, yet they find no
purchase in the defect analysis that forms the core of present prod-
ucts liability law. The causation analysis for enterprise liability
that we envision allows one to consider the full panoply of ways in
which liability can help ensure that the goals of the legal system
are served.
Returning to Henderson and Rachlinski's hypothetical, the
question becomes one of choosing among possible parties to hold
liable (or to spread liability among) with those sorts of considera-
tions in mind. For instance, one might suspect that automobiles
can be equipped with breathalyzer devices that disable the en-
gine's starter system unless the driver passes a sobriety test. In
other words, one might suspect that the care level of car manufac-
turers (as opposed to say, skate board manufacturers) could best
influence this particular accident context, even if one cannot estab-
lish that the car was defectively designed. In such a case, liability
might be placed upon the automobile manufacturer in Henderson
and Rachlinski's hypothetical, in order to spur development of
some as-yet unidentified design improvement. Alternatively, one
might present evidence that the drunken driver had been served
repeatedly by a tavern keeper. Holding tavern keepers liable
might well have beneficial deterrence effects in such a case, even
when they cannot be shown to have known that the patron was
intoxicated. Finally, one might present evidence that alcohol man-
ufacturers and distributors have spent billions of dollars to support
165. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 241 n.110 (quoting Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 41, at 1267).
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a market for excessive drinking, as partially acknowledged by the
Seagram and Pabst courts discussed above. Under enterprise lia-
bility, at least some of those dollars might be devoted toward, say,
discouraging drunk driving, helping tavern keepers and liquor
stores find ways to avoid selling to customers likely to drink and
drive, and lobbying for federal regulations that might lead to the
addition of breathalyzer ignition systems.
We wish to emphasize that a system of enterprise liability cou-
pled with the type of causation analysis that we are describing is
considerably more complicated and unruly than admitted by ear-
lier analyses of enterprise liability. In that regard, Henderson and
Rachlinski (and Twerski) have made an important point. Enter-
prise liability cannot adopt a workable notion of causation for cases
of a certain complexity without simultaneously retreating some-
what on its promise to avoid independent efficiency analysis. In-
deed, by asking juries to consider efficiency and manipulative
conduct as factors in the proximate causation determination, we
are guilty of incorporating some of the same command-and-control
subjectivity that we criticize above in the context of FTC regulation
and traditional product-defect litigation. Nevertheless, we believe
that the arguments we have made in favor of enterprise liability
throughout this and other articles still hold.166
Difficulties in the analysis of causation are nothing new to tort
law and exist under any regime in which causation is an element.
As Judge Calabresi recently put it:
Did the action for which the defendant is responsible cause,
in a legal sense, the harm which the plaintiff suffered?-a
question easily put and often very hard to answer. There is,
166. If they do not, and if the sort of causation analysis that we are describing
is too complex to do well, as Henderson and Rachlinski might argue, then we are at
a loss to see how a fault-based liability scheme is preferable to enterprise liability,
given that it requires a similar analysis in every case. Indeed, if such efficiency-
oriented determinations cannot be made reliably, perhaps legal theorists, our-
selves included, should stop treating efficiency as the actual or desirable goal of
tort law. If the laws we apply cannot consistently lead to more efficient outcomes,
then why adopt efficiency as the goal of those laws? Perhaps instead we should
recognize that other considerations can and should influence legal judgments, both
because such considerations matter to humans (even if they do not matter to Homo
Economicus) and because they can help sort out otherwise intractable problems.
Cf Hanson & Reyes, supra note 20. As indicated above, we believe that behavi-
oralist insights such as the problem of market manipulation could be introduced as
an important first step toward such a richer proximate causation analysis.
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moreover, no older requirement in this area of law than the
need to show such a link between the defendant's actions and
the plaintiffs loss. It long precedes the obligation to show
that the defendant was at fault. Along with the showing of
injury, causation constituted an essential part of what the
plaintiff had to demonstrate for the early common law action
in trespass to lie.
Over the centuries the courts have struggled to give
meaning to this requirement-in the simplest of situations,
who hit whom, and in the most complex ones, which polluter's
emissions, if any, hurt which plaintiff.167
Those struggles, however, have yielded only a "welter of
confusion."16s
The real thrust of the causation critique, therefore, is
this-there are limits to what enterprise liability can accomplish.
Enterprise liability is not the iiber-efficient panacea that early ad-
vocates portrayed it to be or that it appears to be when legal aca-
demic debate proceeds on the assumption that causation is
uncontroversial. That limitation, however, only appears as such
because the products liability debate has for so long dealt in ideal-
ized liability rules with the assumption that causation is clearly
established. In actuality, products liability cases involve difficult,
murky questions of causation. As a result, there are some harms
that are simply unreachable by the tort system. Multiple causa-
167. Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381,383-84 (2d. Cir. 1998) (footnotes
omitted).
168. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts 41, at
263 (5th ed. 1984) ("There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has
called forth more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of
confusion. Nor, despite the manifold attempts.. . to clarify the subject, is there yet
any general agreement as to the best approach."); id. at 42 ("'Having no integrated
meaning of its own, [proximate cause's] chameleon quality permits it to be substi-
tuted for any one of the elements of a negligence case when decision on that ele-
ment becomes difficult. . . . No other formula . . . so nearly does the work of
Aladdin's lamp.") (quoting Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law,
28 Tex. L. Rev. 471 (1950)); see also Joseph W. Glannon, The Law of Torts: Exam-
ples and Explanations 145 (1995):
A great deal of confusion persists about what the term 'proximate cause is
meant to convey. Students find this very frustrating: Justifiably, [they]
would like some answers, some solid ground on which to base an under-
standing of a difficult concept. Frankly, so would I; I have done my home-
work on this problem, read a lot of heady articles, sorted though the cases,
but if I ever thought I could settle this problem ... I was wrong.
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tion problems, which feature prominently in Henderson and Rach-
linski's analysis, are one such category of harms. Another
category-harms for which the period of latency is so long that sci-
ence, and the tort system, struggle to unravel the controlling
causal forces-may ultimately be more important. In both cases,
however, the most one can say is that enterprise liability would
suffer a limitation that every system of products liability suffers.
Enterprise liability would not be similarly limited for the many re-
maining categories of product-caused harms that are both more
comprehensible and, we suspect, more common.
C. Summary
Far from revealing enterprise liability as an unworkable sys-
tem of products liability regulation, Henderson and Rachlinski
have merely raised two bogeymen, one familiar but fallacious, the
other accurate but most likely insignificant and, in any event, ap-
plicable to all liability regimes. The insurance-based arguments
that Henderson and Rachlinski make have been sufficiently ad-
dressed in several articles written over the previous decade. Not
only do Henderson and Rachlinski fail to respond to those articles,
they accuse us of ducking the debate. The authors' causation cri-
tique is more fairly made. They rightly point out that enterprise
liability will be forced to include some form of command-and-con-
trol concepts when faced with certain difficult questions of causa-
tion. Their own example, however, reveals the limited impact of
the point. We invite readers to reread Henderson and Rachlinski's
hypothetical and ask themselves whether its "slapstick"169 routine
typifies products liability cases or whether instead it serves to dis-
tract one from the fact that, for the great majority of product
harms, liability, not causation, is the contentious issue and enter-
prise liability, not a fault-based regime, is the most efficacious
resolution.
169. James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, The Unworkability of Court-
Made Enterprise Liability: A Reply to Geistfeld, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1174, 1175
(1992).
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IV. THE ALLEGED PROBLEM OF CONSUMER OVERESTIMATION OF
PRODUCT RISKS
Finally, Henderson and Rachlinski contend that, despite hav-
ing "superficial appeal,"170 our argument is "ultimately unpersua-
sive"171 because it fails to account for a different problem of market
manipulation:
[0]n its own terms, the new rhetoric advocating [enterprise
liability] fails to 'take behavioralism seriously' by ignoring
the fact that the manipulation of consumers is a two-way
street .... Consequently, just as some manufacturers most
certainly attempt to induce consumers to behave as if a prod-
uct is safer than it appears, others no less certainly attempt
to induce consumers to behave as if a product is more danger-
ous than it appears. 172
Advocates of enterprise liability traditionally cite consumer
underestimation of product risks as a primary reason for institut-
ing enterprise liability. Because manufacturers appear to have the
ability to influence consumers' perceptions in the direction of both
underestimation and overestimation, Henderson and Rachlinski
argue that enterprise liability is an unjustified "abandoning [of]
the central feature of products-liability law."17 3
A. Manufacturer Incentives To Shape Consumer Perceptions
of Risk
Contrary to Henderson and Rachlinski's assertion, we did not
ignore the possibility that manipulation is a two-way street. Our
earlier work contained numerous instances in which we describe
how manufacturers sometimes seek to increase consumer percep-
tions of risk. Indeed, in our review of manipulative marketing
techniques, we included entire sections dedicated to examples of
"Environmentally Marketed Products," "Products Marketed to
Thrillseekers," and "Products Utilizing Fear Appeals," 174 all of
which involved manufacturer attempts to heighten consumer
awareness of some risks related to the manufacturers' products.
170. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 218.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 218-19 (footnotes omitted).
173. Id. at 253.
174. Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1459-66.
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For instance, with regard to the use of fear appeals, 175 we high-
lighted several ways in which manufacturers can raise demand for
their products by exploiting consumer safety concerns. In particu-
lar, we noted that manufacturers of products whose utility lies in
guarding against some harm have particularly strong incentives to
elevate consumer estimations of the severity of that harm. That
type of overselling of safety matches Henderson and Rachlinski's
examples of cereal and vitamin manufacturers who elevate con-
sumer awareness of cancer risks in order to promote their
products.176
We also noted in our earlier articles that manufacturers are
subject to what we called the Volvo Effect.177 A manufacturer has
little incentive to lower consumers' risk perceptions in circum-
stances in which its customers are not already concerned about the
product's risks.17s When consumers do have some awareness of
the product risk, however, it becomes necessary for manufacturers
to manage the content of that awareness. In our view, therefore,
the reason that one sees widespread attempts by automobile man-
ufacturers to position their vehicles as particularly safe is precisely
because consumers are now aware that driving is a dangerous ac-
tivity and at least some of that danger is within the control of man-
ufacturers. 179 This Volvo Effect helps to explain Henderson and
Rachlinski's examples involving tire and automobile manufactur-
ers. Although they claim that such advertising reflects an effort on
the part of the manufacturer to raise pre-existing estimates of the
risks of driving, we view the advertising as an attempt to position
that particular manufacturer's product as the least dangerous in
its class.
Thus, far from "ignoring" the type of manufacturer behavior
that Henderson and Rachlinski emphasize, we both identified it
and explained it within our model. Indeed, as we discuss below,180
175. See id. at 1462-66.
176. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 245.
177. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1466 n.252.
178. The tobacco industry has expressed that very point in one of its strategy
documents regarding how to respond to consumer health concerns. See NM 942
(explaining that "[flor companies in countries where the 'health' concern is dor-
mant," "[tihese companies should not initiate any action which brings the issue to
the fore").
179. We return to this topic in significantly more detail below. See infra text
accompanying notes 241-77.
180. See infra text accompanying note 364.
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on many occasions we have argued that, to the extent it exists, the
problem of consumer overestimation of product risks can be ad-
dressed most effectively by a products liability regime of enterprise
liability. Nevertheless, given Henderson and Rachlinski's re-
peated claim that we have ignored the subject, we will provide in
this Section a slightly more extended discussion of the circum-
stances under which manufacturers would attempt to increase con-
sumer risk perceptions. As will be seen, Henderson and
Rachlinski's claims about "the possibility that manufacturers fre-
quently have incentives to overstate the risks products pose"18 ' are
themselves greatly overstated.
1. Selling Safety Does Not Necessarily Lead to Overestimation of
Product Risks
To begin with, Henderson and Rachlinski's argument is
plagued by a fundamental ambiguity regarding the type of risk
that is supposedly being overstated by manufacturers. The au-
thors admit that elevating perceptions of a product risk appears to
be a questionable, if not irrational, strategy for manufacturers to
adopt insofar as doing so would reduce demand.'8 2 They then ob-
serve, however, that "the media are filled with advertisements that
remind consumers of risks posed by some product-related activi-
ties."' 83 From that evidence, the authors conclude that the prob-
lem of manipulation directed toward consumer overestimation of
product risks is significant.
There is, we think, a non sequitur in Henderson and Rachlin-
ski's argument that has been concealed by their use of the term
"product-related activities." That term allows the authors to re-
count anecdotes that appear to represent instances in which
"[aidvertisements . . . lead people to overestimate the risk that
product-related activities pose."184 But the term simultaneously
distracts readers from the more important point that it is the risk
of products and not product-related activities that is of central con-
cern to the debate over enterprise liability. Once Henderson and
Rachlinski's argument is stripped of those elements of manufac-
turer manipulation that do not actually support their the-
181. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 244.
182. See id. at 244-45.
183. Id. at 245.
184. Id.
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sis-indeed, that fit more comfortably within our analysis of
consumer product markets-the problem of consumer overestima-
tion of product risks appears to be of far less significant concern.
a. Perceptions of Risk From "Product-Related Activities"
The conflation of risk categories appears most obviously in
Henderson and Rachlinski's use of examples such as the "cereal
and vitamin makers [who] remind viewers of the risks of con-
tracting cancer."185 In those examples, the subject risk does not
concern a consumer product at all; that is, even if consumers do
overestimate the risk of cancer due to sensationalist vitamin ads,
they are not overestimating the risk of any product. Henderson
and Rachlinski appear to acknowledge that fact, as when they
state that "[in some instances, the advertised products constitute
stand-alone precautions against the unavoidable risks that life...
poses."18 6 What they do not acknowledge, however, is the fact that
manufacturer hyping of such external risks in no way supports the
thesis that "manufacturers frequently have incentives to overstate
the risks products pose."' 8 7
Indeed, by holding an artificially inflated view of a product's
capacity to prevent an external risk, consumers may concomitantly
be underestimating the risk of the harm posed by the product it-
self. As cognitive psychologist Paul Slovic has noted, individuals
often confuse the concepts of cost and benefit, allowing their im-
pression of one of those concepts to influence their estimate of the
other: "[Judgments of risk and benefit are negatively correlated.
For many hazards, the greater the perceived benefit, the lower the
perceived risk and vice versa."'88 In that manner, a strong percep-
tion of a product's benefits can, by itself, cause consumers to under-
estimate the costs of that same product, including its expected
accident costs.'8 9 Thus, because they involve attempts to enhance
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 244 (emphasis in original
removed).
188. Paul Slovic, Rational Actors and Rational Fools: The Influence ofAffect on
Judgment and Decision-Making, 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 163, 180-81 (2000)
(footnotes omitted); see also Ali Siddiq Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological
Study of the Inverse Relationship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14
Risk Analysis 1085 (1994).
189. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 2, at 733.
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the perceived benefits of a product in guarding against some exter-
nal risk, the advertisements that Henderson and Rachlinski be-
lieve support their view of consumer overestimation of product
risks may actually provide stronger support for our view of con-
sumer underestimation.
To better understand those dynamics, consider a concrete ex-
ample. In Henderson and Rachlinski's discussion of vitamin and
cereal manufacturers who emphasize cancer risks, the authors no-
where mention that many vitamin supplements pose health risks
of their own to users. Iron overuse, to give just one example, has
been linked with such problems as arthritis, heart disease, cirrho-
sis, diabetes and impotence. Those risks are especially high for in-
dividuals with hemochromatosis, a condition that can only be
diagnosed by a physician.190 Yet, faced with a barrage of ads re-
garding the risk of cancer from makers of fortified breakfast cere-
als and vitamin supplements, individuals could easily discount the
relative risk of iron overload. Indeed, when one examines the be-
havior of manufacturers with respect to the potential hazards of
vitamin supplements-rather than the external risk of cancer-one
sees the familiar attempt to lower rather than raise consumer risk
estimates. One vitamin supplement manufacturer, for instance,
long marketed its products under the suggestive name "Self-Care,"
even when its fine print warning label advised consumers only to
use the products under the care of a physician. In other words,
when vitamin manufacturers discuss the health or safety risks
posed by the products themselves-rather than some harm that the
products allegedly help to prevent-they do so by engaging in pre-
cisely the type of manipulation that we described in our earlier ar-
ticles. Moreover, for the same reasons that we outlined in our
earlier articles, enterprise liability represents the best products li-
ability regime to combat such conduct.
Even with respect to the vitamin manufacturers' emphasis of
cancer risks, the best that products liability law can do in such a
situation is institute enterprise liability. In our earlier articles, we
specifically addressed such manipulative tactics, and argued that
no products liability law as currently conceived would be fully ef-
fective in responding to them, primarily because no liability sys-
190. See Meghan E. Flynn, A Year in Review From A to Z, Environmental Nu-
trition (Dec. 1997).
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tern can mitigate manufacturers' ability to shape consumer views
of product benefits, as opposed to product costs. 191 A system of en-
terprise liability would force the makers of vitamins to pay for the
costs of any side effects that occur from consumption of their prod-
ucts. It would therefore make the manipulation of perceived prod-
uct benefits more difficult by requiring the incorporation of actual
product costs. It would also reduce the sheer volume of manipu-
lated purchases that occur simply through the price effect of higher
prices from internalized accident costs. Still, though, the "purvey-
ors of excess safety" would remain free to press their wares
through sensationalist appeals to cancer risks that are allegedly
reduced through consumption of the offered product. Contrary to
Henderson and Rachlinski's apparent view, that type of manipula-
tion is simply not a subject of products liability law. As such, it can
in no way be considered a deficit of enterprise liability.
b. Perceptions of Risk From Other Products
Henderson and Rachlinski also confuse the relevant risks
when they describe advertisements for automobile tires,192 bicycle
helmets 9 3 and medical equipment. 194 In each of those instances,
the manufacturer is selling a product that is used in conjunction
with a different product that is itself risky. Efforts to manipulate
risk perceptions are therefore directed at the consumer's percep-
tions of risk from that different product. For instance, if any prod-
uct risk perception is heightened by the image of infants in tires
with the tagline, "you have a lot riding on your tires," it seems pri-
marily to be the risk posed by automobiles, not tires. The adver-
tised tires are positioned as an effective means of reducing
whatever risk may be posed by automobiles. That is a significant
distinction. On August 9, 2000, Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., an-
nounced the recall of millions of its tires amidst reports from the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration that the tire was
responsible for more deaths than any other safety recall in that
agency's history, causing at least forty-six deaths in the U.S.195
191. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1566-67.
192. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 245.
193. See id. at 247.
194. See id. at 245.
195. See James R. Healey, Tires to Be Recalled, USA Today, Aug. 9, 2000, at
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Over the ensuing months, the estimated death toll in the U.S. in-
creased to 119 and the chief executive officer of Bridgestone/Fire-
stone resigned amidst allegations that the company and its chief
customer, Ford Motor Company, had long been aware of the al-
leged product defect. 196 It seems safe to assume that no Bridge-
stone/Firestone (or competitor) advertisements ever mentioned the
possibility of such a tragic episode.
Similarly, the medical equipment manufacturer that depicts a
horrific car accident 197 may arguably enhance consumer aware-
ness of the dangers of driving, but consumer awareness of the dan-
gers of medical equipment is probably not at play in the
advertisement at all. If it is, the effect will most likely be to lower
consumer appreciation of such dangers by enhancing their view of
the benefits of medical equipment. 198 Again, Henderson and Rach-
linski appear to recognize the distinction between risk perceptions
of the product being sold and the product being protected
against, 199 but they nowhere consider how that distinction se-
verely complicates their thesis regarding consumer overestimation
of product risks. We believe their the examples, upon careful re-
view, fail to support the argument that manufacturers face signifi-
cant incentives to prompt consumer overestimation of product
risks.
For instance, even assuming that Henderson and Rachlinski
are correct that manipulative advertisements in favor of precau-
tionary products result in consumer overestimation of the dangers
of the product being protected against, the incentives and opportu-
196. See Terril Yue Jones, Firestone Removes Top Exec Ono, L.A. Times, Oct.
11, 2000, at Cl; Keith Bradsher, 2 Firestone Studies in 1999 Pointed to Tire
Problems, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 2000, at A25; David Barboza, Firestone Workers Cite
Lax Quality Control, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2000, at Cl; Miki Tanikawa, Bridge-
stone President Admits Tire Quality-Control Problems, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2000,
at Cl; Keith Bradsher, Ford Says Firestone Was Aware of Flaw In Its Tires by
1997, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 2000, at Al; see also Thomas A. Fogarty, Can Courts'
Cloak of Secrecy Be Deadly? Judicial Orders Protecting Companies Kept Tire Case
Quiet, USA Today, Oct. 16, 2000, at 1B (claiming that Bridgestone/Firestone has
settled dozens of tire-tread separation lawsuits with confidentiality provisions over
the last decade).
197. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 245.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
199. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 247 ("Manufacturers that
sell only safety-related complements to risky activities also have incentives to
heighten consumer fears, even though doing so reduces sales of the underlying
product.").
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nities for manufacturers to manipulate consumer risk perceptions
remain highly asymmetric as between under- and overestimation
of product risks. Henderson and Rachlinski complain that "[it
would be naive to assume that the competing efforts of manufac-
turers who attempt to dampen consumers' fears invariably cancel
the efforts of manufacturers who attempt to heighten them."200
However, as we have argued in our earlier articles, all manufac-
turers have incentives to ensure that consumer estimates of risks
posed by their particular products are low. In response, Hender-
son and Rachlinski argue that some manufacturers of precaution-
ary products also have incentives to ensure that consumer
estimates are high with respect to risks posed by a different prod-
uct that their products are designed to guard against.
We believe it would be naive to assume that those latter,
largely happenstance incentives to maximize perceived risk even
remotely operate to cancel out the uniform and powerful incentive
that manufacturers have to minimize the perceived risk of their
particular offerings. The vast majority of consumer products do
not have companion preventative products akin to the bicycle hel-
met. Instead, they exist as independent offerings for which no
product manufacturer will have an incentive to emphasize their
risks. Still, Henderson and Rachlinski seem to take comfort in the
fact that one medical equipment manufacturer happened to extol
the virtues of its product by emphasizing the possibility of automo-
bile accidents-a risk that, significantly, is not unknown to con-
sumers. Conceivably, their argument would carry weight if
medical equipment manufacturers were given a $350 billion dollar
advertising budget and powerful economic incentives to create ad-
vertisements portraying every other potentially risky consumer
product on the market, including especially those many products
that have not yet been recognized by consumers as potentially dan-
gerous in the way that automobiles have been. As it is, such com-
petitive counter-manipulation simply does not occur in amounts
significant enough to alter the conclusions of this debate.
More importantly, it is not at all clear that marketing and pro-
motional efforts by manufacturers of "safety-related complements
to risky activities"20 actually result in consumers overestimating
200. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 253.
201. Id. at 247.
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the riskiness of the underlying product or activity. The fear ap-
peals that we emphasized in our earlier articles,20 2 which did ap-
pear designed to elevate, or at least highlight, consumers' fears, all
involved situations in which manufacturers can increase demand
for their preventative products without limit, since the harm being
guarded against did not involve a consumer product. Henderson
and Rachlinski's examples of advertisements for companion prod-
ucts such as bicycle helmets, on the other hand, face an important
limitation: Every consumer that is scared out of purchasing a bicy-
cle is one less prospective consumer of a bicycle helmet. Therefore,
manufacturers of such companion products, if anything, seem far
more likely to encourage, rather than discourage, consumption of
the "basic product," as doing so will lead directly to increased con-
sumption of the associated safety gear.20 3
Henderson and Rachlinski identify no evidence of the actual
results of the advertising campaigns that they describe to rebut
such logic. 20 4  Instead, they rely on assertions such as the
following:
[M]anufacturers of bicycle helmets want to encourage cyclists
to believe that their activity poses real risks that can be alle-
viated through the purchase of helmets. Increasing the per-
ceived dangers associated with cycling surely discourages
some people from engaging in the activity who consequently
would not buy a helmet, but it might increase the sales of
helmets overall. 20 5
Again, however, there is no evidence to support the claim that
the marketing of helmets increases consumers' risk perceptions or
discourages some people from cycling. Indeed, the more plausible
202. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
203. Henderson and Rachlinski have an argument in response: Some manufac-
turers may gain greater market share by overstating the risk of the "basic prod-
uct," even if the overall market for helmets is thereby reduced. Because that same
argument is made primarily with respect to manufacturer manipulation of percep-
tions of risk from the actual product being sold, we will address it in the sections
immediately following.
204. The only evidence of that type that Henderson and Rachlinski provide
suggests that media treatment of silicon breast implants may have caused an over-
estimation of the risks of breast implants. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra
note 9, at 248. The example, however, deals only with the effects of"a single tele-
vision news-magazine report," id., and does not in any way represent actions by a
manufacturer to raise consumer awareness of a product risk.
205. Id. at 247.
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story is that the selling of helmets, if it increases risk perceptions
at all, only does so insofar as it simultaneously reassures bicycle
consumers that the helmet will substantially alleviate those risks.
Unlike Henderson and Rachlinski, we see no reason why a manu-
facturer would need to discourage people from buying bikes when
advertising helmets.
Although we do not have the same caliber of evidence for bike
helmets that we have for cigarettes, we were able to learn some
interesting things about the way in which bikes and bike helmets
tend to be sold. We contacted Rob Ferola, the sales manager of The
Cycle Loft, New England's largest single bicycle store, and Jeff
Haase, the leading salesperson in the country for Gary Fisher
Bikes, a manufacturer of premier mountain bikes. Those individu-
als provided us with the perspectives of, respectively, one person
who is in charge of sales at a single, highly successful store, and
another who has visited and spent time in many stores across sev-
eral states. In their experience, all bicycle stores carry helmets
and those helmets are virtually always displayed openly and in the
same showroom as the bikes. If it were the case that bike helmets
deterred shoppers from purchasing bikes, it seems likely that bike
shops would not sell helmets or would at least place them in a spe-
cial place to be seen only by those customers who specifically asked
for them. Neither of the individuals we spoke to had experienced
or heard of a situation in which a customer had decided not to
purchase a bike because of seeing or being shown the helmets. Al-
though some consumers do express safety concerns, they generally
arrive at the store with those concerns in mind, and the presence of
a range of helmets is often a source of some comfort-not the other
way around.
The actual marketing of bicycle helmets, moreover, seems
more consistent with our story of manufacturers leading consum-
ers to underestimate product risks, in this case by overstating the
degree to which the precautionary product will help to prevent
harm. Many of the advertisements appear designed to impart to
consumers a feeling of control over the risks of cycling through
their selection of a helmet. For instance, Bell Sports, the world's
largest manufacturer of bicycle helmets, features images of exhila-
rating off-road mountain biking in its marketing, along with the
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slogan, "Courage for Your Head."206 The website for Cratoni Hel-
mets, a leading German manufacturer, sports a video introduction
of mountain scenes, a revolving helmet, and alternating flashes of
the messages, "Cratoni Helmets" and "No Limits."207 That com-
pany's Mountain Maniac line of helmets is described as follows:
"What are you-CRAZY? We hope so because this helmet was de-
signed for you. Are you drooling over it yet?... The Maniac en-
courages you to push the limit ... "2o8 Even buyers of the
company's less aggressive "Leisure" line of helmets are assured
that "Iclasual rides through the city park are more fun when you
are confident in your safety."20 9
One also sees helmet manufacturers utilizing the familiar ap-
peal to pseudo-scientific product features that we described in our
earlier articles.210 Lazer, a Belgium manufacturer, boldly pro-
claims that its Millennium helmet "is really a champion when it
comes to safety and finish because of its In Mould production pro-
cess. Its brand new Quick Grip System (QGS) allows for everyone
to adapt the helmet to his morphology, even while riding your bike.
Loosening a bit during hill climbing and come back to a firmer grip
during downhill can be done in a snap."211 We are not entirely
sure what that plug means, but the ability to adjust the helmet to
our individual morphology, even while cycling downhill, sounds
very impressive. Similarly, the "BrainTrust retention system" of
Specialized, a leading U.S. manufacturer, is "designed to provide
maximum, cool, lightweight protection for your head... [aind all
the valuable stuff inside it."212 Again, we are not sure what ex-
actly a "BrainTrust retention system" offers helmet purchasers,
but given that Specialized derives the bulk of its profits from sell-
ing bicycles, we are fairly confident that the marketing is not de-
signed to talk consumers out of purchasing a bike.
206. See Bell Sports, at http:J/www.bellbikehelmets.com (last visited Dec. 6,
2000).




210. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1453.
211. Lazer, at http://www.lazer.be/accessbicycle.htm (last visited Dec. 6,
2000).
212. Specialized, at http://www.specialized.com/products/family?familyid
1004&parentfamilyid=10002 (last visited Dec. 6, 2000).
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In short, for at least two reasons we are far less confident than
Henderson and Rachlinski that the efforts of some manufacturers
to sell their precautionary products will significantly mitigate the
problem of manufacturer manipulation toward consumer opti-
mism. First, the limited role that such precautionary products
play in the marketplace prevents them from providing anything
other than incomplete and unreliable countereffects to the multi-
tude of product risks that consumers face and for which manufac-
turers have clear incentives to lower consumer risk perceptions.
Second, it is not at all clear that the counter-manipulative efforts
that do exist in the marketplace actually have the effect of raising
consumer estimates of any product risk, as Henderson and Rach-
linski claim.
c. Perceptions of Risk From the Product Being Sold
Thus, the first two categories of examples offered by Hender-
son and Rachlinski involve merely indirect attempts to heighten
the perceived utility of an advertised product by pointing out dan-
gers posed by some other activity altogether. Their final category
of examples, however, features efforts by manufacturers to shape
consumer perceptions of the specific product being advertised. Be-
cause those examples bear far more directly on the possibility of
manufacturer-induced pessimism with respect to product risks,
they must shoulder the weight of Henderson and Rachlinski's
claim that "just as some manufacturers most certainly attempt to
induce consumers to behave as if a product is safer than it appears,
others no less certainly attempt to induce consumers to behave as
if a product is more dangerous than it appears."213
Henderson and Rachlinski seem to assume that any such at-
tempt to sell a safer product will have the effect of increasing con-
sumers' risk perceptions for both the generic product category
involved and for the brand being advertised. 214 With that assump-
tion in place, the authors interpret any evidence of manufacturers
marketing "safer" products as evidence that those manufacturers
213. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 218-19.
214. For instance, the authors note:
A successful scare campaign will frighten many consumers in the market,
thereby increasing demand for safety. Even though this tactic presuma-
bly reduces demand for the basic product, it will differentially and offset-
tingly benefit the manufacturer who has developed a relative advantage
in offering safety precautions.
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are attempting to raise consumer risk perceptions. Moreover, they
seem to think that such evidence supports the view that manufac-
turer incentives to lead consumers to overestimate product risks
are comparable in strength to incentives to lead consumers to un-
derestimate such risks. That assumption is not only unsupported,
it is, we strongly suspect, unsupportable.
Like their repetition of the phrase "product-related activities,"
Henderson and Rachlinski's use of the term "basic product"215 ob-
fuscates what is actually going on in manufacturer efforts to em-
phasize product safety. Because the efforts involve an interplay
between perceptions of risk from both a generic product category
(i.e., cars) and the specific product being advertised (i.e., a Volvo),
there are at least three possible effects that such efforts might
have on consumer risk perceptions. First, they could increase con-
sumers' pre-existing risk perceptions of both the generic product
and, to a lesser extent,216 the specific brand. Second, selling safety
could increase pre-existing risk perceptions of the generic product
but lower those of the specific brand. And, finally, selling safety
could reduce pre-existing risk perceptions of both the generic prod-
uct and the specific brand.
Of those three possibilities, the incentives faced by manufac-
turers will be strongest for selling safety with the third effect,
which both expands the generic product market and increases de-
mand for the specific product, and weakest for selling safety with
the first effect, which may marginally increase market share but
only at the cost of decreasing the generic product market. Even
with respect to the second effect, consumers are not necessarily left
overestimating a specific product's risk, as Henderson and Rach-
linski argue. To the contrary, depending upon the nature of con-
sumer perceptions prior to manipulation, consumers may well be
left underestimating that risk. For example, while consumers may
Id. at 246; see also id. ("Even advertisements that seem, at least superficially, de-
signed to assuage consumer fears might actually be targeted at heightening
them.").
215. See id. ("Even though this tactic presumably reduces overall demand for
the basic product. . . ."); id. at 248 ("In many cases, manufacturers can capture
greater market share for their brands by overstating the risks the basic product
poses.").
216. If the marketing effort resulted in an equal or greater increase in risk per-
ceptions of the specific brand, sales would not only decrease market-wide, but also
with respect to the particular brand at issue. Thus, manufacturers would not en-
gage in such efforts, at least not for long.
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have a heightened awareness of the dangers of driving due to an
advertisement featuring "personal testimonials of people who sur-
vived accidents in their cars,"217 they may also simultaneously be-
lieve that the particular automobile being advertised reduces those
dangers to a greater extent than it actually does.
In sum, even if a manufacturer were to overstate the risk of
the generic product as a means of grabbing market share, as Hen-
derson and Rachlinski claim, that would not necessarily lead con-
sumers to overestimate the risks of the actual products they
purchase. At times, our critics seem to recognize that fact.218
They do not recognize, however, that in any such instance the
manufacturer's strongest incentive will be to advertise in such a
way that consumers are left underestimating the risks posed by
the specific product being advertised. In other words, the
probability of a product manufacturer purposefully attempting to
raise consumer estimates of the risks of its product remains seem-
ingly insignificant. As discussed in the next Section, several good
theoretical reasons exist to support that intuition.
2. Theoretical Reasons Why Marketing that Increases Product
Risk Perceptions Is Extremely Rare
The previous Section clarified ways in which manufacturers
may utilize health and safety risks in their marketing, promotional
and other influential activities. It also noted that Henderson and
Rachlinski's alleged problem of manufacturer heightening of prod-
uct risk perceptions is actually but one subset of one category of
such activities-and a subset which manufacturers have the weak-
est incentives to pursue. This Section argues that there are sev-
eral other theoretical reasons that the problem of manufacturer-
induced pessimism is unlikely to be significant, particularly as
compared to the problem of manufacturer-induced optimism with
respect to product risks.
a. Generic Product Effects Counteract Specific Product Effects
Henderson and Rachlinski are correct in arguing that there is
some incentive for manufacturers to advertise a product's safety.
217. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 245.
218. See, e.g., id. at 246 ("To be effective, these campaigns must produce some
marginal increase in the level of anxiety about the underlying product-anxiety
that can be mollified by use of 'safer' versions of the product.").
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Still, as scholars have many times noted, such incentives do not
yield a significant amount of "safety" advertising. 219 That is true
because there are also strong disincentives to engage in that sort of
advertising. Put differently, as most legal economists who have
looked at the problem acknowledge, the incentives to advertise
safety are far from complete, which helps to explain the existence
of the aphorism "safety doesn't sell."220
The most important reason that safety does not sell is that it
raises awareness of a negative aspect of the product-its potential
to cause harm. As noted in the previous Section, attempts to mar-
ket one's product by increasing consumer risk perceptions will
often have two contrary effects: it will increase demand for the
manufacturer's brand among competitors, but it will also decrease
demand for the generic product, including the manufacturer's
brand. Henderson and Rachlinski acknowledge that tradeoff, but
go on to argue that the problem of manufacturer overemphasis of
product risks will remain robust, at least under certain market
conditions. 221 In so arguing, however, Henderson and Rachlinski
219. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1466 n.252 (collecting sources);
see also Richard L. Abel, Book Review, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 772, 785 (1985) ("Few
manufacturers seem to find safety an effective 'selling point,' . . . for it hardly
figures prominently in their advertising. The problem, of course, is that advertis-
ing one's own safety or the dangers of a competing product or service simultane-
ously alerts consumers and workers to risk.').
220. See supra text accompanying notes 177-79; see infra text accompanying
notes 241-42; see also Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are
Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 Yale J. on Reg.
159, 163 & n.19 (1984) (summarizing results of several surveys, one of the adver-
tising industry and another of consumer outdoor garden equipment manufacturers
both finding that "in general consumers do not make purchase decisions based on
safety," and a third of consumers finding that "safety was... not.., a significant
consideration"). Judge Posner has explained the reasoning behind the
observation:
There is... a special consideration in the case of safety information: the
firm that advertises that its product is safer than a competitor's may
plant fears in the minds of potential consumers where none existed
before .... He must balance the additional sales that he may gain from
his rivals by convincing consumers that his product is safer than theirs
against the sales that he may lose by disclosing to consumers that the
product contains hazards of which they may not have been aware, or may
have been only dimly aware.
Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. Legal Stud. 205, 211 (1973)
221. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 247 (describing the authors'
"casual, unscientific observation that manufacturers of precautions against una-
voidable risks (or products with highly inelastic demand functions) are more likely
to rely on advertising campaigns that emphasize risk").
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may have overlooked a variety of consequences that flow, or poten-
tially flow, from the acknowledged fact that heightening consumer
fears reduces demand in the overall market for a product.
For instance, if consumers typically perceive little or no real
risk when purchasing and consuming a given product, then any
attempt to market safety will create the possibility of a dramatic
and exaggerated increase in risk perceptions among consumers.
Evidence suggests that individuals' generic, base-rate risk percep-
tions tend to be characterized by discontinuous jumps. Below a
certain level of objective significance, consumers fail to perceive a
risk at all. Beyond that certain level, however, consumers overes-
timate the risk.222 Henderson and Rachlinski themselves recog-
nize that stratification of consumer risk awareness: "[Pleople
engage in one of two responses to risk: alarmist overreaction (take
precautions, better-safe-than-sorry), or complete neglect (out-of-
sight, out-of-mind)." 223 To the extent that consumer product risk
perceptions fall into the category of "complete neglect," therefore,
any attempt by manufacturers to raise awareness of product
hazards will run the risk of prompting "alarmist overreaction." Be-
cause that disproportionate jump in consumer risk awareness will
cause a similarly disproportionate drop in consumer demand for
the relevant product, manufacturers face strong disincentives to
engage in advertising that increase consumer awareness of prod-
uct hazards.
Relatedly, advertising that increases risk perceptions regard-
ing a generic product while attempting to portray one brand of that
product as relatively safe may trigger the effects of loss aver-
sion.224 That is, because the loss associated with the consumer's
perception of greater risk from the generic product will be dispro-
portionately weighted by the consumer, it may offset whatever
supposedly larger gain is associated with the particular product's
safety features. Even if the total market shrinkage resulting from
such a strategy does not offset the share-of-market increase, it will
222. See, e.g., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 1 A.L.I. 225 (1991)
[hereinafter Enterprise Responsibility]. As we have argued at length, there are
many ways in which consumers can underestimate the risks of a product even if
they accurately perceive or overestimate the generic, base-rate risks of a product.
In this section, however, we are referring simply to the latter when discussing
product risks.
223. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 255 (footnote omitted).
224. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 673-74.
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always reduce the rewards of the strategy and thus the incentive
to engage in it in the first place. Manufacturer attempts to lower
risk perceptions, on the other hand, pose no such cost. They not
only help to increase the particular manufacturer's share of the
product market, but they may also increase the total size of the
market as well.
Finally, Henderson and Rachlinski's argument that manufac-
turers face incentives "to exaggerate the risks products pose"22s
does not account for the fact that the exaggeration of risk within
any particular product market is a competitive strategy with a lim-
ited shelf life. As Henderson and Rachlinski note, "grabbing more
market share is no less valuable to a firm than expanding the un-
derlying market for the basic product."226 However, the former
strategy, when pursued through a mechanism that concomitantly
reduces the overall size of the market, cannot be followed indefi-
nitely. Expanding a firm's market share by cannibalizing the mar-
ket will only take the firm so far before it ends up with a 100%
share of a miniscule market. Increasing the size of the overall
market, on the other hand, has no such long-term limit.
In short, manufacturer attempts to elevate consumer risk per-
ceptions erode the very market in which the manufacturer seeks to
increase its share. In contrast, the strategy of lowering risk per-
ceptions is robust and uncompromised by any conflicting effects.
As such, the incentives to lower risk perceptions are stronger than
any competing incentives to raise them.
b. Potential Competition
A second factor militating against the use of marketing and
other manipulative tactics to increase market share at the expense
of market size is the problem posed by free-riding competitors.
That is, insofar as a manufacturer's strategy can be replicated rel-
atively easily by its competitors, the manufacturer will know that
its opportunities to gain profits by distinguishing itself on safety
grounds will often be short lived. Incentives for adopting the strat-
egy, therefore, will be tempered accordingly. That threat of repli-
cation is always a problem for any sort of product improvement in
a competitive market. However, the problem is heightened here by
225. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 219.
226. Id. at 248.
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the fact that, as each member of the industry follows suit, not only
does the original manufacturer's share of the market shrink, but so
does the entire size of the market, inasmuch as the message about
the product's risk is amplified as each competitor joins the fray.
That dynamic effect will also reduce any potential profits that the
original manufacturer might hope to receive for safety invest-
ments, thereby further reducing the incentive to make and market
such investments. 227
c. First-Party Insurance
Potential competitors are not the only force that can reduce
manufacturer incentives to acquire market share by targeting
safety concerns. As noted above,228 the coverage of pecuniary
losses by first-party insurance may cause consumers to behave as
if those losses are externalized, irrespective of what liability rule is
in effect or what assurances are made by manufacturers. Thus,
with respect to the risk of pecuniary losses, consumers may be less
willing to pay for additional precautions, rendering manufacturers
less willing to supply such precautions than they would be in an
efficient market.229 For the same reason, manufacturers would be
less willing to engage in the strategy of increasing (or decreasing)
consumers perceptions of the risk of pecuniary losses in order to
grab market share.
Even with respect to nonpecuniary losses-that is, with respect
to product-caused losses that are not monetary in nature or other-
wise commensurable such that monetary payment is considered
adequate by consumers-the nature of first-party insurance in the
economy dulls, or at least fails to sharpen, the incentive of manu-
facturers to engage in affirmative selling of safety. As noted
227. Of course, it is possible that some safety features can be patented-such
that they cannot be replicated very easily. The very purpose of patents, econo-
mists teach us, is to encourage the development of product improvements when the
threat of replication by competitors would otherwise discourage it. Patent protec-
tion, however, is not available for every product feature. It will seemingly not be
available, for instance, with respect to the many manipulative practices that de-
pend on providing the appearance, rather than the reality, of safety. Thus, with
respect to those manipulative practices that cannot be patented, the threat of po-
tential competition will remain robust.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
229. See generally Hanson & Logue I, supra note 24 (describing in more detail
this and other consequences of the first-party insurance externality).
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above,230 we do not believe that the promise of monetary compen-
sation, whether provided by tort law or first-party insurance, will
make consumers indifferent to personal injury, death, and pain
and suffering. Nevertheless, other things equal, a consumer will
be more concerned about safety precautions when she receives an
insurance-premium discount based upon their presence. Moreo-
ver, by aggregating risk experience data across wide samples of
consumers, first-party insurers could, in theory, serve as a surro-
gate for consumers in the quest to live up to the Homo Economicus
model. That is, first-party insurers could gather information on
product risks that is otherwise unavailable to consumers and make
it salient to them through the parties' contractual relationship.
For almost all consumer products, however, first-party insur-
ers do not adjust premiums or otherwise account for the risk char-
acteristics of products purchased and utilized by their insureds.231
Thus, with respect to most products, manufacturers will not face
the prodding force of first-party insurers who, at least in theory,
could raise consumer awareness of, and willingness to pay for,
product safety precautions. The failure of first-party insurers to so
act with respect to the vast majority of consumer products deprives
the market of a potent instigator of consumer awareness of product
hazards. As such, manufacturers face fewer incentives to exploit
consumer safety concerns than they would in a world of perfectly
(or even well-) functioning first-party insurance.
d. Concerns About the Perceptions of Regulators
Finally, manufacturers must be concerned not just with the
risk perceptions of consumers, but also with the perceptions of ac-
tual and potential regulators. Any strategy that leads consumers
to increase their estimate of risks posed by a particular generic
product is likely to have a similar effect on the variety of regula-
tory institutions that might, based on that estimate, increase the
stringency of their regulation. Any market-share increase, there-
fore, might come not only at the cost of a direct market-size de-
crease, but also at the cost of greater expenses needed to satisfy
230. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
231. See Hanson & Logue I, supra note 24, at 190-94.
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increased regulatory requirements and tort damages, and thus an
indirect market-size decrease. 23 2
e. Summary
The foregoing discussion reveals a number of theoretical rea-
sons to doubt that manufacturers face strong incentives to manipu-
late consumers into overestimating product risks. The most
important point to note from that discussion is that the same disin-
centives, risks, and limitations do not plague manufacturer efforts
to manipulate consumers into underestimating product risks.
That is, with regard to those latter efforts, there is no counteract-
ing decrease in market size caused by the manipulation; no cascad-
ing loss of market size to exacerbate the potential-competition
problem; no failure on the part of first-party insurers to fulfill a
role that would otherwise facilitate the manipulative efforts; and
no concern that emphasizing product hazards will trigger greater
regulatory oversight or increased tort damages.
3. A Closer Look at Henderson and Rachlinski's Examples
Contrary to Henderson and Rachlinski's claim, therefore, the
circumstances under which manufacturers are likely to engage in
advertising or other manipulative conduct that attempts to sell
safety appear to be quite limited.233 According to our analysis,
manufacturers are very unlikely to engage in overt discussions of
product risks in the absence of some predicate consumer concern
about those risks. Moreover, when they do address product risks,
they will frame the discussion in a way that emphasizes the safety,
not the riskiness, of their products. That is, if and when "selling
safety" occurs, it will tend to yield lower consumer estimates of the
risks posed by the product being advertised. Such advertising will
have little or no adverse market-size effects, while having desira-
232. Henderson and Rachlinski's anecdote indicating that some entrepreneurs
may lobby regulators requesting that their products be required by law, see Hen-
derson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 246 n.117, does not significantly undermine
that point. As noted above, see supra text accompanying notes 200-01, the preva-
lence of products that serve as independently sold and purchased precautions
against other products is far too limited to mitigate the problem of manipulation
with respect to the vast majority of consumer products.
233. By "selling safety," we mean selling the appearance of safety, regardless of
whether the appearance is accurate.
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ble market-share (and sometimes even desirable market-size)
effects.
Our analysis also yields a few more specific predictions. For
instance, a manufacturer will be more likely to invest in a safety
feature when its competitors cannot easily replicate equivalent fea-
tures. Other things equal, a manufacturer will also be more will-
ing to adopt safety features (even those that are easily replicated
by competitors) when other forces encourage the addition of such a
feature. For example, regulators might require the feature and/or
insurers might adjust premiums to reflect the expected savings of
the feature. Under those circumstances, the manufacturer will
provide the safety feature notwithstanding the potentially adverse
impact of raising awareness of consumer safety concerns. That is,
once the safety feature is independently required by regulators or
encouraged by first-party insurers through mechanisms such as
premium discounts, the manufacturer will face less of a disincen-
tive to raising consumer awareness of the potential for the product
to cause harm. Moreover, once the manufacturer does begin to
provide the safety feature in that manner, it will have strong rea-
sons to utilize its accompanying marketing and other efforts to po-
sition the feature as one that lowers consumer estimates of product
risks. Finally, holding constant each of those factors, selling safety
will be most likely to occur in circumstances under which any repli-
cation by subsequent, free-riding manufacturers will increase,
rather than decrease, overall market size, given the ex ante incen-
tive of manufacturers to avoid strategies that lead to a cascading
loss of market size when potential competitors imitate such
strategies.234
In addition, from the foregoing analysis, one can see several
reasons why selling safety would tend to be more common in indus-
tries that are heavily regulated than in those that are not. First,
heavy regulation will often correlate with general public aware-
ness of a product risk-because that regulation either resulted from
public awareness or enhanced it or both (indeed, the very fact that
an industry is heavily regulated may carry an important message
to consumers about the product's possible risks). Second, heavy
regulation often entails specific safety standards and the addition
of particular safety features or warnings on products within an in-
234. See supra text accompanying note 227.
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dustry-all factors that might enhance consumer awareness of the
product's generic risks.235 Under those circumstances, manufac-
turers will tend to advertise the safety feature because they will
want to lower consumer risk perceptions that might otherwise be
enhanced by the regulation and the addition of the feature (or be-
cause they will want to claim "credit" for the feature23 6). Further-
more, when an industry is heavily regulated, the regulators
sometimes collect data on numbers and causes of accidents-the
sort of information that can assist first-party insurers in making
more informed judgments about how, if at all, to adjust premiums
to reflect an insured's risks. Such information can also be helpful
to other institutions, such as public health groups and the media,
that can use it to alert the public to the product's risks. Finally,
manufacturers would be more willing to sell safety in response to
general public awareness or mandates created by regulators be-
cause, under those circumstances, such marketing efforts would
seem unlikely to lead to additional regulation.237 In sum, heavy
regulation has the potential to mitigate each of the four impedi-
ments to selling safety that we reviewed above.238
With those admittedly loose predictions in mind, we now turn
to the two examples that Henderson and Rachlinski provide of cir-
cumstances in which manufacturers actually do appear to be sell-
ing safety: cars and cigarettes. 23 9 Before doing so, however, we
think it is important to mention that Henderson and Rachlinski's
only pertinent examples are also the ones typically given by legal
theorists when they argue that the market for safety works reason-
ably well.240 The examples are so popular, we believe, because
they are among the only examples available. Moreover, as we dis-
235. That is not to say that regulation itself informs consumers of a product's
risks. Our point is simply that regulation may tip consumers off that there may be
a significant risk associated with a product.
236. See infra text accompanying notes 267-72.
237. But see infra text accompanying notes 368-71 (describing disincentives to
adoption of safety features caused by present products liability regime).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 219-32.
239. We omit from this discussion examples which bear on manufacturer at-
tempts to emphasize some external risk or a risk from different products. See
supra text accompanying notes 182-203. Instead, we focus only upon Henderson
and Rachlinski's examples that involve arguable attempts by manufacturers to el-
evate perceptions of risk posed by their particular product offerings. As it turns
out, only automobiles and cigarettes from their examples fit that bill.
240. For instance, in discussing the question of "how severe a gap there is in
the ordinary consumer's... appreciation of the comparative risk posed by individ-
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cuss in this Section, they seem to be available precisely for the rea-
sons that we predict and not, as Henderson and Rachlinki would
have it, because manufacturers independently find it in their inter-
est to increase consumers' perceptions of product risks.
a. Automobiles
Henderson and Rachlinski offer numerous examples of car
manufacturers advertising the crashworthiness of their models. 241
We of course concede that some automobile advertising does in-
volve selling safety. The question, however, is whether that adver-
tising likely lowers or raises the pre-existing risk perceptions of
consumers.
A little historical context helps to answer that question. To
begin with, it is important to understand that until relatively re-
cently-say, the late 1980s-a common refrain among American car
manufacturers was that "safety doesn't sell." Not only was that a
frequent phrase heard around the boardrooms of the Big Three,
but it was a guiding principle in advertising and marketing depart-
ual products or workplaces of different firms," the Reporters for the American Law
Institute's study on "enterprise responsibility" stated the following:
Certainly we do have some such product-specific impressions-for exam-
ple, that the Volvo is a much safer motor vehicle than a four-wheel-drive
Samurai. Firms whose products ... are safer than the norm have a mar-
ket incentive to advertise the fact: substantial health information was
provided through advertising in the cigarette industry-"our brand has
less tar"-even before regulation.
Enterprise Responsibility, supra note 222, at 227; see also Paul A. LeBel & Richard
C. Ausness, Toward Justice in Tobacco Policymaking: A Critique of Hanson and
Logue and an Alternative Approach to the Costs of Cigarettes, 33 Ga. L. Rev. 693,
731-32 (1999):
[I1f tobacco companies were otherwise given an incentive to develop safer
cigarettes, they would have no difficulty informing the public about the
health benefits of such a product. Indeed, the experience in other seg-
ments of the economy suggests that 'safety sells,' that is, that risk differ-
entials among brands can be used effectively as a marketing tool .... One
could draw this inference from the safety-conscious marketing campaigns
for Volvo automobiles, for example.
Id.
241. See, e.g., Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 228 ("automobile man-
ufacturers' emphasis on the crashworthiness of their products"); id. at 245 ("a car
manufacturer shows personal testimonials of people who survived accidents in
their cars"); id. ("sellers of basic products emphasize the relative safety of their
versions (or brands) the safety features are designed into the basic products them-
selves; certain types of... automobiles reduce the probability of accidents or the
risks associated with them").
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ments as well; that is, car manufacturers did not put their money
where they would not put their mouths. Moreover, at least accord-
ing to Lee Iacocca's best-selling autobiography, even when manu-
facturers attempted to sell safety, consumers were not interested.
Not only did safety not sell, according to Iacocca, the industry could
not "give the stuff away."242
Obviously, all that has changed. One cannot understand the
reasons for that change without first understanding the emergence
of pressures for safety from outside the car market in the 1960s,
70s, and 80s. Prior to 1966, auto manufacturers had no obligations
under federal law to alert consumers to, or correct, any defects in a
car's design.243 Any regulations involving cars that did exist fo-
cused on altering driver behavior-the implicit assumption among
consumers, commentators, and lawmakers seemed to be that "cars
aren't dangerous, people are." Joan Claybrook and David Bollier
explain:
For decades, [the] extraordinary toll exacted on the highways
was not linked to the safety of automobiles themselves. The
auto industry instead attributed the many deaths and inju-
ries associated with its product to driver habits, the unpre-
dictable "human factor" that was beyond industry control.
The traffic safety establishment focused its attentions on
driver education and traffic law enforcement, not safer car
design. It is thus not surprising that the public came to be-
lieve that highway fatalities were caused by the "nut behind
the wheel."244
In the early 1960s that understanding of causation began to
shift slightly, owing substantially to the efforts of Ralph Nader,
including his popular expose of automobile safety, Unsafe at Any
Speed.245 As portions of the public came to suspect that automo-
biles posed their own hazards, federal lawmakers began to take
notice. In 1966, Congress adopted the National Traffic and Motor
Safety Act and created the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
242. Lee Iacocca, Iacocca: An Autobiography 297 (1984).
243. See Joan Claybrook & David Bollier, The Hidden Benefits of Regulation:
Disclosing the Auto Safety Payoff, 3 Yale J. on Reg. 87, 103 (1985).
244. Id. at 91 (footnotes omitted).
245. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Nader's Failures?, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 289, 289
(1992) (book review) ("Although the causal antecedents to the 1966 Act were many,
Nader's book, Unsafe at Any Speed, and his celebrated foul treatment by General
Motors played a prominent role in making auto safety a national issue." (citations
omitted)).
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ministration (NHTSA). Congress adopted the act, and encouraged
the minimum safety standards promulgated by NHTSA, because
the industry had otherwise refused to create, much less abide by,
its own safety standards (apparently because of its belief that
"safety doesn't sell").246 In the late 1960s and 1970s, therefore,
NHTSA issued a host of mandatory safety standards.247
The history of products liability litigation against the car in-
dustry parallels that of federal regulation. Although state prod-
ucts liability suits had been available to consumers, they were
anemic-in part because of the then-prevailing sense that car acci-
dents were "caused" by drivers, in part because accident victims
and the plaintiffs bar had little access to public information that
might have assisted them in identifying design defects, and in part
because of common law doctrines that excluded the type of harms
for which car manufacturers could be held responsible. Prior to
1966, auto manufacturers were not liable for car-related injuries so
long as their products were free from defective materials and work-
manship. Shortly after the regulatory interventions described
above took hold, however, products liability law began to pose a
more significant threat to car manufacturers. That turning tide
was reflected most clearly in the seminal decision of Larsen v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp. 24 8-a 1968 opinion holding that auto manufactur-
ers could be liable for designs that rendered their cars
"uncrashworthy."
The plaintiff in Larsen had been injured when "[a] head-on col-
lision, with the impact occurring on the left front corner of the
Corvair [driven by the plaintiff], caused a severe rearward thrust
of the steering mechansim into the plaintiffs head."249 General
Motors argued, consistent with precedent, that they had "no duty
whatsoever to design and manufacture a vehicle ... which is other-
wise 'safe' or 'safer' to occupy during collision impacts."250 The
trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Gen-
246. See S. Rep. No. 89-1301, at 2 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2709,
2710 ("The committee cannot judge the truth of the conviction that 'safety doesn't
sell,' but it is a conviction widely held in the industry which has plainly resulted in
the inadequate allocation of resources to safety engineering.").
247. See infra text accompanying note 262.
248. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
249. Id. at 496-97.
250. Id. at 497.
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eral Motors.251 The Eighth Circuit disagreed and announced the
"crashworthiness doctrine," which focuses not on the cause of the
accident, but on the consequences of the accident for the vehicle's
occupants-in other words, not with the "first collision" between one
vehicle and another, but with the "second collision" between an au-
tomobile's passengers and its interior. The court held that "a man-
ufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its
vehicles to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of in-
jury in the event of a collision."252 The reasoning of the Larsen
court found wide acceptance, such that the crashworthiness doc-
trine, in one form or other, is now the law in nearly all states. 253
It appears, therefore, that the expansion of federal regulation
of automobile manufacturers and the expansion of state-based
products liability litigation against those manufacturers have sim-
ilar origins. It is also the case that the former may have helped to
facilitate the latter; that is, there may also be a causal connection
between the emergence of administrative regulation of automo-
biles and the strengthening of tort-based regulation of automo-
biles.254 That relationship is true not only because NHTSA helped
to foster the then-emerging sense that car manufacturers were in-
deed partially responsible for much of the harm caused in auto ac-
cidents, but also because NHTSA helped plaintiffs to overcome
certain more practical barriers to recovery that they had previ-
ously faced. Very simply, NHTSA was responsible for collecting,
creating, and making available a great deal of information that
was relevant and helpful to possible plaintiffs, as well as to many
other institutions, including the media and car insurers, that could
251. See id.
252. Id. at 502.
253. See Jo Anne Clark, Note, Second Collision Liability: A Critique of Two
Approaches to Plaintiffs Burden of Proof, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 811, 813 (1983) ("Despite
initial criticism, the second collision doctrine has achieved virtually unanimous
acceptance as a theory of recovery against automobile manufacturers." (citations
omitted)).
254. Admittedly, at the time Larsen was decided, NHTSA had not yet issued
any specific safety regulations. See Cynthia M. Certo, Comment, 1993 Changes to
Safety Standard 208: Deploying an (Air) Bag Full of Product Liability Claims?, 67
Temple L. Rev. 673 (1994). The NHTSA released its first set of standards, how-
ever, just one year after Larsen and, even prior to the release of those standards,
the legislative process leading to NHTSA generated enormous attention to the is-
sue of auto safety.
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use the information to help encourage demand for safety among
consumers.
255
Today, for instance, automobile insurers appear to be the only
providers of consumer-purchased insurance that make any at-
tempt to adjust premiums to reflect the risks posed by different
brands of the product.256 There are several reasons that insurers
seem unusually able to make premium adjustments in the context
of cars, perhaps the most important of which is that automobile
accidents represent a large percentage of the accident costs in our
society.2 57 Because of those heavy costs, insurers stand to gain sig-
nificantly from investments in monitoring the automobile con-
sumption choices of their insureds. Moreover, in the context of
automobiles, insurance companies have the benefit of important
work performed by other institutions including, as noted above,
the information gathering efforts of NHTSA. 258 In addition, there
exists a vast system of traffic laws and law enforcement officers
that gather on-the-spot details regarding automobile accidents, in-
cluding suspected causes. Those and other factors combine to pro-
duce a unique setting in which insurers are able to make
judgments about their insureds' automobile selections. We do not
mean to say that the government information permits insurers to
engage in simple and finely tuned premium adjustments-only that
it gives the industry important clues as to how to make some
broad-brushed distinctions among insureds. What is clear is that
cars are special in this way, and even if premium adjustments are
fairly general, they do exist and they do put pressure on consumers
to demand and, in turn, manufacturers to supply such features. 259
255. For a description of that information and its beneficial effects, see Clay-
brook & Bollier, supra note 243, at 104-17.
256. See Hanson & Logue I, supra note 24, at 190-94.
257. See id. at 192.
258. To give just one example, the insurance industry used data collected by
federal regulators along with data collected through its members' own insurance
claims to determine that air-bag-equipped vehicles are substantially safer for their
occupants. See Don Sherman, It's in the Bag, Popular Sci., Oct. 1992, at 58.
259. See, e.g., Fred Mannering & Clifford Winston, Automobile Air Bags in the
1990s: Market Failure or Market Efficiency?, 38 J. L. & Econ. 265, 265 (1995) (at-
tributing the increase in consumer demand for air bags in part to car insurers: "In
1972 Allstate Insurance was convinced that air bags could save lives--so convinced
that it began equipping its company cars with air bags and offering discounts to
customers who owned cars with air bags"). In a similar manner, the existence of
consumer watchdog groups such as Consumers Union, the publisher of Consumer
Reports, helps to foster consumer demand for automobile safety by making NHTSA
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Nevertheless, for a long time, even with those various external
forces at play, the industry was not keen on promoting safety. In-
deed, throughout the 1970s and '80s the industry was far more fo-
cused on resisting the external forces that were driving it to adopt
more safety features than it was on advertising its products as
safer.260 Those resistance efforts were quite successful in delaying
and mitigating regulatory interventions: "Automakers successfully
resisted installing [air bag] devices from 1968 to 1993 ....- 261
Generally, the industry's stated objection to such safety innova-
tions was that they would be expensive, ineffective and potentially
dangerous. For instance, Ford Motor Company made the following
statement in response to NHTSA's first nineteen motor vehicle
safety standards, which included such basic requirements as
seatbelts, laminated windshields, interior padding, and collapsible
steering wheels: "Many of the temporary standards are unreasona-
ble, arbitrary, and technically unfeasible . . . [If we can't meet
them when they are published we'll have to close down."262 Later,
Iacocca, then president of Ford, told President Richard Nixon that
"the shoulder harnesses [and] the headrests are complete wastes of
money... [,] and you can see that safety has really killed all of our
business," and that "we are in a downhill slide, the likes of which
we have never seen in our business."26 3
crash test data widely available to the public. See, e.g., Which Cars Do Best in a
Crash?, Consumer Rep., Apr. 1991, at 219, 221.
260. See John D. Graham, Auto Safety: Assessing America's Performance
91-104 (1989) (describing the joint and successful lobbying efforts of American au-
tomobile manufacturers in resisting air bag regulations throughout the 1970s and
early 1980s); Dana P. Babb, The Deployment of Car Manufacturers into a Sea of
Product Liability? Recharacterized Preemption as a Federal Regulatory Compli-
ance Defense in Airbag Litigation, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 1677, 1677-78 (1997):
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Big Three clung to the notion that
safety does not sell. However, as the government campaign for the instal-
lation of airbags became increasingly public, the demand for better per-
formance and increased safety features escalated. Despite the escalation
in demand, car manufacturers vehemently opposed the installation of
airbags ....
Id. (citations omitted).
261. Certo, supra note 254, at 681.
262. Claybrook & Bollier, supra note 243, at 97-98.
263. National Archives Nixon Project; National Archives at College Park, Col-
lege Park, MD, Transcript, Conversation among President Nixon, Lee Iacocca,
Henry Ford II, and John Ehrlichman, (Apr. 27, 1971). Iacocca also claimed that
air bags could instantly kill a person by breaking the person's neck. See Iacocca,
supra note 242, at 301.
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The industry's real concern, however, appears not to have
been with the safety or cost of newly required features, but with
the possibly that such innovations would lead to increased tort lia-
bility for the industry. Such increased liability could result either
because earlier automobile designs would be perceived as negligent
(in hindsight 264) or because the new designs would not operate
properly. As Iacocca put it, "Whether an air bag fails to work at
the proper time or whether it works prematurely, the whole busi-
ness is a paradise for product liability lawyers."265 So long as such
features as air bags were not perceived as reasonable or custom-
ary, however, the industry could continue to avoid liability both for
harms that could have been prevented by air bags and for the
smaller class of harms that are caused by air bags themselves. 266
Despite the lobbying efforts of the automobile industry, how-
ever, by the end of the 1980s the public was, because of the various
institutions involved, well aware that the harms cars caused were
often attributable to their manufacturers. 26 7 Consequently, by
that time, safety was becoming a significant concern for a large
percentage of consumers. Moreover, the automobile industry was
running out of delay tactics and the data supporting air bags was
mounting up. In other words, the industry was beginning to un-
derstand that it was going to have to adopt many of the key safety
features that it had long been fighting.268 For those reasons, con-
264. See infra text accompanying notes 368-71.
265. Iacocca, supra note 242, at 300; see also Certo, supra note 254, at 682:
In retrospect, it appears that the automakers' early aversion to air bags
stemmed from one overriding factor: fear of massive common law liability
imposed by the nation's courts. Throughout the air bag controversy, the
concern for liability was so strong that automakers fought mandatory air
bag legislation every step of the way.
Id.
266. Ultimately, the industry resisted air bag technology so long that it faced a
flood of lawsuits claiming that it was negligent for the manufacturers not to in-
clude air bags. See Certo, supra note 254, at 683 (gathering cases). It is notewor-
thy, we think, that such concerns would not have existed had the automobile
industry long been subject to a tort standard of enterprise liability. See infra text
accompanying notes 368-71.
267. As Justice White put it in the context of examining NHTSA's 1981 deci-
sion to rescind the mandatory passive restraint standards, "For nearly a decade,
the automobile industry waged the regulatory equivalent of war against the airbag
and lost--the inflatable restraint was proved sufficiently effective." Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49 (1983).
268. For example, in 1988 NHTSA issued a standard mandating the phase-in
of air bags or other passive restraint systems. See Certo, supra note 254, at 679.
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sistent with our predictions, there appeared to be a dramatic sea-
change in the mindset and approach of car manufacturers. And so
it was that Iacocca went from stating "I'm not sure I'd want one of
those [air bagsl in my car,"269 to calling air bags "the greatest inno-
vation since four-wheel brakes"270 and bragging on television and
in newspapers about Chrysler's concern for safety and its decision
to voluntarily install air bags in all of its cars.271 Likewise, Ford
went from calling the initial NHTSA safety standards, which in-
cluded seat belts, "unreasonable, arbitrary, and technically unfea-
sible," to proclaiming on its website, "The safety of our customers is
important, and no other safety feature on vehicles today is more
effective at reducing the risk of injuries than safety belts."272 In-
deed, the entire automobile industry went from being one whose
marketing mantra was "safety doesn't sell," to one whose willing-
ness to claim credit in advertisements for safety innovations forced
upon it by other forces serves now as Henderson and Rachlinski's
prime example of an industry that advertises safety.
In sum, what happened in those intervening years was not
that one manufacturer began heightening the risk perceptions of
consumers in the hope of gaining a larger market share. Instead,
regulation and litigation and all the information that those institu-
tions made available produced a clear concern about automobile
risks and a demand for safety among consumers. Moreover, manu-
facturers faced increasing regulatory pressure to adopt specific
safety features. Thus, given that consumers perceived cars as
risky and that manufacturers were going to have to provide certain
safety features anyway, it made sense for manufacturers to at-
tempt to lower consumer risk perceptions by promoting safety and
acting as though the added features were motivated purely by each
manufacturer's concern for Americas' safety. The tremendous his-
torical reluctance of automobile manufacturers to sell safety
stands in stark contrast to their current efforts to capitalize on
awareness of consumers that, contrary to earlier beliefs, not all
269. Iacocca, supra note 242, at 301.
270. Sherman, supra note 258, at 58.
271. See Graham, supra note 260, at 212.
272. Ford Motor Company, at httpJ/www.ford.conservlettecmcs/ford/index.
jsp?SECTION=OurCompany&LEVEL2=SafetyAndSecurity&LEVEL3vehicle
SafetyFeatures&LEVEL4=BeltMinder (last visited Dec. 6, 2000).
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driving hazards are attributable solely to the "nut behind the
wheel."
This story is not simply our reconstruction. Indeed, similar ac-
counts feature in contemporaneous news accounts of the shift in
the industry's attitude toward safety. Consider a 1988 Wall Street
Journal article that both described and explained the sudden con-
version. The article began as follows: "'ou won't hear any more
beefs about air bags from me,' crows a two-page newspaper ad from
Chrysler Corp. Chairman Lee Iacocca, a one-time air-bag opponent
who is now pledging to put them on all his U.S.-built cars by 1990
.... "273 The article goes on to ask:
Why this sudden turnabout? The primary reason is demand:
Auto makers are scrambling to satisfy the growing number of
consumers who say they want more safety features in their
cars ....
And the overriding reason for this is that, in the 25 years
since Mr. Nader's book "Unsafe at Any Speed" made automo-
bile safety a national issue, car buyers have been bombarded
with increasing amounts of information about the relative
merits-and demerits-of the various makes of cars. The news
comes from consumer groups; government regulators, who
publish the results of crash tests; and insurance companies,
which charge more to insure cars with poor safety records
than those with good. 274
Finally, regardless of what actually can be gleaned from the
history of automobile marketing, the fact remains that consumers
appear to underestimate, not overestimate, the risks of driving. As
Professor Christine Jolls has put it, "An amazingly robust finding
about human actors-and an important contributor to the phenom-
enon of risk underestimation-is that people are often unrealisti-
cally optimistic about the probability that bad things will happen
to them."275 And chief among the studies leading to that robust
finding are ones that determine that "most people tend to believe
that they are unusually safe drivers."278 Indeed, as Jolls notes,
273. Joseph B. White, U.S. Auto Makers Decide Safety Sells, Wall St. J., Aug.
24, 1988.
274. Id.
275. Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal
Rules, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1649, 1653 (1998).
276. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1537 (1998); see also Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 2, at 656
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"people not only think ... that the probability of their being in-
volved in an auto accident is lower than the average person's
probability, but also think that their probability is lower than the
actual probability."277 Such evidence, though certainly not disposi-
tive, supports our description of manufacturer behavior and con-
sumer perceptions and raises doubts regarding Henderson and
Rachlinski's, particularly given that they provide no evidence to
suggest otherwise.
b. Cigarettes
As discussed above,278 a fundamental misstep in Henderson
and Rachlinski's argument is the assumption that any marketing
that addresses safety must necessarily increase risk perceptions.
In addition to their discussion of automobile advertisements, that
assumption also appears to have been made in their discussion of
cigarette marketing. Henderson and Rachlinski note that tobacco
manufacturers "have historically created safety-oriented products
such as filtered and low-tar cigarettes," and that "more recently,
some companies have run advertisements portraying their prod-
ucts as containing only natural ingredients."279 They then argue
that "[to be effective, these campaigns must produce some margi-
nal increase in the level of anxiety about the underlying prod-
uct-anxiety that can be mollified by use of 'safer' versions of the
product."28° We see no reason why those campaigns must necessa-
rily raise consumer risk perceptions in order to be effective. In-
stead, they could have been effective as a response to increased
consumer concern that occurred independent of the conduct of to-
bacco manufacturers. Although we do not want to review here our
earlier and more detailed discussion of this topic, 281 we will pro-
vide a brief version of what we believe to be the more plausible
explanation of the tobacco industry's efforts emphasized.
(citing Shelley E Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the
Healthy Mind 10-11 (1989) and Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More
Skillful than our Fellow Drivers?, 47 Acta Psychologica 143 (1981)).
277. Jolls, supra note 276, at 1660.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 182-217.
279. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 246 (footnote omitted).
280. Id. (emphasis added).
281. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1467-1553.
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As we have noted, 28 2 the institution of various changes in the
architecture of cigarettes has coincided throughout this century
with episodes of heightened salience of tobacco safety issues among
the public, whether through highly publicized cancer studies in the
1950s, Surgeon General reports in the 1960s, or congressional
hearings in the 1990s. Additionally, as noted earlier in this Arti-
cle, 28 3 the "natural" cigarettes that Henderson and Rachlinski re-
fer to were introduced shortly after well-reported and ultimately
successful efforts by Congress to force the industry to disclose the
ingredients of cigarettes. In response to that adverse publicity, the
tobacco industry has adopted at least two separate marketing
strategies. One is the strategy described earlier which involves the
use of the word "natural" and corresponding imagery in product
advertisements, along with a non-synthetic menthol flavoring used
in the products.28 4 Other than those largely cosmetic changes, the
cigarettes are no different from traditional additive-containing de-
signs28 5 and, thus, consumers have no real reason to believe that
the cigarettes are any safer than those traditional designs. Indeed,
the campaigns are waged for mentholated cigarettes which re-
search suggests may be "more addicting and more deadly" than
non-mentholated cigarettes.2 88
The second type of campaign is for "additive-free" or "all-natu-
ral" cigarettes which, reportedly, do not contain chemical addi-
tives: "By '100 percent natural,' manufacturers mean they don't
use reconstituted tobacco or the flavor-enhancing additives that
caused an uproar [in 19941, when cigarette makers revealed a list
of nearly 600 chemicals that have been added to cigarettes over the
years."2 8 7 Whether these types of cigarettes offer marginal health
282. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1473-83.
283. See supra note 135; see also Kathleen Donnelly, The New Buzz Word in
Cigarettes? Natural, News & Observer (Raleigh, NC), Feb. 18, 1996, at E7 ("In
1994, smokers discovered there was more to their cigarettes than tar and nicotine.
National Public Radio reported on the additives, and, under pressure from Con-
gress, the tobacco industry released a list of chemicals that seemed to include eve-
rything from cocoa to ammonia.").
284. See supra note 135.
285. See Peter Landau, Trend Toward Natural Flavours Boosts Menthol In Cig-
arettes, Chemical Market Rep., Jan. 11, 1999.
286. See Vernellia R. Randall, Smoking, The African-American Community,
and The Proposed National Tobacco Settlement, 29 U. Tol. L. Rev. 677, 688 (1998).
287. Donnelly, supra note 283.
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benefits over additive-containing cigarettes is doubtful.288 What
seems more clear, however, is the potential for such cigarettes to
trigger a compromise effect in smokers who might otherwise stop
using tobacco products altogether. 289 Though he did not couch his
description in the behavioralist terms that we used in our previous
article, Dr. Ron Davis, formerly the head of the Office on Smoking
and Health at the Centers for Disease Control, captured the phe-
nomenon well: "That's one of the reasons cigarette companies are
marketing [additive-free cigarettes] so aggressively .... A lot of
smokers are dying-no pun intended-to find a rationalization to
keep smoking. And if they find a product like this, they say, 'I've
done my job to change my behavior and live a healthier
lifestyle.'"29°
288. See, e.g., id. (quoting one public health expert as saying, "If they're any
less hazardous at all ... it would be like jumping out the 22nd floor instead of the
24th").
289. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1515. Several industry docu-
ments emphasize that possibility quite explicitly. See, e.g., MN Trial Exhibit
10,585 ("All work in this area should be directed towards providing consumer reas-
surance about cigarettes and the smoking habit. This can be provided in different
ways, e.g. by claiming low deliveries, by the perception of low deliveries and by the
perception of 'mildness'."); Creative Research Group, Project Viking, Volume 11:
An Attitudinal Model of Smoking, 1986, Feb.-Mar., prepared for Imperial Tobacco
Limited (Canada):
Quitters may be discouraged from quitting, or at least kept in the market
longer, by either of two product opportunities noted before. A less irritat-
ing cigarette is one route (Indeed, the practice of switching to lower tar
cigarettes and sometimes menthol in the quitting process tacitly
recognises this). The safe cigarette would have wide appeal, limited
mainly by the social pressures to quit.
Id. B&W, 779103789-779103798 ("Industry Public Relations: [Brown & William-
son] makes an effort to accommodate all possible low ' tastes .... Mitigate
quitting by offering a choice.... Provides smoker with a choice and a reason not to
quit.").
290. Donnelly, supra note 281. That compromise effect was evident in the fol-
lowing story of two smokers interviewed by a San Francisco journalist investigat-
ing the "natural" cigarette push:
For many who smoke nonadditive cigarettes, (the fact that they are still
carcinogenic] is the crucial irony. Like Margaret Tibbatts, they know
smoking is a potentially deadly addiction, and they dream of quitting
someday. But until then, all-natural cigarettes lighten the load on the
conscience, if not on the lungs.
"'ve been smoking (American Spirits) for two years," says San Francisco
resident Jennifer Mink. "I suppose rm just killing myself the natural way.
I do plan on quitting-realistically, this year sometime. I've done it before,
so I'm sure I can do it again."
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Thus, one can draw two general conclusions from the tobacco
industry marketing campaigns highlighted by Henderson and
Rachlinski. First, tobacco companies instituted the campaigns, not
as a means of prompting heightened consumer fear of product
hazards, but as a response to a heightening that already existed
due to external forces. In the particular case of "natural" and "ad-
ditive-free" cigarettes, the congressional investigation of cigarette
additives and the accompanying media reports that tobacco manu-
facturers were "spiking" cigarettes with everything from cognac to
carbon dioxide had already served to increase consumer demand
for more natural, "safer" cigarettes. Again, that explanation seems
to comport better with both the historical evidence and the incen-
tives of manufacturers than Henderson and Rachlinski's theory
that manufacturers raise consumer risk perceptions in the hope
that they might simultaneously lower them again. Second, the
campaigns seem likely to result in consumer underestimation of
the hazards of smoking, rather than overestimation as Henderson
and Rachlinski would have us believe. As noted earlier,291 the
"natural" campaigns waged for mentholated cigarettes by R.J.
Reynolds and Brown & Williamson rely on the well-documented
psychological tendency of individuals to discount the severity of
risks that they perceive as "natural" in origin. Similarly, the "ad-
ditive-free" cigarettes marketed by other tobacco manufacturers
seem likely to capture market share among individuals who would
otherwise quit smoking altogether, were it not for the illusion of
safety and choice provided by the "additive-free" brands. 292 Moreo-
Edward W. Lempinen, Natural Smokes for a Health-Conscious Market, San Fran-
cisco Chron., May 17, 1996, at Al.
291. See supra note 135.
292. In contrast, Henderson and Rachlinski argue that tobacco industry mar-
keting campaigns are designed merely to attract brand-switchers rather than to
maintain or increase the overall size of the market for tobacco products. See Hen-
derson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 246. One response to that contention is that
a great deal of evidence suggests that tobacco advertising is oriented toward at-
tracting new smokers. See Hanson & Kysar H, supra note 2, at 1462-66, 1473-79.
Henderson and Rachlinski do not confront that evidence. More importantly,
whether tobacco manufacturer efforts attract brand-switchers or new smokers or
both, the effect is likely to be the same-encouraging the people who do smoke to
underestimate the risks of smoking. As noted in our earlier articles, the type of
architectural changes to cigarettes that Henderson and Rachlinski are describing
most often do not offer any actual safety benefits to smokers. Rather, the indus-
try's self-proclaimed "health-reassurance cigarettes," see Hanson & Kysar II,
supra note 2, at 1473-79, are designed to offer the appearance, and not necessarily
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ver, both campaigns capitalize on the manner in which people's
risk perceptions are heavily biased by affective qualities that they
ascribe to the source of risks: "natural," "additive-free" descriptions
avoid the dread that is associated with risks that are perceived as
technological or man-made (i.e., synthetic chemical additives).
Those results should not be viewed with surprise, given what
we know about the market for tobacco products. Consistent with
the Volvo Effect hypothesis, tobacco manufacturers address safety
issues in their marketing and other behavior precisely because
consumers have been more or less aware that cigarettes may raise
health and safety issues since the "Big Scare" (a period in the mid
1950s during which several high-profile studies were released and
publicized identifying a connection between cigarettes and can-
cer).293 Richard Kluger calls that period "the end of the age of in-
nocence about the blithe charms of the cigarette," a period that led
to a sudden, significant drop in sales. 294 Not surprisingly, manu-
facturer efforts to portray their products as safe intensified in re-
sponse to those intensified consumer fears. Consider, for instance,
the "Tar Derby" among manufacturers in the late 1950s that has
become a staple example among economists of evidence that the
unfettered market for safety works well. 29 5 That episode in the
history of tobacco marketing occurred directly on the heels of the
Big Scare, as did the emergence of filters, which were designed
simply to reassure safety-conscious smokers.296 Moreover, it ap-
pears from the subsequent increase in per capita smoking rates
that such industry efforts to assuage heightened fears
succeeded. 297
The fact that cigarette packages have carried prominent gov-
ernment-mandated health warnings for the last several decades
also helps to ensure that product safety will be openly (though not
necessarily truthfully) addressed by manufacturers. While in
the reality, of marginal safety benefits over other cigarettes. That is a highly sig-
nificant distinction because it suggests that the smokers attracted to such ciga-
rettes are not reliably internalizing risk information, whether they are brand-
switchers or new smokers.
293. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1484-87 & 1503 n.467.
294. Richard Kluger, Ashes to Ashes: America's Hundred-Year Cigarette War,
the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris 133 (1996).
295. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Constructive Cigarette Regulation, 47 Duke L.J.
1095, 1117-18 (1998).
296. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1474.
297. See id.
20001
360 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:259
many respects, the regulation of cigarettes in the U.S. has been lax
compared to products with similar hazards, 298 Americans never-
theless have been reminded continually that "The Surgeon Gen-
eral Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to
Your Health."29 9 They have also had access to some, albeit limited,
cigarette content information due to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's mandatory testing and disclosure of tar and nicotine
levels.300 In addition, consistent with our earlier predictions, that
regulatory requirement has encouraged manufacturers to use the
disclosed information affirmatively in their efforts to manage con-
sumer risk perceptions. 30 1 Finally, life insurance carriers some-
times distinguish between smoking and non-smoking insureds
when setting premium rates,30 2 providing a further reminder to
some individuals that smoking raises significant health issues and,
hence, a further reason for tobacco manufacturers to manipulate
perceptions of those issues.303
In short, there are many reasons to suspect that tobacco mar-
keting efforts such as the "natural" and "additive-free" cigarette
298. See Hanson & Logue II, supra note 24, at 1167-69.
299. The quoted warning, which featured on cigarette packages beginning in
1970, was replaced by four new rotating warnings in 1984. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)
(1994).
300. See Viscusi, supra note 295, at 1118.
301. As Professor Kip Viscusi notes, however, there was a silent period between
the "Tar Derby" and the mandatory disclosure regulations, during which the Fed-
eral Trade Commission flatly prohibited efforts by tobacco manufacturers to adver-
tise tar and nicotine level information. See id.
302. See Hanson & Logue II, supra note 24, at 1226-27.
303. Of course, like the automobile industry, cigarette manufacturers have
fought or otherwise resisted those various forces that led to consumer awareness of
safety issues. For instance, just as Detroit waged a war to stall the creation and
implementation of federal safety standards for automobiles, cigarette manufactur-
ers have lobbied hard against various efforts to regulate tobacco products over the
years. See generally Stanton A. Glantz et al., The Cigarette Papers passim (1996)
(describing some of the industry's efforts of that sort). Similarly, the industry de-
voted enormous resources toward minimizing its common law liability. An attor-
ney for R.J. Reynolds described the strategy as follows: "The aggressive strategy
we have taken regarding depositions and discovery in general continues to make
these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs' lawyers, particu-
larly sole practitioners. To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these
cases was not by spending all of [R.J. Reynolds'] money, but by making that other
son of a bitch spend all his." Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 421
(D.N.J. 1993). Both of those efforts were buttressed by the industry's overarching
campaign to create "controversy" and "doubt" over the pertinent scientific ques-
tions regarding the impact of tobacco on health. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra
note 2, at 1483-96.
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campaigns flow from the types of factors that we have identified,
rather than an interest that manufacturers purportedly have in
elevating consumer safety concerns. Before concluding this discus-
sion of Henderson and Rachlinski's tobacco example, it also bears
noting that the evidence is strong that smokers underestimate
their personal risks of smoking, as we explained at length in our
earlier article.30 4 Thus, like Henderson and Rachlinski's example
of the automobile industry, their discussion of tobacco manufactur-
ers involves a product market for which we have good evidence of
consumer risk perceptions, and the evidence suggests that tobacco
manufacturers are not leading consumers to overestimate the risks
of smoking. To the contrary, it appears that tobacco industry ef-
forts to lower consumer risk perceptions have been remarkably
successful, even in the face of significant public health campaigns
to raise awareness of the health hazards of smoking.
4. The Relevance of Competition Within an Industry
In a separate but related argument, Henderson and Rachlin-
ski claim that our treatment "seems to assume that manufacturers
always behave as monopolists."30 5 Henderson and Rachlinski
point out, however, that "[mlost industries are competitive"30 6 and,
consequently, manufacturers are unable to resist the temptation to
grab market share by cannibalizing the market. In our earlier ar-
ticle, we acknowledged the fact that "[tihe increased ease of such
tactics as coordinated marketing, shared research, and product-de-
sign conspiracies makes an oligopolistic industry likely to exhibit
more pronounced manipulative practices than competitive indus-
tries."307 However, we concluded that such oligopolistic manipula-
tion just "represent[s] a particularly sharp rendering of practices
common to virtually all consumer product markets."308 Not only
do we disagree with Henderson and Rachlinski's claim that firms
will frequently harm their own product market in order to enhance
their competitive position, but for a variety of reasons, we now
think that even we may have undersold the ability of competitive
304. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1502-51.
305. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 247.
306. Id. at 248.
307. Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1552.
308. Id.
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industries to behave cooperatively when it comes to consumer risk
perceptions.
To begin with, our argument does not depend on an assump-
tion that manufacturers behave as monopolists. Even a manufac-
turer in a relatively competitive industry will be reluctant to
pursue strategies that increase its market share by raising con-
sumer risk estimates, for all of the reasons described above.30 9
Moreover, we agree with Henderson and Rachlinski's apparent
concession that, to the extent that industries do behave monopolis-
tically, then our conclusion regarding risk perception manipulation
is irresistable. That is, the goal of a monopolist with respect to risk
perceptions is purely one of maximizing market size through vari-
ous efforts, including through the use of manipulation to lower con-
sumer risk awareness. Henderson and Rachlinski nowhere
consider, however, the possibility that even competitive manufac-
turers can find ways to cooperate when doing so is good for the
industry as a whole. That is, they nowhere consider the possibility
that manufacturers can join together to behave as monopolists
without actually being monopolists.
An executive of Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM) pro-
vided a more succinct statement of that point than we ever could.
As James M. Griffin of the United States Department of Justice
reported following the government's successful conviction of sev-
eral players in an international lysine price-fixing cartel:
In another [FBI] tape played at the lysine trial, ADM's Presi-
dent summed up the company's attitude toward its customers
in a single phrase, when he told a senior executive from his
largest competitor that ADM had a corporate slogan that
"penetrated the whole company": "Our competitors are our
friends. Our customers are the enemy."310
As Griffin also noted, "[alnother characteristic of international
cartels is that they frequently use trade associations as a means of
providing 'cover' for their cartel activities."311 If corporations util-
ize trade associations to accomplish something as clearly unlawful
as price-fixing, we see little reason why they would hesitate to use
309. See supra text accompanying notes 219-32.
310. James M. Griffin, An Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Character-
istics of International Cartels (2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/4489.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2000) (emphasis added).
311. Id.
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such associations to coordinate an industry-wide policy with re-
spect to product safety issues.312
There are plenty of other examples of manufacturers in a
given industry working together, as a monopolist would, particu-
larly with respect to protecting or enhancing consumer perceptions
of the generic product that they sell. When the public image of
milk was on the decline, for instance, the otherwise competitive
milk industry found a way to come together and revive it. They did
so, as many industries do, with the help of trade associations, busi-
ness councils, and other collaborative groups that provide struc-
ture and selective incentives for such "monopolistic" endeavors. A
campaign of white-mustached celebrities asking the simple ques-
tion "got milk?" worked wonders for the dairy industry.313 Such
coordinated campaigns are commonplace within all manner of in-
dustries, whether or not competitive. Other examples abound:
"Beef. It's what's for dinner"; "Pork, the other white meat"; "Cot-
ton, the fabric of our lives"; "Plastics make it possible"; and "Flor-
ida orange juice-are you drinking enough?" The success of such
campaigns can be striking. Consider, for instance, the fact that
trade groups representing the citrus industry have convinced
many consumers that oranges are a virtually unparalleled source
of vitamin C, when in fact many fruits and vegetables provide com-
parable amounts of the vitamin per serving.314
In addition to providing catchy promotional campaigns, trade
groups facilitate manufacturers' efforts to coordinate in defense of
their industry from both external and internal threats. For exam-
ple, U.S. cattle producers cooperated to bring suit against Oprah
Winfrey, who stated on her television show that she would not eat
hamburgers for fear that U.S. beef might be contaminated with
312. Admittedly, ADM participates in the heavily concentrated agribusiness
sector of the economy. See Jon Lauck, Toward An Agrarian Antitrust: A New Di-
rection for Agricultural Law, 75 N. Dak. L. Rev. 449, 454-55 (1999). The fact that
many consumer product industries are similarly concentrated, however, leads one
to suspect that similar behavior will be present in those markets. Moreover, as
noted in the text, such practices do not appear limited to oligopolistic industries.
313. See also Greg Farrell, Milk Does a Body Good, But Ads Do the Industry
Even Better, USA Today, June 14, 2000, at 7B (describing success of campaign).
314. See Roberta Larson Duyff, The American Dietetic Association's Complete
Food & Nutrition Guide 88 (1996) (listing seventeen common fruits and vegetables
other than oranges that are recommended sources of vitamin C, including
four-guava, red bell pepper, papaya and broccoli-that have as much or more vita-
min C per serving than oranges).
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mad cow disease.315 Although the industry suit was unsuccessful,
the fact that it was brought and litigated to conclusion against a
popular and well-financed defendant says quite a bit about how far
competitors are willing to go to maintain a positive image of their
product. The same is likely true with respect to internal threats,
where a single manufacturer attempts to increase its market share
by emphasizing safety advantages. Consider the difficulties faced
by Smith & Wesson this year after Ed Shultz, its chief executive
officer, broke ranks with the U.S. gun industry by agreeing to
adopt safety measures such as gun locks, greater control over its
distribution chain and the development of "smart gun" technology.
Sales by Smith & Wesson have dropped and Shultz himself has
endured repeated death threats amidst sharp criticism from the
National Rifle Association and fellow industry heads. As William
Keys, the president of Colt Manufacturing, put it, "[Smith & Wes-
son's move] hurts the whole industry. If we don't stick together,
we won't ever solve the problem."3 16
Indeed, the incentives for such cooperative punishment are
probably greatest in precisely those circumstances that are most
relevant to this debate-that is, where the threat of tort liability
and regulation and the need for consumer manipulation are most
significant. Put differently, although there may not be strong in-
centives for cooperation among industry members whose product is
perceived to pose little or no risk to consumers, those incentives
are greatly enhanced as soon as that product is perceived to be
risky. We can think of two well-documented examples of such a
phenomenon. According to Paul Starr's Pulitzer Prize-winning
history of the American medical profession, it was the threat of
liability that finally permitted physicians, who had otherwise been
unable to gain any sort of cooperative foothold, to "achieve the
unity and coherence that had so long eluded them."317 Through
cooperative arrangements, members of medical societies were able
to avoid virtually all liability, while non-members were not. Each
doctor's incentive to join such arrangements was therefore im-
315. See David J. Bederman, Food Libel: Litigating Scientific Uncertainty in a
Constitutional Twilight Zone, 10 DePaul Bus. L.J. 191, 217-23 (1998).
316. Jeff Zeleny, NRA Aims Hatred at Iowa Native: Hostility, Threats Face
Smith & Wesson's Ed Shultz at Gathering, Des Moines Reg., May 22, 2000, at 1.
317. See Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The
Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry 110 (1982).
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mense-as was the resultant power that the incentive across all
doctors eventually created for the profession.318
Similarly, as Richard Kluger describes in his Pulitzer Prize-
winning history of the tobacco industry, it was the threat of liabil-
ity and regulation posed by increased risk perceptions that helped
drive cigarette manufacturers to come together and cooperate
throughout the second half of the last century.319 The industry's
stated goal was to present an "united front,"320 including an agree-
ment of each manufacturer not to "seek a competitive advantage"
by making explicit health claims regarding their products.3 21 The
agreement was more than just an industry aspiration; tobacco
manufacturers largely stuck to that agreement despite supposed
competitive pressures to breach it.322
In addition to those empirical counterexamples, there is still
another, more theoretical problem with Henderson and Rachlin-
ski's argument that firms are unable to overcome the temptation to
grab market share by cannibalizing the market. Over time one
would expect any industry in which the strategy were commonly
employed to grow more concentrated and, therefore for behavior
within that industry to become more monopolistic. That is true for
a couple of reasons. First, insofar as the industry can act like a
monopolist, industry profits will be maximized. Thus, there will be
market pressure for companies to merge in order to enhance coop-
eration and exploit those otherwise foregone industry profits. Sec-
ond, even in the absence of such intra-industry mergers and
acquisitions, there will be growing concentration in the industry.
318. Id. at 111.
319. See Kluger, supra note 294, at 133 (describing the tobacco industry's "Big
Scare" that followed the release of several studies linking smoking with lung can-
cer, and detailing the remarkable assemblage of tobacco company chief executive
officers in 1953 that, under the guidance of public relations firm Hill & Knowlton,
gave birth to the industry's coordinated defense strategy for the remainder of the
century); see also Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1483-1502 (describing his-
torical emergence of industry groups such as the Tobacco Industry Research Com-
mittee and their importance to the industry in suppressing and confounding
consumer understanding of the risks of smoking).
320. See Memorandum from Fred Panzer to Horace R. Kornegay 1-2 (May 1,
1972) ("For nearly twenty years, this industry has employed a single strategy to
defend itself on three major fronts-litigation, politics, and public opinion.").
321. See Report of Special Master: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendations Regarding Non-Liggett Privilege Claims, State v. Philip Morris,
Inc. (No. C1-94-8565) (Minn. D. Ct. 1998).
322. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1467-1502.
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If Henderson and Rachlinski's story is correct, then the dynamic
effect of market-share grabbing will move the industry toward mo-
nopoly, leading participants to act increasingly as monopo-
lists-individually and in cooperation with the remaining
competitors.
In sum, even individual manufacturers in a competitive indus-
try cannot haphazardly adopt a strategy that makes their specific
product seem more desirable given that doing so simultaneously
makes the generic product seem less desirable; there is often "mo-
nopolistic behavior" (that is, manufacturer cooperation within an
industry) even among "competitors"; such cooperation is particu-
larly common in the very situations that Henderson and Rachlin-
ski are imagining; and any non-cooperation that does lead to
increased risk perceptions is likely to be temporary. Finally, it
bears mentioning again that, even if an industry does remain fairly
competitive over time, its very competitiveness may discourage the
sort of manipulation that Henderson and Rachlinski claim would
lead consumers to overestimate product risks.3 23
5. Is Overestimation Generally Easier To Encourage than
Underestimation?
Henderson and Rachlinski also contend that, other things
equal, manufacturers urging overestimation of risk will be more
successful than those urging underestimation: "In the main, over-
reaction to risk is probably easier to encourage than under-reac-
tion. Many cognitive processes foster overestimates of the
probability of an accident."3 24 Again, however, they provide virtu-
ally no evidence of products whose risks consumers overesti-
mate. 325 Nor do they rebut our argument regarding the many
ways in which consumers appear to misunderstand the risks of
smoking-despite the fact that cigarettes have long been considered
one of the best examples of a product whose risks consumers over-
estimate. Similarly, they do not rebut the many studies that have
been performed demonstrating that people across demographic
categories are optimistic with respect to the personal risks posed
323. See supra text accompanying note 227.
324. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 254.
325. See supra note 204.
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by a seemingly endless array of products and activities.3 26 Finally,
they do not consider the ease with which manufacturers might
lower consumer risk perceptions at any given moment, whatever
consumers' perceptions might have been prior to that moment.
Surprisingly, Henderson and Rachlinski seem to emphasize
that ready manipulability at other points in their argument. For
example, they write that "so strong is the [representativeness heu-
ristic that people] might disbelieve available and otherwise credi-
ble studies."327 As an example, they note that a popular television
advertisement for an analgesic recounts "numerous statistical
studies reveal[ing] that it is the most effective pain reliever availa-
ble," but ultimately relies upon the personal appeal of the product's
spokesperson who "asserts that he knows the product works be-
cause he uses it."328 Such advertisements, Henderson and Rach-
linski write, "take advantage of natural, but sometimes erroneous,
decision-making strategies."329
Of course, we agree: theirs is just another version of one of the
main points of our previous two articles. Nevertheless, they seem
to ignore consumer manipulability when making their claim that
pessimism is easier to foster than optimism. Instead, they focus
more on "human emotional responses," observing that:
mental illnesses that involve chronic overreaction to danger,
such as post-traumatic stress disorder and phobias, lack any
counterparts involving chronic underreaction. Similarly, al-
though excessive anxiety underlies dozens, if not hundreds, of
diagnosed mental disorders, only one (sociopathy) involves
chronic under-reaction to danger. Even depression is often
characterized by states of extreme anxiety.330
326. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 2, at 654-58; see also Neil D. Weinstein,
Optimistic Biases about Personal Risks, 246 Science 1232, 1232 (1989) [hereinafter
Weinstein I] ("[Optimistic bias] is robust and widespread. It appears with diverse
hazards and samples and with different questions used to elicit the personal risks
ratings .... Pessimistic biases are... rare."); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Opti-
mism about Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions from a Community-
Wide Sample, 10 J. Behav. Med. 481, 494-96 (1987) (determining from a demo-
graphically diverse sample that "optimistic biases are largely unrelated to age, sex,
level of education, or occupational prestige") [hereinafter Weinstein II].
327. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 221.
328. Id. at 222.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 254 (footnotes omitted).
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From just those observations, Henderson and Rachlinski con-
clude that "[tihe human brain seems, on the whole, built to over-
react to risk rather than to casually disregard risk."331 Indeed,
they add that "it would be remarkable if any species survived the
evolutionary process by persistently under-reacting to risk."33 2
Although, we believe that we have already provided a great
deal of evidence that casts doubt on their conclusion, we add here
two general points. First, with regard to mental illness, the fact
that overreaction to risk is common among those who are suffering
from some mental illness does not imply, as Henderson and Rach-
linski seem to infer, that everyone is inclined to be pessimistic. In-
deed, to the contrary, it appears that it may only be the clinically
depressed who are not optimistic.333 The work of Daniel Gilbert, a
leading psychologist who studies people's emotions, how well peo-
ple forecast those emotions, and how those forecasts influence peo-
ple's decisions, appears to support that generalization. 33 4 Gilbert's
research demonstrates how most people tend to look on the bright
side-quite the opposite of the image that Henderson and Rachlin-
ski attempt to elicit with their examples of phobic or depressed in-
dividuals. According to Gilbert, "[mlost people are reasonably
happy most of the time, and most events do little to change that for
long."336 He adds:
In science, literature and folklore,. . . people are famous for
making the best of bad situations, remembering their suc-
cesses and overlooking their excesses, trumpeting their tri-
331. Id. at 254.
332. Id.
333. See Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress,
and Cognition, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 71, 149 (1998) ("[Ihe only group that seems
consistently to get it right-to get subjective probabilities to mirror objective
probabilities-is the clinically depressed.") (citing Lauren B. Alloy & Lyn
Y. Abramson, Judgment of Contingency in Depressed and Nondepressed Students:
Sadder but Wiser?, 108 J. Experimental Psychol. 441 (1979) and Benjamin M.
Dykman et al., Effects of Ascending and Descending Patterns of Success Upon
Dysphoric and Nondysphoric Subjects' Encoding, Recall, and Predictions of Future
Success, 15 Cognitive Therapy & Res. 179 (1991)); Weinstein I, supra note 326, at
1232 (summarizing studies suggesting that optimism may be associated with less
depression, greater willingness to work hard to make optimism self-fulfilling, and
increased physical health).
334. See, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability
Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 617 (1998).
335. Philip J. Hilts, In Forecasting Their Emotions, Most People Flunk Out,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1999, at D2.
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umphs and excusing their mistakes. Psychologists from
Freud to Festinger have described the artful methods which
the human mind ignores, augments, transforms and rear-
ranges information in its unending battle [against the bad
feelings produced by the world and things in it].336
Given such research, by focusing on mental illnesses, Henderson
and Rachlinski seem to have confused the exception for the rule.
Second, with regard to "evolutionary process," our intuition is
quite different from Henderson and Rachlinski's. Although opti-
mism may have some Darwinian drawbacks, the previous
paragraphs indicate that it may have some important advantages
as well. Moreover, pessimism and preoccupation with risk seem
likely to create significant disadvantages of their own. For in-
stance, it would be remarkable, we think, if a chimpanzee would
ever swing from a high, thin vine or a human would ever emerge
from its cave (much less hunt large carnivores) absent some degree
of optimism. Given that hunger and other sources of necessity
likely exposed our early ancestors to many inevitable risks, the
ability to put most of those risks out of mind would be crucial for
survival because it would leave more capacity for other sorts of cog-
nitive processing-including those necessary to negotiate risks.337
At least one other legal scholar has written about this issue from
an evolutionary biological perspective. Judge Posner, who has no
stake in this particular debate recently put it this way: "We need
only imagine the kind of cognitive equipment that would be opti-
mal in the prehistoric environment to which early man adapted:
when thinking oriented to the distant future or to understanding
low-probability events or to balancing immediate impressions
against subtler inferences would have had only limited survival
value;... when optimism was essential to keep one going in condi-
tions of wretched adversity ... -"33 Similarly, as Ziva Kunda, a
Social Cognition Theorist, recently summarized, the various opti-
mistic illusions are likely adaptive because without them, "the
threats and difficulties of daily life would doom us to misery and
336. Id.
337. Cf Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 2, at 658-59 (describing cognitive disso-
nance and the illusion of control).
338. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,
50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551, 1570 (1998) (emphasis added).
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depression."33 9 Moreover, "Itihey may also increase our motivation
and effort, and lead us to persist at difficult tasks even in the face
of initial failure,"3 40 and thus may be usefully self-fulfilling.
In sum, it is not at all clear that consumer pessimism is easier
for manufacturers to encourage than consumer optimism.
B. Enterprise Liability and the Problem of Consumer
Overestimation
As the preceding discussion makes clear, we do not believe
that the alleged problem of consumer overestimation of product
risks is significant. For that reason, we also do not believe that
Henderson and Rachlinski have identified an especially important
problem with enterprise liability when they cite "the possibility,
indeed the certainty, that under an [enterprise liability] regime,
manufacturers would induce consumers to purchase extra safety
precautions to reduce the risks of accidents."341 Nevertheless, we
feel compelled to point out a few ways in which their more specific
arguments regarding enterprise liability fail to hit their mark. Af-
ter that discussion, we revisit the question of how enterprise liabil-
ity might respond to any overestimation of product risks that, for
whatever reason, may exist among consumers.
1. Enterprise Liability Does Not Exacerbate the Problem (Insofar
as There Is a Problem)
Henderson and Rachlinski believe that enterprise liability, be-
cause it would force all product prices to reflect expected accident
costs, would enable the efforts of manufacturers who attempt to
utilize consumer fear for economic gain:
[Aldopting [enterprise liability] would narrow the gap in price
between an efficiently safe product and a product that incor-
porates an excess of safety precautions. It is precisely this
effect that [enterprise liabilityl's new proponents advance as
a benefit of the system-the monetary price of the product
under [enterprise liability] would perfectly reflect all of its
339. Ziva Kunda, Social Cognition: Making Sense of People 233 (2000) (citing
and summarizing Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Be-
ing: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 Psychol. Bull. 193
(1988)).
340. Id. at 233-34.
341. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 219.
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costs, making it more likely that consumers will purchase
safer products. This feature of [enterprise liability), however,
also facilitates exploitation of consumers by purveyors of ex-
cess safety.342
Upon close scrutiny of their argument, however, one finds no
reason to suppose that a products liability regime of enterprise lia-
bility would catalyze the type of perceptual manipulation with
which Henderson and Rachlinski are concerned.
a. A Summary of Henderson and Rachlinski's Model
The authors pose the case of two products, one of which carries
an $80 price tag but poses a $10 risk of harm (Design One), the
other of which carries a $95 price tag but poses no risk of harm
(Design Two). Under a negligence rule, the price of Design One
would be $80 because it is an efficient product for which the manu-
facturer would not be liable. Under enterprise liability, however,
the $10 accident cost of Design One would be factored into the
price of the product, raising its total price tag to $90. At that point
according to Henderson and Rachlinski, consumers, under the ma-
nipulative influence of the manufacturer of Design Two, would
continue to add the $10 expected accident cost to the price of the
product, even though that cost has been internalized into the price
mechanism by the products liability system. Such a mistaken be-
lief by consumers would allow the manufacturer of Design
Two-the inefficiently safe product-to position its product as the
least costly offering. Consumers would view the total cost of De-
sign One as $100 (double-counting the $10 expected accident costs)
while the cost of Design Two would remain at $95 even after the
institution of enterprise liability (because it poses no accident
costs). Even if consumers do not double-count accident costs in
that fashion, Henderson and Rachlinski argue that a similar ineffi-
ciency would occur due to the fact that consumers view tort law as
providing insufficient compensation for bodily injuries. Thus, Hen-
derson and Rachlinski conclude that "[plurveyors of excessively
safe versions of products will find it easier to convince consumers
to spend a little extra on safety under an [enterprise liability]
system."3 43
342. Id. at 251 (footnote omitted).
343. Id. at 252.
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b. Fundamental Tension in Henderson and Rachlinski's
Argument
Henderson and Rachlinski's model depends, at heart, on one of
two problematic assumptions. Specifically, it assumes either that
manufacturers can manipulate consumers to believe that they will
not be compensated under enterprise liability or that, even if con-
sumers understand that they will be compensated, consumers will
nonetheless realize that tort-based compensation is incomplete. As
to the first possibility, Henderson and Rachlinski are actually
quite critical of us for assuming that manufacturers can manipu-
late consumers' risk perceptions without giving equal weight to the
possibility that manufacturers can manipulate consumers' percep-
tions of expected liability-based compensation. They write, for ex-
ample, that "[enterprise liabilityl's new proponents would have us
believe that the same consumers who misunderstand safety, risk
and their own preferences, somehow perfectly understand that the
legal system forces manufacturers to cover them for the injuries
products pose. We think not."344 Elsewhere they state that our
analysis "assumes that consumers would be aware that the [enter-
prise liability] system provides extensive insurance," which they
describe as "a remarkable logical flaw in the new rhetoric."3 45
Henderson and Rachlinski have a serious glass-house prob-
lem. In their own example, they assume that consumers are per-
fectly informed of product risks at the same time that consumers
are perfectly clueless with respect to the underlying liability re-
gime. By positing that consumers know that Design One poses
precisely $10 in expected accident costs and Design Two $0, Hen-
derson and Rachlinski assume that consumers possess perfectly
accurate product risk information. That assumption is not only at
odds with the theory and evidence marshaled in our articles, but
also with the remainder of Henderson and Rachlinski's own cri-
tique.346 Moreover, the implausible assumption is crucial to their
story. If, for instance, they had assumed that consumers perceive
both products to pose the same average risk, then consumers
344. Id. at 219.
345. Id. at 249-50 ("The same consumers who are supposedly being duped by
manufacturers regarding the risks products pose cannot, at the same time, be ex-
pected to understand the legal system accurately.").
346. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17.
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would prefer Design One even under enterprise liability and even
with the double-counting of accident costs. 347
Simultaneously, Henderson and Rachlinski's argument as-
sumes that consumers remain entirely ignorant of the liability sys-
tem following institution of enterprise liability. To be sure, the
authors buttress that assumption by noting that "purveyors of
safety can encourage [consumer ignorance] with their advertis-
ing."34 Nevertheless, we find it highly implausible to believe, on
the one hand, that consumers are perfectly aware that Design One
poses an expected accident cost of $10 and Design Two $0, and on
the other hand, that consumers are completely ignorant of the exis-
tence and operation of the legal system. If manufacturers can con-
vince consumers that the legal system does not compensate their
losses when it actually does, then we have strong reason to suspect
that they can also convince consumers that their products are
harmless when they actually are not. Conversely, if consumers re-
ally can accurately conduct an on-the-spot analysis of the full risk
implications of a product, then we have strong reason to suspect
that they can understand the meaning of enterprise liability. In
other words, if consumers can function as highly trained engineers,
actuaries, and economists while standing in the store aisle, as
Henderson and Rachlinski assume, why can they not also be
lawyers?
c. The Implausibility of Double-Counting
Henderson and Rachlinski also claim that we overlooked the
possibility that manufacturers can manipulate consumer percep-
tions of the liability system. It is that possibility that Henderson
and Rachlinski rely upon to construct a scenario in which the man-
ufacturer of Design Two, the inefficiently safe product, could posi-
tion its product as less costly than could the manufacturer of
Design One.3 49 The flaw in that line of reasoning, however, is that
347. That is, if consumers viewed Design One and Design Two as both posing
an expected accident cost of $5, consumers would continue to purchase Design One
under enterprise liability even with double-counting, as its perceived price would
be $90, compared to $100 for Design Two.
348. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 251.
349. See id.
If consumers are completely ignorant (or suspicious) of the operation of
the [enterprise liability] system (ignorance and suspicion that purveyors
of safety can encourage with their advertising), then consumers would
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if consumers are ignorant of the liability system in the manner de-
scribed, then it is not clear that those consumers will bring law-
suits when they are injured. That is, if manufacturers successfully
convince consumers that tort law offers them no compensation,
then consumers will have no reason to bring products liability
claims. Without such lawsuits being filed, there will be no accident
costs for product manufacturers to internalize. Thus, the alleged
double-counting of accident costs-upon which Henderson and
Rachlinski's model crucially depends-is a fiction.350
d. The Implausibility of Manufacturer Manipulation with
Respect to Perceptions of the Legal System
Moreover, the dominant incentive of the vast majority of man-
ufacturers under enterprise liability will be to use the "guarantee"
that they are required to provide through tort law as a selling
point-a way of making their product appear more attractive or less
expensive.3 51 Any manufacturer of any specific product that seeks
to convince consumers that they will not be compensated through
tort law will face many challenges. For instance, competitors of
that manufacturer will often be able to provide a comparable prod-
uct, plus a "guarantee." The first manufacturer will not only have
to forego that benefit (or face that challenge) but will also have to
find a way to counter the marketing prowess of the vast majority of
other manufacturers across the industry (and, indeed, the entire
economy) who will similarly be inclined to get "credit" for a benefit
that the law requires them to provide. Furthermore, the individ-
ual manufacturer will also have to face the informative effect of
count the costs of the accidents associated with the efficiently safe prod-
ucts twice: first, when manufacturers of efficiently safe products include
the costs of the accidents that these products cause in the purchase price;
and second, when consumers, ignorant of the legal system, act as if they
will have to bear the costs of the accidents that efficiently safe products
cause.
Id.
350. Henderson and Rachlinski may argue in response that consumers remain
ignorant of the liability system only until they are injured, at which point they
consult an attorney or otherwise investigate their legal remedies. Still, if manipu-
lation regarding the legal system really is as effective as Henderson and Rachlin-
ski claim, then they must offer some explanation of how consumers could remain
completely ignorant of their rights in some circumstances but completely effective
in vindicating those rights in other instances.
351. Cf supra text accompanying notes 267-72.
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lawyers and other existing or newly arising actors in the market-
place who will have an economic incentive to advertise consumers'
rights under enterprise liability. Government agencies, public in-
terest groups, and other entities can and likely will contribute to
such efforts. Moreover, the fact that the individual manufacturer
does not have special knowledge of, or control over, the underlying
issue substantially weakens the manufacturer's ability to counter
the wave of information and manipulation in the opposite direc-
tion. Those characteristics are all in stark contrast to the manu-
facturer's ability to manipulate consumer perceptions of product
risks-which likewise are limited but, for all the reasons we have
discussed above and in our earlier work, far less so.
e. The Role of Undercompensation by the Tort System
Henderson and Rachlinski offer an assumption in the alterna-
tive. Even if consumers do believe that they will be compensated
for product-caused harms, they will know that tort damages pro-
vide imperfect compensation. Henderson and Rachlinski write, for
example, that "the legal system.., will chronically undercompen-
sate victims relative to the ex ante value people place on life and
limb," and thus, even after taking into account their compensation
from the tort system, "consumers . . . would still be willing to
purchase further safety precautions."352 We do not disagree with
that assumption, but even so, it provides no help to Henderson and
Rachlinski whose numeric example implicitly assumes that con-
sumers will be fully compensated. If tort law does not make plain-
tiffs whole, then the numbers that they employ do not apply and
the conclusions that they draw from those numbers are baseless.
Specifically, Henderson and Rachlinski's numeric example as-
sumes that Design One costs $80 to produce and causes $10 of ex-
pected damage. The assumption is that the $10 damages figure
accurately captures the value of the harm caused, no matter how
or when it is measured. That assumption is implicit throughout
the example, and comes very close to being explicit where Hender-
son and Rachlinski "assume away valuation problems with injury
to life and limb."353 Within those constraints, they then argue that
people would prefer Design One at a real cost of $90 to Design Two
352. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 250 (footnotes omitted).
353. Id. at 252.
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at a real cost of $95. Furthermore, they argue that under a highly
implausible set of assumptions, it is possible that people may be
led to purchase Design Two under enterprise liability when they
would not be under negligence.
The error in the argument, though, is that if "the legal system
... chronically under-compensate[s] victims relative to the ex-ante
value people place on life and limb,"35 4 as Henderson and Rachlin-
ski argue, then it is not at all clear that consumers are worse off
when they purchase Design Two. If the actual harm experienced
from Design One accidents is valued at $15 or more, rather than
the mere $10 in tort compensation received by victims, then Design
Two, not Design One, is the product that consumers should prefer.
If consumers cannot accurately place any "value" at all on life and
limb, then the point may be even more important. It does not fol-
low, therefore, under the assumption that consumers are inade-
quately compensated by tort damages that the "inefficiently safe"
product really is inefficiently safe.
f. Comparative Willingness on the Part of Manufacturers To
Invest in Manipulation
Similarly, Henderson and Rachlinski do not consider within
their model the comparative willingness of manufacturers to invest
in manipulation, which, after all, is not free. Once the costs of ma-
nipulation are added to the analysis, it becomes clear that the
manufacturer of the more efficient product will, under their as-
sumptions, be more willing to spend on manipulation under enter-
prise liability than will its inefficient counterpart. According to
Henderson and Rachlinski, the manufacturer of Design Two will
seek to convince consumers that the products liability regime pro-
vides no compensation for them. However, any amount of money
that the manufacturer would have to spend would weaken its abil-
ity to attract consumers. Indeed, any amount per product that the
manufacturer of Design Two had to spend more than $5 would
render the investment unprofitable.3 55
354. Id. at 250 (footnote omitted).
355. Suppose, for example, that the manufacturer would have to spend $6 per
product sold in order to successfully convince consumers that there would be no
compensation provided through the civil liability system. Under that assumption,
consumers would prefer Design One at a perceived cost of $100 (and an actual cost,
without double-counting, of $90) to Design Two at a real and perceived cost of
$101.
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More important, consider the manufacturers' relative willing-
ness to invest in manipulation of consumer perceptions of the prod-
ucts' underlying risks. Assuming, as seems plausible, that
consumers initially believe that both products pose the same risk,
the manufacturer of Design One will always be willing to spend up
to $5 more per product sold on manipulating consumer risk percep-
tions than will the manufacturer of Design Two. That is true be-
cause $5 represents the actual savings that Design One provides to
consumers over Design Two-if only they can be convinced of it.
Thus, given the two manufacturers' relative willingness to invest
in manipulation, there is good reason to doubt Henderson and
Rachlinski's assumption that consumers will perceive Design One
to be more risky than Design Two. Indeed, there is good reason to
suppose that consumers will perceive the precise opposite.
g. The Failure To Make Comparisons Between Liability Regimes
The most fundamental problem with Henderson and Rachlin-
ski's example is that the authors fail to make the sort of compari-
sons that are required in order to make a well-advised choice
among policy options. Henderson and Rachlinski conclude that en-
terprise liability is undesirable without comparing its potential
manipulation-based inefficiencies to the manipulation-based ineffi-
ciencies that exist under the current regime. They assume that
society has recently moved from a negligence regime to an enter-
prise liability regime and then examine whether the enterprise lia-
bility regime would be efficient. The proper question to ask,
however, is whether the enterprise liability system is more or less
efficient than the negligence regime, holding everything constant
except the change in the legal regime. When that question is
asked, the case for enterprise liability is very strong.
According to Henderson and Rachlinski's example, the effi-
cient product, Design One, was the only product that sold under a
negligence regime. It had a nominal price of $80, but a real price of
$90. The manufacturer of Design Two, according to the model, was
unable to persuade consumers that the risks posed by Design One
were large enough to justify the added $15 investment. According
to the example, therefore, there was an efficiency savings of $5
each time Design One sold instead of Design Two. The move to
enterprise liability, however, made it possible for the manufacturer
of Design Two to successfully lead consumers to overestimate the
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risks of Design One, and thus to purchase Design Two, at an effi-
ciency loss of $5 per product sold.
Even if one supposes, as Henderson and Rachlinski apparently
do, that the problem of manipulation is unique to enterprise liabil-
ity, it is hard to think that the problem is of any real significance.
After all, the problem is one that would exist only when the real
price differential between an efficiently unsafe product (Design
One) and an inefficiently safe product (Design Two) is small
enough for consumers to mistakenly view the expected accident
costs of the efficiently unsafe product as greater than the price dif-
ferential. Other things equal, therefore, the problem will be most
significant in situations in which the inefficiency associated with
the safer product is least significant. That is, the greater the inef-
ficiency associated with the safer product, the more difficult it will
be for its manufacturer to convince consumers that the safer prod-
uct is, nonetheless, the less costly one. On the other hand, for Hen-
derson and Rachlinski's point to carry any normative punch in the
choice among liability regimes, it must also be the case that the
real price differential is too large for manufacturers to have
achieved the same feat of manipulation under negligence.356 We
are simply not persuaded that the class of risks that are "small
enough" to manipulate under EL but "not so small" that they could
have been manipulated under negligence represents a serious con-
cern, even assuming that everything else about Henderson and
Rachlinski's analysis is unassailable.
Now consider the possibility that the source of the problem
they have identified-the ability of manufacturers to manipulate
consumers' perceptions-would exist under negligence. Under that
assumption, the outcome under negligence would be less efficient
than the one that they worry might result under enterprise liabil-
ity. For instance, the purchase of Design One under a negligence
regime might often be made by consumers under the falsely opti-
mistic view that the product posed little or no risk. If one assumes
356. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 252 n.128:
Of course, if the purveyors of the inefficiently safe design were to induce
consumer to believe that the efficient design is much more dangerous
than is the case, they might be able to convince consumers to purchase the
inefficiently safe product under any system. The point here, however, is
that by narrowing the price gap, [enterprise liability] makes their efforts a
little easier.
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that manufacturers manipulate consumers to believe that Design
One posed no risk, then with each product purchased, there would
be an efficiency loss of up to $10.35 7 Moreover, it is clear that the
number of products purchased under negligence (each one leading
to a potential net loss of $10) would be greater than the number
under enterprise liability, simply because the price of the product
is higher under enterprise liability. Thus, both the size of the po-
tential inefficiency per product sold and the number of products
sold would be greater under negligence than enterprise liability.
And that is before taking account of the fact that, as described
above,358 the incentives to manipulate toward consumer underesti-
mation of product risks are not mitigated by conflicting effects in
the way that incentives to manipulate toward overestimation are.
There is another way that Henderson and Rachlinski have ig-
nored the potential inefficiencies of a negligence regime in order to
suggest that the enterprise liability regime is inferior. One can im-
agine that a third product, Design Three, dominates the market
under negligence at a price of $75, but carries expected accident
costs of $30 that are not perceived by consumers. Furthermore, it
could easily be the case that courts do not recognize that either
Design One or Design Two is superior to Design Three, simply be-
cause courts and juries are not especially proficient at making such
determinations. The imposition of enterprise liability in such a
market would internalize the $30 expected accident costs and
would lead to the development of Design One and/or Design Two
by manufacturers. Thus, the fact that Henderson and Rachlinski
can tell a story in which consumers might prefer Design Two to
Design One under enterprise liability overlooks the fact that both
of those designs could well be superior to the design that domi-
nates under negligence.
Finally, even if one assumes that consumers have some esti-
mate of the risks posed by Design One, there is still reason to be-
lieve under Henderson and Rachlinski's assumptions that
enterprise liability would be superior to negligence. Henderson
and Rachlinski assume that manufacturers can manipulate con-
sumer perceptions of the underlying liability regime. Under a neg-
ligence regime, therefore, the manufacturer of Design One could
357. That would be the case because consumers might actually value the prod-
uct at some amount lower than its full cost of $90.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 219-32.
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manipulate consumers into falsely believing that they will be com-
pensated for any harm done, such that consumers partially disre-
gard those risks, leading to the same inefficient outcome that
occurs when consumers are optimistic with respect to product
risks. Again, Henderson and Rachlinski fail to recognize that the
problem that they purport to have identified with enterprise liabil-
ity may be as significant or more significant under the current
regime.
h. Summary
Henderson and Rachlinski argue that a "remarkable logical
flaw" exists within our work, when in fact it is their argument that
requires a simultaneous belief in consumer manipulability and
consumer omniscience; that assumes unlimited, unmitigated abil-
ity on the part of manufacturers to manipulate perceptions of the
legal system; that assumes in the alternative imperfect compensa-
tion from the legal system without realizing that such an assump-
tion undermines their entire model; and, finally, that criticizes
enterprise liability against a hypothetical perfectly functioning
market and liability system without providing any comparison of
the manipulation-based inefficiencies that exist in alternative le-
gal regimes, including the present one. Those are remarkable logi-
cal flaws and, what is worse, they are flaws in service of a point
that would be insignificant even if shown. As noted above,359 the
vast majority of the fear appeals that Henderson and Rachlinski
believe enterprise liability would catalyze do not bear on consumer
product safety-except inasmuch as the hyping of external safety
risks can result in an underestimation of risks intrinsic to the
product. The remainder are merely tangential attempts to en-
hance one product's attractiveness by emphasizing hazards posed
by another type of product altogether or by emphasizing the safety
features of the advertised product, either of which also may lead
consumers to underestimate the risks of the particular product be-
ing promoted. The fact is that none of Henderson and Rachlinski's
empirical examples actually fit their stylized model of a market in
which Design One competes with an "excessively safe" Design Two.
In essence, therefore, we are asked to abandon hope in enterprise
359. See supra text accompanying notes 185-217.
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liability because it may exacerbate a problem that has not been
shown to exist.
2. Enterprise Liability Actually Helps to Solve the Problem
ansofar as There Is a Problem)
Henderson and Rachlinski's basic claim is that we "ignor[ed]
the fact that the manipulation of consumers is a two-way
street,"360 and that "some manufacturers struggle to convince con-
sumers that a product-related activity is dangerous while their
competitors struggle to convince consumers that the same activity
is safe."361 They believe that market competition between manu-
facturers in that fashion should result in both overestimation and
underestimation of product risks by consumers, with no easy pre-
diction as to which result will predominate.362 Moreover, unravel-
ling such a "messy and difficult empirical chore," according to
Henderson and Rachlinski, "is an essential prelude to abandoning
the central feature of products-liability law."363
With respect to the first point, we have tried to make clear in
the preceding Sections and in our earlier articles that, although
the road to manipulation may be a two-way street leading to both
under- and overestimation, all the available empirical evidence, as
well as the balance of theoretical arguments from economics and
psychology, suggest that the vast majority of the traffic is heading
in one direction. With respect to the second point, we are not at all
sure that the possibility of consumer overestimation of product
risks is problematic for enterprise liability. To the contrary, enter-
prise liability may represent the best hope that the legal system
has of combating any problem of consumer overestimation that
does exist.
We readily admit that there may be situations in which manu-
facturers will have an incentive to increase consumers' risk percep-
tions. Our admission of that point, however, is not recent.
Instead, it is a point that we ourselves went out of our way to
make. It is also a point that we have argued will apply with equal
force to all products liability regimes and that will be best ad-
360. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 218 (footnote omitted).
361. Id. at 253.
362. See id. at 251-55.
363. Id. at 253.
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dressed (though not perfectly addressed) by enterprise liability.364
Just as earlier products liability scholars too hastily determined
that enterprise liability could not remedy the harmful effects of
consumer overestimation of product risks, 365 Henderson and Rach-
linski are wrong to conclude that enterprise liability cannot com-
bat manufacturer attempts to induce consumer overestimation.
Enterprise liability offers compensation for all injuries shown
to be caused by consumer products. Thus, to the extent that con-
sumers do overestimate a product risk, their resulting concern over
that estimation will be reduced in part under enterprise liability
by the fact that they know they will receive tort damages for any
loss that does occur. Moreover, enterprise liability offers at least
the theoretical promise of providing consumers with an indepen-
dent source of risk information through the price mechanism. As-
suming full internalization of product-caused accident costs under
enterprise liability, consumers can rely upon product shelf prices
to provide at least some means of comparison among and across
product lines.
Even absent those price effects, consumers can be more confi-
dent under enterprise liability about product safety because they
will be better able to trust manufacturers to make decisions that
are in the interests of consumers. Although we did not previously
express it this way, our point can be described in terms of a well-
known insight of agency theory, 366 which holds that "agency costs"
are inevitable in economic relationships that rely, to some degree,
on trust. Agency costs are defined as the sum of the monitoring
and bonding costs between principal and agent necessary to deter
disloyal acts on the part of the agents, plus any residual loss in-
curred due to disloyalty that cannot be cost-justifiably deterred.
364. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1565-67; Hanson & Logue I, supra
note 24, at 177-81; Croley & Hanson I, supra note 6, at 786-92.
365. See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 2, at 717.
366. This entire debate can be translated into the terms of agency theory. A
very rough version of that translation might be expressed as follows: Opponents of
enterprise liability tend to believe that, with the assistance of market forces and ex
post analysis ofjudges and juries, the principals' (consumers') ability to monitor its
agents (manufacturers) minimizes agency costs (which comprise the aggregated
costs of monitoring, of bonding, and of residual disloyalty). Proponents of enter-
prise liability tend to believe that agency costs are minimized only when agents
are more completely bonded by the threat of liability for product caused injuries.
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According to agency theory, an agent (here, the manufacturer)
will, other things equal, tend to act more in accordance with the
interests of its principals (here, the consumers) if the agent is
bonded; that is, if the agent's own interests or profits depend in
part upon the interests of its principals.36 7 Thus, enterprise liabil-
ity will not only succeed in making manufacturers more loyal to
consumer interests, but it will allow consumers to be less con-
cerned about the risks of product designs simply because they un-
derstand that manufacturers must bear some of the costs that
would otherwise be borne only by injured consumers. Relatedly,
not only does enterprise liability encourage better risk informa-
tion, more effectively conveyed to consumers from manufacturers,
but it also enhances the credibility of that information in the eyes
of consumers.
Consumers may also place greater faith in manufacturer de-
sign decisions under enterprise liability because the system elimi-
nates harmful disincentives to adopting safety innovations that
manufacturers currently face under the fault-based regime. As
Judge Posner has noted, the market-size reduction effect of any
attempt to sell safety under the current regime can inhibit the
adoption of safer designs:
If advertising and marketing a safety improvement are thus
discouraged, the incentive to adopt such improvements is re-
duced. But make the producer liable for the consequence of a
hazardous product, and no question of advertising safety im-
provements to consumers will arise. He will adopt cost-justi-
fied precautions not to divert sales from competitors but to
minimize liability to injured consumers.368
Moreover, despite the apparent safe-harbor of the evidentiary
rule that excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures,3 69
manufacturers under current law seem quite concerned about the
possibility that consumers, regulators or jury members will view
product innovations as evidence that earlier designs were defec-
367. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305
(1976); Daniel Levinthal, A Survey of Agency Models of Organizations, 9 J. Econ.
Behav. & Org. 153 (1988).
368. Posner, supra note 220, at 211.
369. See Fed. R. Evid. 407.
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tive.3 70 Indeed, the impact of the hindsight bias on jury determi-
nations3 7 ' significantly compounds manufacturers' reluctance to
adopt a new safety precaution. The mere existence of such a pre-
caution will be viewed through the lens of the hindsight bias as
strong evidence that the prior design was inadequate and that the
manufacturer should have been aware of that inadequacy.
Enterprise liability eliminates all of those disincentives to
safety innovation because it imposes liability costs at every stage
of the design process. That is, manufacturers of a current design
have no reason to fear that adoption of a new design will suddenly
force them to internalize costs-they already must internalize costs
for the current design. Thus, manufacturers will adopt the new
design based not on whether marketing it may reduce overall de-
mand or on whether developing it will result in biased jury or regu-
latory determinations, but on whether it will cost-justifiably
reduce accident costs. Eliminating such harmful disincentives pro-
vides one more reason that consumers may have greater assurance
under enterprise liability that manufacturers are "bonded" to their
interests.
Despite those many reasons for greater consumer trust of
manufacturers under enterprise liability, Henderson and Rachlin-
ski remain skeptical. They argue that consumers' ability to rely
upon manufacturers will be undermined by the fact that tort law
provides imperfect compensation for personal injuries: "[Ilt would
not be rational for [consumers] to ignore their fears and rely on
370. See, e.g., MN Trial Exhibit 11,296 ("In attempting to develop a 'safe' ciga-
rette you are, by implication in danger of being interpreted as accepting that the
current product is 'unsafe' and this is not a position that I think we should take.").
371. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 572 (1998):
Consider, for example, the dilemma of a defendant who, despite taking
reasonable care, has caused an accident and has been sued. The defen-
dant's level of care will be reviewed by a judge or jury who already knows
that it proved inadequate to avoid the plaintiffs injury. Consequently,
the defendant's level of care will seem less reasonable in hindsight than it
did in foresight. Reasonableness must be determined from the perspec-
tive of the defendant at the time that the precautions were taken, but the
hindsight bias ensures that subsequent events will influence that deter-
mination. The law relies on a process that assigns liability in a biased
manner.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Jolls et al., supra note 276, at 1523; Russel B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rational-
ity Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051, 1098-99 (2000).
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manufacturers to make them whole if they are injured. Thus, [en-
terprise liability] would neither assuage consumer fears nor inhibit
manufacturers' ability to exploit those fears."372 In so arguing,
however, Henderson and Rachlinski have merely knocked down a
straw man. Our claim is not that enterprise liability will eliminate
all incentives for manufacturers to manipulate risk perceptions,
only that it will reduce those incentives more effectively than will
other products liability systems, including the current regime. 373
Moreover, we do not claim that tort compensation will be full and
complete. Incompleteness does not imply, however, that tort com-
pensation will have absolutely no effect on the way in which con-
sumers feel about those risks. Our point is simply that, to the
extent that compensation reduces the downside of any possible
harm, it will "assuage" (though not eliminate) "consumer fears"
and will "inhibit" (though not eliminate) "manufacturers' ability to
exploit those fears."
Finally, we must point out that the alleged problem of con-
sumer overestimation has been, at least prior to Henderson and
Rachlinski's argument, treated by most products liability scholars
as a problem that tort law is not designed to confront. As Professor
Mark Geistfeld put it in his survey of products liability theory for
the Encyclopedia of Law and Economics:
Imperfect information need not result in overly unsafe prod-
ucts. If consumers overestimate the way in which increased
safety investments reduce risk, they will attribute too great a
value to safety investments and demand more than the opti-
mal amount of safety. Although this outcome is inefficient, it
seems unwise to construct a regulatory regime, with its at-
tendant administrative costs, in order to reduce product
safety. Hence there is a pressing need to regulate market
transactions only if consumers undervalue safety
investments.374
372. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 250-51.
373. Where we have indicated that enterprise liability would fully address the
problem of overestimation, we have typically been assuming that all losses are
pecuniary and compensated through tort law (an assumption that we frequently
acknowledge is extreme). See, e.g., Hanson & Logue I, supra note 24, at 182, 188.
374. Mark Geistfeld, Products Liability, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics
5140 (1997); see also Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Pro-
posals for Products Liability Reform, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 803, 835-36 (1994) ("If con-
sumers overestimated the product's full price, then manufacturers would have an
incentive to provide consumers with accurate information about the product's true
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Several other prominent products liability scholars over the
past two decades have shared the view that products liability
should not be concerned with situations in which consumers over-
estimate the risks posed by products.3 75 It is at least somewhat
surprising, therefore, that Henderson and Rachlinski suddenly
view the problem as a fundamental roadblock to the institution of
enterprise liability.
In short, Henderson and Rachlinski's claim to have under-
mined the case for enterprise liability depends upon their view
that they identify a problem that we ignore. In fact, not only did
we not ignore the problem of consumer overestimation of risk, but
we also explained why enterprise liability provides a better solu-
tion to it than existing law. More important, regardless of whether
our argument is compelling, most courts and scholars have, implic-
itly or explicitly, treated the problem of consumer overestimation
of product risks as outside the range of relevant considerations in
the choice among liability rules. Even if there is traffic flowing
heavily in both directions, therefore, we think it is striking that
opponents of enterprise liability are only now acting as if the one
lane that has long been dismissed is critically important.
CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset,376 we had originally planned a much
different focus for this Article. Nevertheless, for a number of rea-
sons, we appreciate the opportunity provided by Henderson and
Rachlinski's thought-provoking and admirably concise critique.
full price. Consumers who found such information to be credible would reduce
their estimates of the product's full price, thereby increasing consumer demand
375. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 99
n.61 (1983) (arguing that if consumers overestimate product risks, manufacturers
would have an incentive to voluntarily provide full warranties for their products,
thereby achieving a result similar to enterprise liability); Steven Shavell, Strict
Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4 (1980) (arguing that manufactur-
ers have obvious incentives to correct consumer overestimation of product risks,
irrespective of tort law); W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 65 (1991)
(noting that "[ilf risks are highly publicized and are overestimated, there is no
need for additional intervention through tort liability"); Jennifer H. Arlen, Com-
pensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 Md. L. Rev. 1093, 1125 (1993) (con-
tending that "products with risks that consumers are likely to overestimate
significantly" should be "excluded from the [liability] system altogether").
376. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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The two articles that we published last year prompted reactions
from those who thought that we had gone too far in our view of
market manipulation and from those who thought that we had not
gone far enough. Henderson and Rachlinski's challenge is unique
among those reactions in that it seems to argue both positions si-
multaneously. On the one hand, the authors claim that we ignore
the many ways in which rational, sovereign consumers can under-
mine the efficiency of tort law if they are given insufficient incen-
tives to take care. 377 On the other hand, we also ignore the many
ways in which manipulative manufacturers can lead consumers to
overestimate product dangers and, indeed, snowball them into dis-
believing the most basic premise of enterprise liability.3 78 Hender-
son and Rachlinski's account seems to both accept and reject the
lessons of behavioralism and the possibility of market
manipulation.
The tension in those premises is understandable. As Hender-
son and Rachlinski note, 379 the current approach to "behavioral
law and economics" walks a fine line by attempting to salvage
some aspects of the standard legal economic model while disman-
tling others. We attempted in our earlier articles to walk that line
by focusing primarily on risk perception manipulation, arguing
that manufacturers almost invariably have incentives to lower con-
sumer perceptions of the risk of the manufacturers' product offer-
ings. In doing so, we put to one side the problem of preference
manipulation; that is, the efforts of consumer product manufactur-
ers to influence the very content of perceived consumer needs and
desires. That particular problem, which we view as far more philo-
sophically troubling than the problem of risk perception manipula-
tion, was to be a major focus of this Article.
Instead, however, we have focused on Henderson and Rachlin-
ski's various important critiques, hopefully sharpening our analy-
sis of the problem of risk perception manipulation and the case for
enterprise liability. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that Hender-
son and Rachlinski conclude their critique by pointing out the way
in which our story of market manipulation casts considerable
doubt on the assumption that expressed consumer preferences nec-
essarily represent a positive accrual of utils. As the authors note:
377. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 170-73.
379. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 257-58.
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If consumer preferences are completely constructed, then
what exactly is supposed to be the efficient level of consump-
tion? Should the socially optimal demand for soup be mea-
sured with the cans in alphabetical order, or not? On a rainy
day, or sunny? With what kind of music or ambient odors (if
any) in the background? In what section of the store? What
should the labels look like? How big are the cans?380
Those questions are admittedly troublesome for any economi-
cally oriented scholar, but our argument is not that enterprise lia-
bility would result in efficiency in the sense that every consumer
transaction would be guaranteed to be utility-maximizing (nor, by
the way, is it our argument that preferences are "completely con-
structed"). We have merely argued that the institution of enter-
prise liability would provide a far greater assurance than does
current law that manufacturers and consumers do not unduly dis-
count accident costs associated with the design, manufacture, mar-
keting, purchase and use of consumer products. Where we have
discussed the problem of preference manipulation, we have indi-
cated that no products liability system is designed to deal with
it.381 Products liability addresses the actual and perceived inci-
dence of product costs, particularly the costs of product-caused ac-
cidents. No products liability regime is designed to address
perceptions of product benefits.
In our view, many of Henderson and Rachlinski's examples
fall into this category of manipulation that lies beyond the purview
of products liability law, at least as it has been traditionally under-
stood. For instance, consider Henderson and Rachlinski's sug-
gested case of breakfast cereals. Manufacturers create fortified
breakfast cereals by spraying liquefied vitamins onto ordinary ce-
real. They then charge a price far higher per unit than the cost of
purchasing the ordinary cereal and the vitamins separately.38 2
Why, given such "outright deceptive" marketing, do consumers buy
the overpriced cereal? Perhaps because, as Henderson and Rach-
linski note,383 they have been convinced by advertisements that
the background risk of cancer is high and that the cereal is effec-
tive at lowering that risk. Perhaps also because consumers prefer
380. Id. at 258.
381. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1566-67.
382. See Steve Pratt, Super Flakes: These Days, a Corn Flake Contains More
than Just Corn, Chi. Trib., May 24, 1995, at 3.
383. See Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 245.
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the illusion that they are receiving their vitamins from some "nat-
ural" aspect of the cereal rather than an obviously man-made tab-
let. In either case, however, consumers have been led to purchase
an item that would draw sneers from a perfectly rational wealth-
maximizer. The remaining examples that Henderson and Rachlin-
ski provide of products that are designed to guard against some
external risk (whether or not emanating from another consumer
product) are also arguably designed to enhance the perceived util-
ity of the offered product and therefore cast doubt on the "effi-
ciency" of any resulting purchases. In our view, however, such
efforts are simply not the province of products liability law. Thus,
we find it puzzling that Henderson and Rachlinski offer the exam-
ples as evidence against enterprise liability-no one ever claimed
that enterprise liability would solve the problem of defining and
comparing "true" preferences.
In so arguing, however, we do not mean to suggest that legal
policymakers should ignore the problem of preference manipula-
tion altogether. To the contrary, in our view preference manipula-
tion is the driving force behind consumerism and a host of related
social and environmental problems and, as such, it is deserving of
regulatory attention.384 If adopted, enterprise liability would pro-
vide a starting point for such a project by affording greater assur-
ance that consumers make well-informed market purchases with
respect to product risks. We are under no illusion that enterprise
liability would sort out the philosophically nettlesome question of
whether "the socially optimal demand for soup [should) be mea-
sured with the cans in alphabetical order, or not."385 Nevertheless,
enterprise liability would at least diminish one source of doubt re-
garding the efficacy of consumer product purchases by forcing
prices to reflect accident costs and by providing manufacturers
with far greater incentives to educate consumers about product
risks and appropriate use behaviors. 386 Moreover, as noted in our
384. See Douglas A. Kysar, Ecological Economics: A Macroeconomics for Legal
Analysis? (August 15, 2000) (working title) (manuscript on file with authors).
385. Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 258.
386. Henderson and Rachlinski attempt to undermine that argument by re-
minding us that the notion of risk itself is socially constructed, such that no inde-
pendent yardstick exists against which to measure a product's risk and calculate
an appropriate cost factor. They write, "The slight risk of death from skiing cre-
ates part of the sport's pleasure whereas the slight risk of death from exposure to a
nearby hazardous waste dump creates a massive uproar." Id. Of course, their ob-
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earlier articles,38 7 enterprise liability would make the accomplish-
ment of preference manipulation more difficult than any other
products liability regime because it would, in essence, raise the bar
which manufacturers must clear in order to manipulate prefer-
ences. By internalizing the accident costs caused by a product, en-
terprise liability would force manufacturers to overcome a higher
perceived price of their products when influencing consumer per-
ceptions of product benefits.
One might also consider policy measures outside of products
liability in order to help combat the problem of preference manipu-
lation. For instance, one could eliminate the corporate income tax
deduction for advertising expenses.388 That sand-in-the-wheels
approach would reduce the sheer volume of advertising that oc-
curs. Given that consumerism depends at least partially on the
servation is correct, but such disparities in behavior are attributable to differing
perceptions of qualitative aspects of the risky activity, such as its perceived volun-
tariness and naturalness, and not necessarily to differing perceptions of the objec-
tive probability of the risk. We scarcely raise an eyebrow at ski resorts because we
believe that people are aware of the riskiness of their activity and have made a
voluntary choice to endure it in order to individually experience the benefits of a
thrilling encounter with nature. We pitch a "massive uproar" over hazardous
waste dumps because we believe that residents of targeted sites are being forced
against their will to suffer a risk of a human-made harm in order to create a bene-
fit that will only infinitesimally accrue to them. Some orthodox economists like to
think that low-income homeowners settle next to toxic waste dumps for the same
reason that wealthy thrillseekers vacation in Aspen. They believe that everything
can be reduced to a common currency involving dollars and life expectancy and
that, in the end, nothing beyond those two measures really matters. Others of us,
however, suspect that other factors-economic, social and psychological-are at play.
Again, enterprise liability is not intended to unravel such profound philosophi-
cal puzzles. All that the system will do is ensure that the expected accident costs
of a consumer product-however imperfectly measured-are incorporated into the
cost calculus of manufacturers and consumers. As we have noted several times in
this Article, monetary tort awards provide imperfect compensation for physical in-
jury. Likewise, actuarial risk information provides an imperfect predictor of how
consumers will react to a given risk, in light of the fact that qualitative and contex-
tual aspects of the risk matter to consumers in determining their reaction. Thus,
enterprise liability will not necessarily guarantee a "natural and appropriate risk-
benefit assessment." Id. It will, however, provide a far greater assurance of know-
ing and voluntary consumer assumption of product risks than current law.
387. See Hanson & Kysar II, supra note 2, at 1566-67.
388. See Hanson & Kysar III, supra note 2; Juliet Schor, The Overspent Ameri-
can: Upscaling, Downshifting, and the New Consumer 165 (1998).
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omnipresence of commercial messages,38 9 limiting the incidence of
advertising might aid in overcoming corporate construction of pref-
erences. A more refined approach might be to eliminate the tax
deduction only for advertising expenses covering national cam-
paigns, as such campaigns tend to involve lifestyle marketing and
other potentially manipulative techniques, as opposed to advertis-
ing on the local level, which focuses more on providing information.
Additionally, one could institute an advertising tax, the reve-
nues of which would be used to fund counter-advertising and other
educational efforts designed to instill values that are not repre-
sented in commercial advertising.390 Given that preferences
clearly are subject to construction, the government can (and
should) participate in the competition to create, manage, and ex-
ploit preferences among its citizens. Finally, and perhaps most
radically, one could begin to think about a more advanced and in-
formative system of disclosure than any currently practiced efforts.
Legal scholars have recently begun proposing innovative ways of
utilizing technological advances for the promotion of better in-
formed, more efficient markets.3 91 To that list one could add the
institution of a centralized database containing detailed informa-
tion on corporate social and environmental responsibility records.
Consumers could instantly access the database using a wireless
handheld device and related technology which are already com-
mercially available. The fact that unique UPC scanner codes are
already present on the great majority of consumer products would
make institution of this system all the more possible.
Those suggestions are obviously incomplete and speculative
thoughts on a topic that deserves far deeper treatment than we can
provide in this Article. Nevertheless, we feel it is important to
take those first faltering steps because, unlike Henderson and
Rachlinski, others who have commented on our first two articles
felt that even the "radical" solution of enterprise liability would
389. See generally Bradley A. Harsch, Consumerism and Environmental Policy:
Moving Past Consumer Culture, 26 Ecology L.Q. 543, 557-72 (1999) (providing a
review of sociological and anthropological understandings of consumerism).
390. See id. at 608-10.
391. See, e.g., Hanson & Logue II, supra note 24, at 1293-95 (describing the
potential use of an electronic card to track individual cigarette consumption);
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
Stan. L. Rev. 683, 755-57 (1999) (suggesting the creation of web site devoted to
compiling and making available important health and risk information).
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provide an incomplete defense against the problem of market ma-
nipulation. We agree and look forward to returning to the topic.
